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This thesis contributes to the energy literature by leveraging insights from empirical and 
experimental economics. The thesis presents four papers with a common goal of understanding 
specific themes in the energy sector namely: households energy use patterns, behavioural 
preferences among entrepreneurs operating energy businesses and applications of behavioural 
nudges to reduce energy use. 
The first paper set the tone for the two subsequent chapters. The paper: ‘Energy Choices and 
Tenancy in Rwanda’ examines the energy choice patterns of households based on their rental 
status and dwelling types. The fifth Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV5) 
conducted over one year, October 2016 to October 2017, together with a bivariate probit model is 
used. A heterogeneous analysis focused on gender and income differentiated impacts, as well as 
geographical differences based on the tenancy status of households, is further examined. The 
results signal that households energy choices in Rwanda differ by rental and dwelling types. 
The second and third papers ascertain the role of competition and risk preferences among 
entrepreneurs working in off-grid renewable energy microenterprises and its effects on business 
success in the context of including more women as entrepreneurs in the energy sector. Specifically, 
the second paper: ‘Competition and Gender in the Lab vs Field: Experiments with Off-Grid 
Renewable Energy Entrepreneurs in Rural Rwanda’ examines the gender differences in 
competitiveness and how this affects the business success of entrepreneurs operating renewable 
energy enterprises. Results from the economic experiments are compared to the day to day 
activities of the business. Findings show that female entrepreneurs are not less likely to compete 
and are not outperformed by male entrepreneurs. This stands in contrast to several studies, mostly 
conducted on university students of developed countries.  
The third paper: ‘Risk attitudes, Gender and Business Performance Among off-grid 
Renewable Energy Entrepreneurs in Rural Rwanda’ in a similar context examines the risk 
attitudes among entrepreneurs and its effect on the performance from a gender perspective. The 
study adopts a choice list experimental approach to elicit risk attitudes. The results indicate a strong 
risk aversion among entrepreneurs. The risk aversion found is higher for women compared to men. 
Entrepreneurs with high risk-taking abilities also tend to record better performance levels. The 
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paper concludes that policies geared towards hedging against risk aversion in entrepreneurial 
programs may be vital in reducing gender gaps in business performance. 
The fourth paper: ‘The power of nudging: Using feedback, competition and responsibility 
assignment to save electricity in a non-residential setting’ answers the question ‘can 
behavioural interventions achieve energy savings in non-residential settings where users do not 
face the financial consequences of their behaviour?’ The paper relies on a randomized control trial 
and two behavioural interventions. Results show that behavioural nudges can be useful in reducing 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The commitment and investment efforts by developmental agencies and governments to achieve 
energy access for all is remarkable yet; energy poverty remains a challenge. Globally, 860 million 
people are without electricity, and over 2.6 billion people do not have access to clean cooking 
energy (IEA,2019a). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) alone has close to 600 million people living 
without electricity, and over 900 million people are without clean cooking energy (IEA, 2019a). 
Most households in the region are heavily reliant on fuelwood, crop residue, kerosene and 
charcoal. The utilization of such biomass fuels has adverse effects on health, forest, ecosystem, 
climate and the overall wellbeing of households (Chomert-Nkolo, Motel & Le Roux, 2019; Bos, 
Chaplin & Mamun 2018; Bonan, Pareglio & Tavoni, 2017; Köhlin et al., 2015; Heltberg, Arndt & 
Sekhar, 2000). 
Amidst the global energy deficit, demand for energy continues to rise. It is projected that by 2050, 
the global energy demand will double due to rapid population growth and harsh climatic conditions 
(Whitesides & Crabtree, 2007; Lewis & Nocera, 2006). This presents significant challenges for 
climate change mitigation as fossil fuels continue to dominate the energy mix, providing over 80% 
of the total energy consumed (Yoon, Sun & Rogers, 2010).  
The population growth of Africa is among the fastest in the world, making it more difficult for the 
continent to catch up with energy demands despite efforts by policymakers to provide energy 
access for all. According to Africa’s outlook report by IEA (2019b), the continent in the case of 
electricity will need to triple the yearly number of people gaining access to meet the 100% 
electricity target for its citizenry.  
One of the many solutions has been to promote the expansion and development of the continent’s 
renewable energy resources. Africa’s renewable energy sector is currently booming as several 
governments are working towards increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix. This 
climate-friendly alternative serves as a cleaner energy option in the quest to provide energy access 
to the poorest of the poor who are usually women and children. 
The central role women play in the energy system cannot also be underestimated. Access to cleaner 
lighting and cooking energy can increase their participation in development. However, in recent 
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times, studies have shown that providing modern energy sources alone is not enough to achieve 
the desired empowerment levels and economic freedom for women. Women’s journey towards 
better welfare opportunities and livelihoods could be fast-tracked if they are well represented at all 
levels of the energy supply chain (Baruah, 2017; 2015). Entrepreneurship has since been used as 
a breakthrough point for women in the sector (Clancy et al., 2012; Clancy, Oparaocha & Roehr, 
2004). This has resulted in projects targeted at female entrepreneurship. Typical examples are the 
Solar Sisters initiative, Women Integration into Renewable Energy (WIRE) and Women’s 
Entrepreneurship in Renewables (wPOWER) under the Energy4Impact initiative. This goes to 
suggest that the challenges faced in the energy sector are complex, intertwined and multifaceted. 
Against this background, this thesis uses survey and experimental approaches to address some of 
the complexities in the energy sector. The thesis examines the energy use patterns of households 
and the application of behavioural techniques to promote energy conservation and empowerment 
of women which provides insights on critical challenges facing the energy sector. Specifically, the 
four papers in the thesis will consider (i) households energy choices based on tenancy status ; (ii) 
the role of competitiveness and risk-taking and its effects on the successfulness of energy 
businesses from the perspective of including more women in the energy sector and (iii) the 
effectiveness of behavioural nudges in promoting energy conservation in a non-residential sector. 
While the first paper relies on an empirical approach, the other three papers in the thesis use 
experimental methods. In the subsequent subsections, a more detailed discussion of the four papers 
is provided. 
 
1. Energy Choices and Tenancy in Rwanda 
Rwanda over the last decade has embarked on several developmental initiatives in the energy 
sector with the primary objective of increasing electricity access to all by the year 2024 while 
reducing the usage of biomass fuels. Efforts to increase electricity supply to households and firms 
through multi projects such as the Nyabarongo hydropower and methane gas are on the rise. The 
latest update from the Rwanda Energy Group shows that as of December 2019, 52.2% of 
households had electricity access with a national grid connection share of 38.2% and an off-grid 
connection share of 14%. Despite the progress and continuous commitment of the government of 
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Rwanda, households are heavily dependent on bio-energy products. The country energy-use 
statistics show that of the 91% of total energy consumed by households, 85% depend on biomass 
energy with fuelwood dominating the cooking energy mix. Another primary energy policy in 
Rwanda is the objective to expand the usage of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) although the 
current adoption rate of LPG is still low. 
The country also has one of the unique house ownership patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa, with over 
60% of households currently living in centralized settlements. This paper ascertains the effect of 
Rwanda’s house ownership patterns and rental status on energy choices by examining the role of 
tenancy status (rented or owner occupant) and dwelling types (private or compound dwelling) on 
households lighting and cooking energy choices. Using a bivariate probit model and the fifth 
Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey data of Rwanda conducted over one year, October 
2016 to October 2017, results show that rental status and dwelling types have varying effects on 
cooking and lighting fuel choices. 
Renters and compound house residents compared to homeowners and private unit residents are 
more likely to adopt electricity and “other” sources of lighting energy but are less likely to use oil 
lamps and torches. They are also more likely to choose charcoal but tend to use less fuelwood for 
cooking.  A heterogeneous analysis further shows that renters in higher-income quartiles, who are 
female household heads and living in urban communities are more likely to adopt relatively better 
cooking and lighting fuels compared to homeowners. Rwanda’s unique geographical distribution 
of homeowners which emanates from the country’s rural resettlement policy is an explanatory 
factor for these results. 
 
2. Competition and Gender in the Lab vs Field: Experiments with Off-Grid Renewable 
Energy Entrepreneurs in Rural Rwanda 
The renewable sector of Rwanda is booming as the government of Rwanda is determined to 
promote private sector involvement, in its quest to accelerate rural electrification to off-grid 
communities in order to provide 100% energy access to its citizenry. However, women’s 
participation in the private energy sector of Rwanda is low, as no gender policies are governing 
the private energy sector (Parshotam & van der Westhuizen, 2018). Though entrepreneurship is a 
vital tool for promoting women’s empowerment, it is essential to note that a predominant 
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characteristic associated with successful entrepreneurship is the ability to compete (Shane, Locke 
& Collins, 2003). A deliberate attempt to empower women in the renewable energy industry 
through entrepreneurship initiatives may have limited potential if due consideration is not given to 
women’s competitiveness and performance abilities. 
To date, very little is known about the competitive and performance capabilities of women working 
as sales point entrepreneurs in the renewable energy sector.  This paper contributes to the global 
discussion on women’s competitive decisions and performance levels by using lab-in-the-field 
experiments to examine how gender attitudes towards competition differ amongst village-level 
entrepreneurs (VLEs) in Rwanda. The study also demonstrates how performance under 
competitive situations in the lab reflects microenterprise operations in the field by using a unique 
dataset from off-grid microenterprises managed by entrepreneurs already working in mixed and 
single-sex teams since 2016. The study measures willingness to compete and performance under 
competition using the standard experimental design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) for a 
sample of 374 entrepreneurs from off-grid microenterprises. Subsequently, field outcomes – sales 
and self-reported incomes from microenterprise operations – are used to measure the field 
performances of gender teams. 
The study finds that female entrepreneurs are not less likely to compete and are not outperformed 
by male entrepreneurs. This stands in contrast to several studies, mostly conducted on university 
students of developed countries. Furthermore, the study leverages administrative and self-reported 
business data to show that the female entrepreneurs who chose to compete in the lab perform as 
well as their male counterparts, providing some external validity to the lab results. 
3. Risk attitudes, Gender and Business Performance Among off-grid Renewable Energy 
Entrepreneurs in Rural Rwanda 
Theory predicts that entrepreneurs’ ability to take risks positively affect business success. Yet, 
empirical findings are mixed, with no available experimental evidence. This paper fills the gap by 
conducting a lab-in-the-field experiment among 374 entrepreneurs operating off-grid renewable 
energy recharge stations in assigned gender teams, to examine risk attitudes among entrepreneurs 
and the effect of risk aversion on business performance in rural Rwanda from the perspective of 
including more women as entrepreneurs in the energy sector. 
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The study relies on both subjective and experimental measures of risk. Experimentally, the 
multiple price list design,  following notable studies such as Booth et al. (2018), Tanaka, Camerer 
and Nguyen (2016), Brick and Visser (2015), Brick, Visser and Burns (2012) and Holt and Laury 
(2002)  is used to elicit entrepreneurs risk attitudes. Survey risk measures were based on 
entrepreneurs self-reported ability to take risks on a scale of 1 (never take risks) to 5 (always take 
risks). Following the Willebrands et al. (2012) and Daniel and Mead (1998), the study employs 
sales levels as a measure for business performance. 
 Findings show a strong risk aversion among entrepreneurs. Results also reveal a negative 
relationship between risk aversion and business performance. Thus, entrepreneurs with high risk-
taking abilities tend to record better sales. Contrary to experimental results, we find no significant 
relationship between risk attitudes and business performance for subjective risk measures. Women 
reveal higher risk aversion levels than men for both experimental and survey risk measures. 
Despite the gender differences in risk aversion, findings seems to suggest that women are not 
outperform by men. The findings raise important insights female participation in the private energy 
sector of Rwanda. Given the many benefits associated with the inclusion of more women in the 
energy sector, policies geared towards hedging against risk aversion in entrepreneurial programs 
can be vital in reducing gender gaps in business success. 
4. The power of nudging: Using feedback, competition and responsibility assignment to 
save electricity in a non-residential setting 
This paper addresses the question ‘Can behavioural interventions achieve energy savings in non-
residential settings where users do not face the financial consequences of their behaviour?’ 
Using a high-frequency data based on 30 minutes interval, the paper addresses this question by 
leveraging social comparison and responsibility assignment aimed at reducing electricity 
consumption in a large provincial government office building with 24 floors, a total of 1008 
occupants.  The study relies on a randomized control trial with two treatments arms and a control 
group. Both treatment groups received regular emails encouraging recipients to turn off appliances 
and lights before leaving the office, as well as weekly ranked energy consumption results by floors. 
Additionally, weekly “energy advocates” were assigned to each floor in treatment group two. 
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 Findings show that floors that participated only in the inter-floor competitions reduced energy 
consumption by 9%, while those additionally assigned floor-wise “energy advocates” reduced 
energy consumption by 14%. A further investigation of the sustainability of the results shows that, 
although the intervention effect observed in the first month of the post-intervention period 
attenuates monthly, by the fifth month, these initial declines in the intervention effect completely 
dies out. The five months intervention period reductions reveal that financial consequences are not 
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Chapter 2: Energy Choices and Tenancy in Rwanda 
    
Rebecca A. Klege 
 
Abstract 
Rwanda has one of the unique house ownership patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper 
ascertains the effect of Rwanda’s house ownership patterns and rental status on energy choices by 
examining the role of tenancy status (rented or owner occupant) and dwelling types (private or 
compound dwelling) on households lighting and cooking energy choices. Using a bivariate probit 
model and the fifth Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey data of Rwanda, we find that 
rental status and dwelling types have varying effects on cooking and lighting fuel choices. An 
analysis of impact of  heterogeneity using income quartiles, gender and rural-urban differences 
reveals that renters in higher-income quartiles, who are female household heads and living in urban 
communities are more likely to adopt relatively better cooking and lighting fuels compared to 
homeowners. Rwanda’s unique geographical distribution of homeowners which emanates from 
the country’s rural resettlement policy is an explanatory factor for our results. The study only partly 
supports the energy ladder hypothesis which suggests how evidence does not always provide 
conclusive support of the energy ladder. Other factors such as rental agreements and the ability for 
renters to choose better housing conditions are discussed in the paper.  
 













The commitment and investment efforts by developmental agencies and governments to achieve 
energy access for all is remarkable yet; energy poverty remains a challenge. Globally, 860 million 
people are without electricity, and over 2.6 billion people do not have access to clean cooking 
energy (IEA,2019). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) alone has close to 600 million people living without 
electricity, and over 900 million people are without clean cooking energy (IEA, 2019). Most 
households in the region are heavily reliant on fuelwood, crop residue, kerosene and charcoal. The 
utilization of such biomass fuels has adverse effects on health, forest, ecosystem, climate and the 
overall wellbeing of households (Chomert-Nkolo, Motel & Le Roux, 2019; Bos, Chaplin & 
Mamun 2018; Bonan, Pareglio & Tavoni, 2017; Köhlin et al., 2015; Heltberg, Arndt & Sekhar, 
2000). 
The energy landscape of Rwanda is not any different from the SSA region.  Rwanda over the last 
decade has embarked on several developmental initiatives in the energy sector with the primary 
objective of increasing electricity access to all by the year 2024 while reducing the usage of 
biomass fuels. Efforts to increase electricity supply to households and firms through multi projects 
such as the Nyabarongo hydropower and methane gas are on the rise. The latest update from the 
Rwanda Energy Group shows that as of December 2019, 52.2% of households had electricity 
access with a national grid connection share of 38.2% and an off-grid connection share of 14%. 
Despite the progress and continuous commitment of the government of Rwanda, households are 
heavily dependent on bio-energy products. The country energy-use statistics show that of the 91% 
of total energy consumed by households, 85% depend on biomass energy with fuelwood 
dominating the cooking energy mix. Another major energy policy in Rwanda is the objective to 
expand the usage of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) although the current adoption rate of LPG is 
still low. 
Existing literature identifies income, education, gender, age, household size, location, prices, 
preferences, culture and dwelling characteristics as important factors influencing household 
cooking and lighting choices in developing countries (see review by Muller & Yan, 2016). 
Tenancy status and dwelling types arguably also affect household energy investments (Baiyegunhi 
& Hassan 2014; Lay, Ondraczek & Stoever, 2013; Arthur et al., 2010). Martey (2019) show that 
households’ ability to own a house or rent, live in a private or compound residential unit have 
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varied effects on energy-use decisions. The tendency to free ride is also likely when housing units 
are shared with landlords (Kholodilin, Mense & Michelsen, 2017; Gillingham, Harding & Rapson, 
2012; Myers, 2015; Maruejols & Young, 2011).  Although prior studies such as Baiyegunhi and 
Hassan (2014), Lay et al., (2013) and Arthur et al., (2010)  suggest that homeowners compared to 
tenants, tend to shift towards cleaner energy, until the recent study conducted in Ghana by Martey 
(2019), research focused on exploring the differential impacts of housing ownership and dwelling 
status on energy choices in a developing country context was non-existent. 
This paper contributes to this grey research area by examining the role of tenancy (owned or 
rented) and dwelling status (private or compound habitat) on households’ cooking and lighting 
energy choices in Rwanda. Our study compared to Martey (2019) is distinct in three ways. First, 
the study is conducted in Rwanda. Rwanda, unlike other SSA countries, has a unique housing and 
ownership distribution pattern. After the blurred history of the country, the government of Rwanda 
launched a resettlement campaign to relocate dispersed habitat to a more centralized location with 
the primary objective of providing better basic amenities to rural communities. This campaign 
which later became known as the rural settlement policy, increased the number of homeowners in 
the country with over 60% of households currently living in such centralized settlements. The 
policy ensures that relocated households receive free building materials, and the cost of 
construction is mitigated through the country’s compulsory community participation law - 
Umuganda. Consequently, homeownership in Rwanda is not necessarily associated with high 
socioeconomic status, which is mostly the case for other African countries.  The unique housing 
characteristics and ownership pattern of Rwanda enable the study to distinctively contribute to the 
household energy use literature by examining the relationship between housing characteristics and 
energy choices. 
Secondly, cooking energy is grouped into three categories: fuelwood, charcoal and other sources, 
unlike the four categories: LPG, charcoal, fuelwood and other sources used in Martey (2019). The 
categorization is informed by the number of households using a specific fuel type. For instance, 
only 1% of households utilizes LPG in Rwanda compared to the 23.6% LPG adoption rates in 
Ghana reported in 2015 (Mensah & Adu,2015). We argue that the effects of tenancy and dwelling 
types on fuel choices may yield varied results in Rwanda. Finally, the study, unlike Martey (2019) 
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additionally examines the disaggregated effect of tenancy and dwelling types based on household 
heads gender and geographical location to explore the heterogeneity potential of our results. 
The study relies on the most recent household national survey conducted by the Rwandan National 
Institute of Statistics to achieve its objective. We disaggregate lighting energy into five categories: 
electricity, oil lamp or lanterns, solar, battery-powered torches and other energy sources. Cooking 
energy, on the other hand, is categorized into three groups, namely: fuelwood, charcoal and “other” 
fuel types. The empirical strategy first relies on the probit estimation technique. However, arguable 
factors such as unobserved preferences and welfare characteristics may correlate with both tenure 
status and energy choices. We, therefore, employ the bivariate probit model to attenuate potential 
endogeneity biases associated with univariate discrete choice models (Heckman, 1978). The study 
further analyses the heterogeneity in household energy choices using income, the gender of 
household heads and the geographical location of households by tenure status and dwelling type. 
Following Martey (2019), we disaggregated households into welfare quartiles, and the effect of 
tenancy status on energy choices (cooking and lighting) are distinctly examined for each quartile. 
Additionally, we estimate the effect of tenure status for female and male-headed households and 
rural and urban households separately. 
Findings after accounting for endogeneity reveal that households who were renting compared to 
homeowners are 9% and 5% more likely to use electricity and “other” lighting sources, but 3% 
and 10% tend to use less of oil lamps and torches respectively. Households living in compound 
houses compared to private unit residents tend to adopt electricity for lighting (4%) yet, they are 
less likely to choose torches and “other” lighting sources (7% and 3% respectively). For cooking 
energy, renters compared to homeowners are 11% less likely to adopt fuelwood. Renters also tend 
to adopt charcoal and “other” cooking sources with a probability of 8% and 3% respectively. 
Similarly, compound dwellers are less likely than private unit residents to adopt fuelwood but tend 
to use charcoal. 
Further, when households are sub-divided into income quartiles results show that as income 
increases, renters and homeowners are likely to increase their consumption of electricity and solar 
technologies but tend to use less oil lamps, torches and “other” lighting sources. Compound and 
private unit residents are also likely to use more electricity but use less oil lamps, torches and other 
forms of lighting energy as household’s income increases. We observe an inverted U-shape 
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relationship between income and fuelwood. A U-shape relationship is also found between charcoal 
use and income. 
Female household heads living in rented houses are more likely to use electricity than households 
headed by males. The magnitude of cooking energy choices also differs among female and male-
headed households. For female-headed households, renters are 10% more likely to adopt charcoal 
and 12% less likely to choose fuelwood compared to owners, unlike male-headed households who 
show a 7% likelihood of utilizing charcoal and a 9% less likelihood of using fuelwood. Renters in 
rural and urban households compared to owners tend to use less fuelwood but more likely to adopt 
charcoal as their source of cooking energy. The magnitude of the low usage of fuelwood is higher 
for rural households than for urban households. Although findings from Martey (2019) strongly 
supports the energy ladder hypothesis, our study only partly support this hypothesis. This highlight 
how evidence does not always provide conclusive support of the energy ladder and how different 
contexts could yield varied results. 
The rest of the paper progress as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical and empirical 
literature underpinning household energy choices. Section 3 outlines the descriptive statistics and 
data for the study. The empirical model is presented in section 4. In section 5, we present the results 
and discussion of the study. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical literature 
Conceptually, the study relies on the theory of consumer choice to develop a framework showing 
the possible relationship between homeownership status or dwelling type and household energy 
choices. Households are usually faced with expenditure decisions subject to a budget constraint 
(income). As depicted in Figure 1, a typical household will allocate their resources between food 
expenditure and non-food expenditure which includes energy use expenditures. Focusing on 
energy use, key demographic factors such as age, household size, education, household’s location 
may determine the choice of fuel and amount spent on energy. Such a relationship is well 
documented in the energy literature (see Rahut et al., 2017; Alem et al., 2016; Rahut et al., 2014; 
Mensah & Adu, 2015; Baiyegunhi & Hassan, 2014). 
An important characteristic that is usually not mentioned is the role of rental status or the type of 
dwelling. Owning or renting a house is likely to affect energy use in the following ways. First, 
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home ownership requires fixed investment which implies higher level expenditure when building. 
As a result, homeowners who are in the process of completing their building especially in sub-
Saharan Africa tend to devote less capital towards cleaner energy. Further, homeowners are likely 
to lean towards space intensive fuels at the initial stages before considering better energy sources 
when the capital investment of owning a home lessens. Renters on the other hand are likely to be 
limited by space and tend to opt for less space-intensive fuels when considering expenditure 
allocation. Further, the location of homeowners and renters could impact the energy choices of 
household. For instance, in the case of Rwanda, renters are more abundant in urban areas like 
Kigali where existing infrastructure can support access to cleaner fuels. The structure of houses 
can equally impact the choice of fuel. As such, in compound houses where two or more households 
share the same electricity metering system, which is usually inconvenient, households are likely 











Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
The energy ladder hypothesis is also one of the early theories underlying household energy 
choices. The model assumes that with increasing income, households completely switch from 
inefficient fuels to more sophisticated and cleaner energy options (Hosier & Dowd, 1987). 
Climbing up the ladder is assumed to occur from one stage to the other depending on the physical 
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characteristics of fuels, efficiency, cleanliness, and cooking time required. As a result, a move up 
the ladder implies a complete halt in the usage of previous energy sources (Hiemstra-vanderHorst 
& Hovorka,2008; Heltberg 2005). Households at the first stage steadily shift from traditional fuels 
(fuelwood) to transition energy sources (charcoal and kerosene) and finally to modern fuels (LPG, 
and electricity) as their socio-economic status rises.   
A growing body of literature in recent decades have challenged the accuracy of the energy ladder 
hypothesis resulting in the conceptualization of the fuel-stacking hypotheses (Ruiz-Mercado & 
Masera, 2015; Heltberg, 2004; Masera, Saatkamp, & Kammen, 2000). According to the proponent 
of this concept, energy transition does not occur in an orderly manner as households from low- 
and middle-income countries often use multiple sources of fuels and do not linearly move to better 
fuels.  Thus, with increases in income, cleaner energy sources do not necessarily replace traditional 
fuels as perfect substitutes.  
Over the years, empirical evidence from low- and middle-income countries have been focused on 
factors influencing fuel choices and thereby contributing to the debate on the income-fuel choice 
relationship. Choumert Nkolo et al. (2019) identified factors influencing energy choices in 
Tanzania. The results of their study show that income is a significant determinant of household 
choices with results supporting the fuel-stacking concept. Their analysis of intrahousehold 
bargaining power shows that spouse education significantly informs decisions to shift to modern 
fuels. Other studies conducted in Ethiopia, Malawi, Bhutan, Nigeria and  Ghana also show that 
age, education, gender of household heads,  electricity access, location, prices and type of dwelling 
unit influences households choice of cleaner fuels (Rahut et al., 2017; Alem et al., 2016; Rahut et 
al., 2014; Mensah & Adu, 2015; Baiyegunhi  & Hassan, 2014). 
To date, existing studies on the relationship between tenancy and dwelling types on household fuel 
choices are limited. Martey (2019) recently stepped in by examining this topic for the Ghanaian 
economy. The study shows that renters compared to homeowners tend to use fuelwood, crop 
residue and candles as their lighting sources but depend on LPG, charcoal and “other” fuels for 
cooking. We extend the literature on tenancy and energy choices in the context of Rwanda – a 





3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Rwandan National Survey 
The study relies on the fifth Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV 5) from 
Rwanda. The EICV 5 is a nationally representative dataset conducted over one year from October 
2016 to October 2017 by the Rwandan National Institute of Statistics. A multi-stage stratified 
sampling technique is used to sample 14,580 households across the five provinces of Rwanda 
based on the 2012 census frame. The initial stage sampled 1,260 villages. These villages were 
subdivided into urban and rural sampling areas. This provides the study with a sample of 2, 526 
urban households. Rural households were 12,054 of the total sample. 
The data offers a range of indicators such as poverty, inequality, employment, migration, living 
conditions, education, health, agriculture, energy use, water and sanitation at the individual, 
household and community levels (NISR,2018). The study makes use of the personal, housing, 
income and expenditure sections of the EICV 5 data which provides information on household 
demographics, economic and geographical variables as well as household cooking and lighting 
fuels, type of dwelling and tenancy status (owned or rented). However, EICV 5 does not allow for 
multiple fuel use (fuel stacking) analysis as information on energy use is limited to only 
households’ primary cooking and lighting fuels types.  
3.2 Construction and household patterns of energy use 
Cooking energy is categorized into three main groups: fuelwood, charcoal and other fuel types. 
The reported number of households per each fuel type informed our choice of categories. The use 
of modern energy cooking fuels example, LPG and electricity in Rwanda compared to other SSA 
countries is on the low side. Most households heavily rely on biomass energy to meet their cooking 
energy needs.  EICV 5 shows that only 386 households use “other” forms of cooking in Rwanda, 
including LPG and electricity. We show the distribution of the “other fuel” category in Table A1 
of Appendix A. Lighting fuels, on the other hand, are categorized into five main groups: electricity, 
oil lamp or lanterns, solar, battery-powered torches and “others”.  
Table 1 presents cooking energy choice patterns based on households’ tenancy status (owned or 
rented) and dwelling type (private or compound). For clarity purposes, a private dwelling type in 
this study refer to a single house or group of dwellings occupied by one household. A compound 
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house on the other hand refers to a single house or group of dwelling occupied by multiple 
households with shared amenities. 
From Table 1, fuelwood remains the most used cooking energy type with 82.59% share of total 
cooking energy despite the effort by the government to promote other cleaner cooking fuels such 
as LPG use in Rwanda. Comparing homeowners to renters, 91.29% of homeowners prefer 
fuelwood, 7.35% prefers charcoal, whereas only 1.36% prefer to use “other” cooking energy types. 
On the other hand, 50.34% of renters use fuelwood, while 42.32% and 7.44% uses charcoal and 
“other” fuel types respectively. 
For dwelling type, 87.7% of private unit residents use fuelwood, 10.26% use charcoal and the 
remaining 2% use “other” fuel sources.  On the other hand, compound house dwellers prefer 
cooking with charcoal (63,28%) with only 9.93% using “other” forms of fuel types.  Also, 10.26% 
and 1.97% of households living in private residential units use charcoal and “other” fuels, 
respectively. 
Table 1: Distribution of Cooking Energy Choices by tenancy and residency type (in %) 
 
Tenancy Status 
Cooking Energy types 
Fuelwood Charcoal Other fuel 
Owned 91.29 7.35 1.36 
Rented 50.24 42.32 7.44 
Dwelling Type Fuelwood Charcoal Other fuel 
Private housing 87.77 10.26 1.97 
Compound housing 26.80 63.28 9.93 
All 82.59 14.77 2.65 
Sample 12,041  2,153  386  
Source: Authors’ calculations using Rwandan EICV 5 (2016–2017) data. Values are in percentages 
 
Table 2 reports the lighting energy use pattern by tenancy status and dwelling type. Most 
homeowners (56.90%) use torches which are powered by batteries. This is not surprising in the 
context of Rwanda, as most homeowners live in rural areas where electricity access is either limited 
or unavailable. About 18% of house owners rely on electricity with 10% using “other” types of 
lighting fuels, and a fraction (9% and 5%) depend on solar and oil lamps respectively. Compared 
to house owners, renters primary lighting energy source is electricity (49%), followed by torch 
users (34%). Only 2% and 3% of renters depend on solar and oil lamps respectively, with the 
remaining 12% relying on other sources of lighting energy. 
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Lighting Energy Sources   
Electricity Oil lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
Owned 18.37 5.59 9.02 56.90 10.12 
Rented 48.82 3.17 1.94 34.16 11.91 
Dwelling Type Electricity Oil lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
Private housing 20.30 5.34 8.11 55.60 10.66 
Compound 
housing 
73.61 2.26 1.13 14.21 8.80 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Rwandan EICV 5 (2016–2017) data. Values are in 
percentages 
 
A high proportion of private home dwellers (56%) are torch lights users. About 20% use electricity 
as their primary source of lighting. Solar and lamp users are 8% and 5% respectively, with about 
10% using other lighting sources. However, most compound house dwellers (73%) rely mainly on 
electricity. Torch users living in compound units are 14% with about 8% using “other” lighting 
sources. Only 2% and 1% of compound unit dwellers use oil lamps and solar respectively. 
Table 3 presents differences in means for cooking and lighting fuels by the ownership and renting 
status of households as well as the type of dwelling units. We find significant differences for 
households dwelling types and tenancy status. Thus, households fuel choices differ based on the 
dwelling type or tenancy status of households. The result first reveals that renters frequently use 
electricity as their lighting source compared to owners. Similarly, compound house dwellers 
compared to private unit residents are more likely to use electricity. Renters also rely on “other” 
lighting sources compared to house owners. Private house residents and owners, on the other hand, 
tend to adopt oil lamps, solar and torch lights for lighting purposes. Results for cooking energy 
show that renters use charcoal and “other” cooking fuel types compared to owners. Compared to 








Table 3: Mean comparisons for lighting and cooking energy 
Energy Variables Diff. in mean 
Owned-Rented 




Lighting energy      
Electricity -0.3044 0.000 -0.533 0.000 
oil lamp/lantern 0.0242 0.000 0.031 0.000 
Solar  0.071 0.000 0.069 0.000 
Torches 0.227 0.000 0.414 0.000 
Other lighting types -0.018 0.006 0.019 0.028 
Cooking energy      
Fuelwood 0.410 0.000 0.609 0.000 
Charcoal -0.349 0.000 -0.530 0.000 
Other cooking types -0.061 0.000 -0.079 0.000 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using Rwandan EICV 5 (2016–2017) data. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.3 Housing habitat and tenancy status 
The housing landscape of Rwanda reflects the country’s unique rural settlement policy known as 
“Imidugudu” (villagization). The policy ensures that dispersed settlements are relocated to a more 
centralized settlement. Over 60% of households live in these settlements – Umudugudu1 
(NSIR,2018). These houses are mainly constructed through the compulsory community 
participation law (Umuganda). As a result, there are more homeowners in the rural part of the 
country than in urban areas.  Table 4 shows the dwelling types and tenancy status of households 
based on their location (urban-rural distribution). Majority of rural households are homeowners 
(85.7%) and mainly staying in private units (97%). On the other hand, urban dwellers have a higher 
proportion of renters (54%) and a lower percentage of compound unit dwellers (33%). House 
ownership in Rwanda, therefore, does not necessarily depend on the wealth status of households 
especially in rural areas where exogenous factors like assistance from government and non- profit 








Table 4: Distribution of household tenancy status and dwelling types by location (in %) 
 Tenancy Status Dwelling Type 
Rural/ Urban Owned Rented Private Compound 
Rural 85.71 14.29 96.73 3.97 
Urban 45.84 54.16 66.5 33.45 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Rwandan EICV 5 (2016–2017) data. Values are in percentages 
 
3.4 Explanatory Variables 
We identify several variables that can influence household energy choices. Among these are 
demographic, socio-economic, geographical, and housing characteristics summarized in Table A2 
in Appendix A., Demographic variables capture household heads information as well as the 
household’s membership distributions. Socio-economic variables are measured using adult 
equivalent expenditure indicators. Housing characteristics capture the type of building materials 
and dwelling space. Finally, location characteristics of the household are included as dummies. 
We compare the mean differences of these variables by tenancy and dwelling status Table 5, 6 and 
7.  
Table 5: Mean Comparisons for socio-demographic variables 
Socio-demographic 
Variables 
Diff. in mean 
Owned -Rented 
P-value Diff.  in Mean  
(Private– Compound) 
P-value 
Sex household head 0.01 0.24 0.03 0.04 
Age of household head 11.51 0.00 9.47 0.00 
Household size 1.36 0.00 1.27 0.00 
Household head education -0.14 0.00 -0.16 0.00 
Poverty Status (1= poor) 0.12 0.00 0.25 0.00 
Dependency Ratio 0.22 0.00 0.32 0.00 
Ratio of women to men 0.27 0.00 0.33 0.00 
Wage Salary (1=Yes) -0.04 0.00 0.12 0.00 
log per-adult-eq. non- energy 
expenditure 
-0.48 0.00 -0.79 0.00 
log per-adult-eq. energy 
expenditure 
-2.07 0.00 -3.28 0.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using Rwandan EICV 5 (2016/2017) data. *** p<0.01, ** 





Table 5 presents the mean comparison of demographic and socioeconomic variables. The 
computed P-values shows that our groups of interest are unbalanced. Homeowners tend to be older, 
have larger household size, higher dependency ratio with more women and tend to be poor. 
Renters, on the other hand, have higher non-energy and energy expenditure and are more educated.  
We find similar patterns when private house dwellers are compared to compound house dwellers.  
 
Table 6: Comparison of means for geographical variables 
Geographic Variables Difference in mean 
Owned -Rented 





Urban (Yes=1) -0.342 0.000 -0.556 0.000 
Kigali City (Yes=1) -0.274 0.000 -0.548 0.000 
Southern Province (Yes=1) 0.044 0.000 0.129 0.000 
Western Province (Yes=1) 0.097 0.000 0.135 0.000 
Northern Province (Yes=1) 0.111 0.000 0.142 0.000 
Eastern Province (Yes=1) 0.022 0.008 0.141 0.000 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using Rwandan EICV 5 (2016/2017) data. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6 reports differences in means for geographical variables. Results show that renters 
compared to homeowners tend to live in urban areas, usually in the capital city of Rwanda, Kigali.  
Similarly, compound residential dwellers tend to stay in Kigali city. Homeowners and private 
residential dwellers are more likely to live in the southern, western, northern and eastern provinces 
of Rwanda.  
We present the mean comparisons of housing characteristics in Table 7. The result indicates that 
renting households are likely to live in buildings with cement, mud walls, metallic roofs and 
cement floors. They are also more likely to share their rooms and dwellings with others compared 







Table 7: Mean comparisons of housing characteristics 
Housing Variables Difference in mean 
Owned -Rented 




Number of Rooms 0.97 0.00 1.247 0.00 
Number of Sleeping 
Rooms 
0.57 0.00 0.564 0.00 
Share dwelling (1-yes) -0.42 0.00 -1.266 0.00 
Number years in dwelling 8.70 0.00 5.994 0.00 
Mud walls (1= yes) -0.08 0.00 -0.070 0.00 
Cement walls 1=yes) -0.05 0.00 -0.053 0.00 
Other walls (1= yes) 0.12 0.00 0.122 0.00 
Metalic roof (1= yes) -0.19 0.00 -0.29 0.00 
Clay tiled roof (1= yes) 0.19 0.00 0.290 0.00 
Other roofs (1= yes) 0.00 0.09 0.000 0.97 
Earth floor (1= yes) 0.31 0.00 0.480 0.00 
Cement floor (1= yes) -0.32 0.00 -0.484 0.00 
Dung/clay floors (1= yes) 0.00 0.39 -0.002 0.76 
Other floor types (1= yes) 0.00 0.04 0.006 0.06 
Access to electric. 
connection 
-0.23 0.00 -0.46 0.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using Rwandan EICV 5 (2016/2017) data. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A predominant characteristic of developing countries is the low access to electricity as the 
connection to the grid is limited in supply. Thus, electricity may not necessarily be present in the 
household’s decision set, which may flaw their utility maximization process. EICV5 provides 
information on households’ access to the national grid or other mini-grids. This information 
enables the study to account for electricity access in our model. Table 7 additionally shows that 
renters and compound unit dwellers tend to have access to electricity connection than owner-
occupants and private unit residents. 
 
4. Empirical Model 
Using a random utility probit framework, differences between renters and homeowners as well as 
private and compound dwellers choice of cooking and lighting energy is modelled as a 




∗  = {    
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Where    𝜋𝑖𝑗
∗  is an unobserved latent variable expressing whether household 𝑖 chooses a specific 
lighting or cooking energy type  𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑘 defined as a function of household dwelling type 
(𝐷𝑖), tenancy status – (rented or not – 𝑅𝑖), socio-demographic, geographical and housing variables 
(𝑋𝑖) as expressed in equation (1) 
𝜋𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗𝐷𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑖𝑗      (1) 
𝑖𝑗 represents the idiosyncratic error term and  𝛼0, 𝛽1𝑗, 𝛽2𝑗,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾𝑖𝑗  denote parameters to be 
estimated. Given that the latent variable 𝜋𝑖𝑗
∗   is conditioned on explanatory variables Ψ𝑖 (Ψ𝑖 =
𝑅𝑖, 𝐷𝑖, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑖), the probability that  for each household 𝑖 we observe 𝜋𝑖𝑗 = 1 (chooses a specific 
lighting or cooking energy type 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝑘) can be estimated as: 
𝑃𝑟(𝜋𝑖 = 1|Ψ𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟(𝛽
′Ψ𝑖 + 𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0|Ψ𝑖) = Φ 
𝛽′Ψ𝑖
𝜎1
      (2) 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function with error terms  𝑖𝑗~𝑁 (0,1). 
Consequently, following Greene (2003) and Wooldridge (2002), the likelihood function is 
expressed as: 
𝐿 = Π𝜋𝑖𝑗




∗ >0 [Φ 
𝛽′Ψ𝑖
𝜎1
 ]       (3) 
Given that 𝜋𝑖𝑗
∗  is unobservable, we employ the maximum likelihood estimation technique in 
equation 4. This provides the study with the resulting parameter of interest 𝛽1𝑗 which compares 
households tenancy status (rented or owned) based on their choice of lighting and cooking energy 
types and 𝛽2𝑗 which compares the dwelling units of households (private or compound house) given 
their energy choices. 
𝜋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗𝐷𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑖𝑗       (4)  
It is plausible that factors such as preferences and income levels may correlate with both 
household’s energy choices and tenancy status. Martey (2019) argues that differences in wealth 
and income levels may affect the type of cooking and the lighting fuels adopted by households as 
well as their tenancy status. Consequently, the probit model may lead to biased estimates as 
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unobserved factors and other sources of endogeneity may cause a correlation between error terms 
𝑖𝑗 and energy choice as well as tenancy status 𝑅𝑖 in equation 4. 
Heckman (1978) developed the bivariate probit (biprobit) model to address such biases. This 
model is widely used by applied economists such as Han and Vytlacil (2017), Acosta (2011), 
Fleming and Ker (2008), Bhattacharya, Goldman and McCaffrey (2006) and Brown, Pagan and 
Bastida (2005). In the energy context, selected studies such as Martey (2019), Gebreegziabher et 
al. (2012) and Yoo, Lee and Kwak (2009) have also used the biprobit model to examine energy 
choices.  The model enables easy identification of parameters irrespective of the inclusion of an 
endogenous explanatory variable. Han and Vytlacil (2017) and Altonji, Eder and Taber (2005) 
confirm this characteristic by showing that omitting restrictions is of less importance for 
identification if the same controls are included in the estimation of biprobit simultaneous 
equations. 
Based on Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Greene (2003), two variables are defined (energy 
choice and household rental status where 1=rented, 0=owned) based on the unobserved latent 
variables as follows: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗𝐷𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑋1𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 1𝑖      (5) 
𝑅𝑖
∗ = 𝛽2𝑗𝐷𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑋2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 2𝑖        (6)  
𝜋𝑖𝑗
∗  is previously defined in equation 1.  𝑅𝑖 represent the rental status of households, 𝐷𝑖 is the 
dwelling type. 𝑋1𝑖 and 𝑋2𝑖 are exogenous explanatory variables summarized in Appendix A.  1𝑖 
and 2𝑖 are jointly determined such that: 
𝐸[ 1𝑖|𝑋1𝑖 , 𝑋2𝑖 ] = 𝐸[ 2𝑖|𝑋1𝑖 , 𝑋2𝑖 ] = 0, 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[ 1𝑖|𝑋1𝑖 , 𝑋2𝑖 ] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[ 2𝑖|𝑋1𝑖 , 𝑋2𝑖 ] = 1,       (7) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣[ 1𝑖 1𝑖|𝑋1𝑖 , 𝑋2𝑖 ] = 𝜌. 
 A seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model based on a maximum likelihood estimation is 





5. Results and Discussion 
This section reports the marginal effects of the bivariate probit estimates to examine the differences 
in households lighting and cooking energy choices by rental status and dwelling types having 
accounted for potential correlations.  For comparison purposes we report the probit estimation 
results in Appendix B. Additionally, we conduct a heterogeneous analysis to understand how 
differences in income, gender and geographical location of households affect energy choices based 
on tenancy status and dwelling types. 
5.1 Bivariate probit estimates of lighting and cooking energy choices 
Table 8 and 9 present the marginal effect of the bivariate model. We report the results in two parts. 
The first part “panel A” control for demographic and geographical variables. The second part 
(panel B) additionally includes housing characteristics. Arguably, housing characteristics can 
simultaneously influence both energy choice decisions and tenancy status (Martey, 2019). For 
instance, the size of renter’s apartment is likely to influence their choice of energy investments.  
Reporting results with and without housing characteristics enables the study to observe and 
attenuate any potential biases. These estimates show the effect of households’ tenancy status and 
dwelling type on cooking and lighting energy choices. Comparing the bivariate probit model to 
the probit model (Appendix B), we find that the expected signs remain unchanged. Marginal effects 
are steadily higher for the bivariate probit model compared to the probit model when we control 
for housing characteristics. This suggests an improvement in estimates after correcting for 
endogeneity. Given the assumption that the distributional properties underlying the biprobit model 
hold for our data, we can conclude that the probit model estimates were downwardly biased. 
Results from Table 8 reveal that renting households compared to owners are 11% less likely to use 
fuelwood. They are, however, more likely to use charcoal and “other” cooking energy sources with 
a probability of 8% and 3% respectively. Similarly, compound dwellers are less likely than private 
unit residents to adopt fuelwood but more likely to adopt charcoal; however, these effects 








Table 8: Biprobit estimates of cooking energy choices 
 Cooking Energy Sources 
Tenancy/Residenc
y Status 
Fuelwood Fuelwood Charcoal Charcoal Other Other 
1(a) 1(b) 2(a) 2(b) 3(a) 3(b) 
Renting  -0.040 -0.106*** 0.066*** 0.077*** -0.0200 0.028* 
 (0.035) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) 
Dwelling type -0.042*** -0.003 0.017* -0.011 0.009 0.002 
(Compound 
housing) 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Housing variables     NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Demographic var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald (df) 6515(33) 7434(57) 6665(33) 7000(57) 3894(33)) 4227(57) 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 14,580 14580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 
Notes: Biprobit marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. We accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and 
geographical variables summarized in Appendix A are included. 
 
Table 9 shows that renters are 9% and 5% more likely to adopt electricity and “other” lighting 
sources but 3%, and 10% not likely to adopt oil lamps and torches compared to homeowners when 
household characteristics are included in the estimation. Rental status, however, does not affect 
the choice of solar lighting. Households living in compound houses tend to adopt electricity for 
lighting yet, are less likely to adopt torches and “other” lighting sources compared to private unit 
residents. 
Our results suggest that rental status and household dwelling types have varying effects on fuels 
choices in Rwanda. Contrary to the finding of Martey (2019), Baiyegunhi and Hassan (2014), Lay 
et al., (2013) and Arthur et al., (2010) our findings show that renters and compound house residents 
compared to homeowners and private unit residents tend to use relatively cleaner lighting sources. 
The finding that renters and compound house occupants adopt less fuelwood but use transition fuel 








Table 9: Biprobit Estimates of lighting energy choices 
 Lighting Energy Sources 
 Panel A 
Tenancy/Residency 
Status 
Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
1(a) 2(a) 3(a) 4(a) 5(a) 
Renting 0.034 -0.015 -0.046 -0.059 0.040 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.029) (0.059) (0.027) 
Dwelling type 0.085*** -0.013 -0.013 -0.102*** -0.024* 
(Compound housing) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.030) (0.015) 
Housing variables NO NO NO NO NO 
Demographic var. YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic var. YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi 2 (df) 7009(33) 3625(33) 4266(33) 5798(33) 3897(33) 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 
 Panel B 
Tenancy/Residency 
Status 
Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
1(b) 2(b) 3(b) 4(b) 5(b) 
Renting 0.088*** -0.029* -0.0233 -0.104*** 0.049** 
 (0.025) (0.0167) (0.0238) (0.0325) (0.0198) 
Dwelling type 0.040*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.069** -0.026* 
(Compound housing) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.028) (0.015) 
Housing variables      YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic var. YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi 2 (df) 4483(57) 3931(57) 4605(57) 5163(57) 4132(57) 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 
Notes: Biprobit marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. We accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and 
geographical variables summarized in Appendix A are included. 
 
Geographical distribution of homeowners in Rwanda could be an explanatory factor for our results. 
Rationally, owning a home is associated with higher socioeconomic status and wellbeing, but this 
is not necessarily the case for Rwandan residents. Most Rwandan homeowners are poor, live in 
rural communities and are unable to access modern energy. Their homeownership comes as a result 
of the social housing intervention by the Rwandan government (imudugudu) which see to the 
relocation of scattered residents in rural communities to a more centralized settlement to provide 
better amenities to enhance development in such areas. The resettlement policy enables the 
ownership of simple homes which are built through community participation. In effect, most 
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homeowners in Rwanda are still reliant on traditional fuels. Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda, has 
the highest number of renters compared to other provinces and has better access to electricity and 
other transitional energy. Given that urban areas have relatively better access to cleaner energy 
than in rural areas, renters in Rwanda who are mostly based in Kigali city are more likely to access 
better cooking and lighting fuels explaining their fuel choices. 
Further, factors such as sanitation, efficient energy appliances, access to the grid, basic amenities 
and proximity to work are among the many factors considered before an individual settle for a 
rental unit. Consequently, informed decisions about preferred energy investments are considered 
before signing a rental agreement resulting in their ability to adopt relatively cleaner fuels. 
Homeowners on the other hand, especially in a developing country context where people build 
their own houses may move into an uncompleted house or less developed areas with the hope of 
gradually completing and accessing better amenities in future due to the additional financial burden 
associated with relocating to new a house. Such decisions slow their ability to adopt cleaner 
household fuels quickly, therefore explaining why renters are more likely to use better energy 
types compared to homeowners. Martey (2019) additionally identifies preferences, ownership 
rights and building structure as potential mechanisms for these varying effects.  
Further, the use of fuelwood requires ample cooking space. Compound house dwellers, unlike 
private house residents, do not have the luxury of residential space as they tend to share their 
compound with other residents. This may be an explanatory factor to why compound unit residents 
are less likely to adopt fuelwood for cooking. 
5.2 An Analysis of Impact of Heterogeneity 
Differences in income levels, gender of household heads and geographical location of households 
(rural-urban) can account for differences in household’s energy choices (Choumert-Nkolo et al., 
2019; Das, De Groote & Behera, 2014; Baiyegunhi & Hassan, 2014; van der Kroom, Brouwer & 
van Beukering, 2013; Pachauri and Jiang, 2008 Hosier & Dowd,1987). In this section, an analysis 
of impact of  heterogeneity as a form of robustness test to examine the varying effect of households 
rental or ownership status and dwelling types on energy choices based on differences in income 
quartiles, female and male-headed households and location (rural-urban).  
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5.2.1 Income Differences 
We categorize income into quartiles (lowest to the highest income group) to demonstrate the 
degree to which the energy ladder hypothesis holds for the Rwandan economy. The potential to 
explore multiple fuel use (fuel-stacking) is, however, limited given that households provided 
answers on only their primary source of lighting and cooking fuels. The binscatter plot in figures 
2 and  3 show the relationship between households choice of lighting energy and income by 
tenancy status and dwelling type, respectively.  
 
 




Figure 3: Lighting energy choices and income  by dwelling type 
We observe a similar relationship between income and lighting fuels for renters and owners 
(Figure 2) as well as compound and private unit dwellers  (Figure 3) except for solar where 
compound dwellers show a positive relationship compared to the somewhat constant relationship 
observed for private unit residents. Generally, with increases in income renters and owners are 
likely to adopt more electricity and solar energy sources but less of oil lamps, torches and “other” 
sources of lighting energy. Both compound house dwellers and private unit residents also tend to 
adopt electricity and less of torches, oil lamps and other sources of lighting energy with increases 
in income. The adoption rates, however, differ between renters and owners as well as compound 
and private unit dwellers. In income quartile four, renters are likely to increase their electricity use 
but adopt less of oil lamps, torches and solar lighting sources relative to homeowners. Compound 
unit occupants compared to private residents in the same quartile use more electricity and less of 
oil lamps, torches, solar and “other” lighting sources. 
Figure 3 depicts the relationship between households cooking energy choices and income by rental 
(left panel) and dwelling types (right panel).  The binscatter plot show more of an inverted U-shape 
for fuelwood. Thus, at the initial levels of increases in income, renters and owners demand more 
fuelwood, but with further increases in income, they tend to use less fuelwood. Renters and owners 
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in the second and third quartiles are therefore more likely to use more fuelwood but tend to prefer 
less fuelwood in the fourth quartile thus depicting an inverted U shape.  A similar relationship is 
observed for compound and private unit dwellers. 
  
Figure 3: Cooking choices and income levels by rental status and dwelling types 
On the other hand, we observe a U-shape relationship for charcoal. The demand for charcoal first 
decreases with increasing income but does not persist as further increases in income result in higher 
demand for charcoal. This U-shape relationship is observed for homeowners, renters, as well as 
private and compound house residents. Renters also prefer “other” forms of cooking energy which 
include LPG, electricity and biogas as income increases. The relationship between “other” forms 
of cooking fuels and dwelling types remains inconclusive. For comparison purposes, we 
additionally present the biprobit results for each quartile in Appendix C. Consistent with the above, 
results also emphasize the importance income for fuel choices. 
The importance of income for household fuel choices is studied in most empirical studies. Higher 
income is often associated with cleaner energy choices. Consistent with Baiyegunhi and Hassan 
(2014), Lay et al. (2013), Démurger and Fournier (2011), Gupta and Köhlin, (2006) Ouedraogo 
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(2006) and Hosier and Dowd (1987) our estimates from the biprobit model and the distributional 
analysis when income is sub-divided into quartiles partly confirms the income-fuel choice 
relationship and weakly supports the energy ladder hypothesis.  This contrasts the study of Martey 
(2019) who finds a strong support of the energy ladder hypothesis. Our finding, therefore, 
highlights that evidence does not always provide conclusive support of the energy ladder and that 
different contexts can yield varied results. 
5.2.2 Gender differences 
Gender-differentiated impacts are associated with households’ energy choices (Choumert-Nkolo 
et al., 2019; Wickramasinghe, 2011; Narasimha & Reddy, 2007). Evidence shows that female-
headed households tend to adopt relatively cleaner fuels compared to male-headed households 
(Das et al. 2014; Farsi, Fillipinni & Pachauri, 2007; Rao & Reddy 2007). Women are generally 
caregivers and do most of the household chores (Zambelli et al., 2017). Consequently, they are 
responsible for household cooking and therefore more exposed to health risks associated with 
using dirty fuels which further informs their decision for cleaner energy options.  Contrary to this 
argument, existing literature shows that this is not always the case. For instance, Link, Axinn and 
Ghimire (2012) show that females are more likely to use fuelwood in Nepal. Similarly, Heltberg 
(2005) show no association between a higher proportion of females and fuelwood usage. To 
explore this concept in the context of tenancy status and dwelling types, we estimate the biprobit 
model to examine the effect of tenancy and dwelling types on energy decisions based on the gender 
of household heads. 
Table 10 presents the marginal effects of cooking energy. Consistent with the main findings of the 
study, household heads who are renters compared to owners tend to rely on charcoal for cooking 
but are less likely to adopt fuelwood. The degree of magnitude, however, differs for female and 
male-headed households with female-headed household showing a higher probability of using less 
fuelwood. Specifically, whereas female-headed households are 12% less likely to adopt fuelwood 
and 9% more likely to use charcoal, male-headed households are instead 9% less to likely use 
fuelwood and tend to use more charcoal (5%), when renters are compared to owner-occupants. We 
formally test the differences between female and male-headed households using the suest post 
estimation test (Weesie,1999) reported in Appendix D, focusing on fuel types for which we observe 
significant results (Fuelwood and Charcoal). Results show a substantial difference in fuelwood 
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and charcoal adoption by gender of household heads. Consistent with Das et al. (2014), Rao & 
Reddy (2007) and Farsi et al. (2007) our finding supports the argument that female-headed 
households tend to adopt cleaner cooking fuel. 
Table 10: Biprobit estimates of cooking energy choices by household heads gender 
 Cooking Energy Sources 
Tenancy/Residenc
y Status 
Fuelwood Fuelwood Charcoal Charcoal Other Other 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Renting -0.095*** -0.119*** 0.065*** 0.098*** 0.035* -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.075) 
Dwelling type -0.009 0.0194 -0.005 -0.026** 0.001 0.007 
(Compound 
housing) 
(0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.016) 
Housing variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald (df) 5570(55) 1858(55) 5221(55) 1803(55) 3284(55) 1020(55) 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 10,856 3,724 10,856 3,724 10,856 3,724 
Notes: Biprobit marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. We accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and 
geographical variables summarized in Appendix A are included. 
 
Results for lighting energy choices are presented in Table 11.  Consistent with the main findings 
of the study, household heads who are renting are likely to use more of electricity than owner-
occupants. Similar to the results for cooking energy, the magnitude of lighting fuel usage differs 
across female and male-headed households which are confirmed by the post estimation test in 
Table D2 Appendix D. For female-headed households, renters compared to homeowners are 13% 
and 11% more likely to use electricity and other lighting sources, respectively. They tend to be 
24% less likely to use torch lights. Male headed households who are renters compared owners are 








Table 11: Biprobit estimates of lighting energy choices by gender of the household head 




Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
1(a) 2(a) 3(a) 4(a) 5(a) 
Renting 0.129*** -0.008 0.0443 -0.245*** 0.112** 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.051) (0.046) 
Dwelling type 0.013 -0.008 8.59e-05 0.0133 -0.059* 
(Compound housing) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.049) (0.034) 
Housing variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi 2 (df) 1927(53) 1068(53) 1078(53) 1636(53) 1232(53) 
P value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
1(b) 2(b) 3(b) 4(b) 5(b) 
Renting 0.087*** -0.041** -0.039 -0.032 0.023 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.027) (0.039) (0.021) 
Dwelling type 0.053*** -0.011 -0.019 -0.116*** -0.019 
(Compound housing) (0.015) (0.016) (0.032) (0.033) (0.016) 
Housing variables      YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi 2 (df) 5926(53) 2876(53) 3369(53) 4865(53) 2855(53) 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 10,856 10,856 10,856 10,856 10,856 
Notes: Biprobit marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. We accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and 
geographical variables summarized in Appendix A are included. 
 
5.2.2 Rural-urban differences 
Given that most Rwandan households are based in rural areas which are likely to affect the role of 
tenancy status on fuel choices, we sub-divide our sample into rural and urban households to explore 
these differences. Specifically, we examine the effect of tenancy status and dwelling type on 





Table 12: Rural-urban biprobit estimates for cooking energy choices 
 Cooking Energy Sources 
Tenancy/Residenc
y Status 
Fuelwood Fuelwood Charcoal Charcoal Other Other 
Rural  Urban Rural  Urban Rural  Urban 
Renting -0.119*** -0.064* 0.050*** 0.155*** 0.029** -0.052 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.017) (0.054) (0.014) (0.046) 
Dwelling type 0.004 -0.009 0.016* -0.031 -0.015 0.026* 
(Compound 
housing) 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.014) 
Housing variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald (df) 4864(53) 1561(53) 3162(53) 1567(53) 2112(53) 1107(53) 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 12,054 2,526 12,054 2,526 12,054 2,526 
Notes: Biprobit marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. We accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and 
geographical variables summarized in Appendix A are included. 
 
Table 12 and 13 present the results for cooking and lighting energy choices, respectively. For 
cooking energy, findings show that renters compared to owner-occupants in rural and urban areas 
are less likely to use fuelwood but use more charcoal for cooking. The magnitude of the low usage 
of fuelwood is greater for rural households than for urban households. Rural households are 12% 
not likely to adopt fuelwood compared to 6% for urban households. Result for the charcoal 
adoption is as expected. Renting households compared to owners in urban households are more 
likely to use charcoal (15%) than in rural areas (5%). 
Additionally, renters in rural areas also tend to adopt “other” cooking sources, but no significant 
effect is observed for urban households. Compound unit residents also tend to use more charcoal 
and “other” cooking energy in rural households. Table D3 of Appendix D formally confirms the 








Table 13: Rural-urban biprobit estimates for lighting energy choices 
 Lighting Energy Sources 
 Rural Households 
Tenancy/Residency 
Status 
Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
1(a) 2(a) 3(a) 4(a) 5(a) 
Renting 0.131*** -0.026 -0.023 -0.141*** 0.059** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.042) (0.028) 
Dwelling type 0.016 0.009 -0.018 -0.085** 0.017 
(Compound housing) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.041 (0.023) 
Housing variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi 2 (df) 4795(51) 2314(51) 2854(51) 3637(51) 2435(51) 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 12,054 12,054 12,054 12,054 12,054 
 Urban Households 
Tenancy/Residency 
Status 
Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
1(b) 2(b) 3(b) 4(b) 5(b) 
Renting 0.010 -0.043* -0.001 0.011 0.036 
 (0.037) (0.022) (0.008) (0.044) (0.031) 
Dwelling type 0.057*** -0.033** 0.003 -0.015 -0.035** 
(Compound housing) (0.017) (0.016) (0.006) (0.021) (0.018) 
Housing var.      YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic var. YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic var. YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi 2 (df) 1497(51) 935(51) 836(51) 1223(51) 1066(51) 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 2,526 2,526 2526 2,526 2,526 
Notes: Biprobit marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. We accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and 
geographical variables summarized in Appendix A are included. 
 
Results for lighting energy choices (Table 13) show that renters compared to homeowners in rural 
areas use more electricity and “other” lighting sources but less likely to use torch lights. We find 
no significant effect for electricity, solar, torch lights and “other” lighting energy use for urban 
households. However, renters in urban households use less of oil lamps and lanterns.  Results for 
dwelling type also show that whereas compound house dwellers compared to private unit residents 
are less likely to use torch lights in rural areas; they are more likely to use electricity and less likely 
to adopt oil lamps and lanterns in urban areas. 
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Previous studies show that the magnitude of factors influencing fuel choices in urban and rural 
areas differ (Heltberg, 2004). However, the variation in effect shows that urban households are 
often more likely to utilize relatively cleaner fuel sources than rural households due to better 
accessibility of modern fuels and the high opportunity cost associated with collecting and the 
utilization of dirty fuels (Mekonnen & Kohlin, 2008; Farsi et al., 2007; Heltberg, 2005; Hosier & 
Dowd, 1987).  Our finding supports this assertion as urban households show a tendency of using 
more transition fuels like charcoal for cooking than in rural areas. Result for lighting energy is, 
however, inconclusive for rural and urban households. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Rwanda has one of the unique house ownership patterns in the SSA region. In this study, we 
ascertain the heterogeneity effect of the country’s house ownership patterns and rental status on 
energy choices. Specifically, we employ the bivariate probit models to examine the role of tenancy 
status (rented or owner occupant) and dwelling type (private or compound house residence) on 
households lighting and cooking choices in the country. To achieve our objective, the study relies 
on the fifth Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV 5) - a nationally representative 
dataset conducted by the Rwandan National Institute of Statistics. 
Results show that tenancy status and dwelling types significantly influence households fuel 
choices in Rwanda.  Income, gender of household head and location additionally influence cooking 
and lighting fuel choices.  
Estimates from the biprobit model show higher effects than probit results. Renters compared to 
owner-occupants use charcoal and “other” fuels but less of fuelwood for cooking. We find no 
effect for compound house residents compared to private house residents. Results for lighting 
energy show that renters in comparison to homeowners use more electricity and “other” fuels but 
fewer oil lamps and torches. Households residing in compound houses tend to use more electricity 
but fewer torches and “other” lighting energy sources. 
 A further sub-division of our sample into income quartiles, rural-urban households and female- 
male-headed households confirm the existence of heterogeneity in energy choices. Specifically, 
the income-fuel choice relationship shows that for lighting purposes, higher-income quartile 
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groups tend to adopt more electricity and use fewer torches. They, however, use more charcoal 
and less fuelwood for cooking Although the energy ladder hypothesis is popular in the energy 
literature (Martey, 2019; Baiyegunhi & Hassan, 2014; Das et al., 2014; Lay et al. 2013; Démurger 
& Fournier, 2011; Gupta & Köhlin, 2006; Ouedraogo, 2006; Reddy & Reddy, 1994; Hosier & 
Dowd,1987) our finding only partly supports this hypothesis. This demonstrates the importance 
the context and how evidence does not always provide conclusive support of the energy ladder 
hypothesis. 
 Location of households (urban-rural) also significantly affects energy choices. Renters compared 
to owner-occupants in urban households show a tendency of using more transition fuels like 
charcoal for cooking than in rural areas confirming previous findings of Mekonnen and Kohlin 
(2008), Farsi et al., (2007), Heltberg (2005) and Hosier and  Dowd (1987). Consistent with Das et 
al. (2014), Farsi et al. (2007) and Rao & Reddy (2007). Our results also show that female-headed 
households are more likely to adopt cleaner cooking energy choices. 
The geographical distribution of homeowners resulting from Rwanda’s rural resettlement policy 
could be a significant explanatory factor of our results. Most Rwandan homeowners are poor, 
reside in rural communities and unable to access modern energy. In effect, most homeowners in 
Rwanda still rely on traditional fuels.  Kigali has the highest number of renters compared to other 
provinces and has better access to electricity and other forms of transitional energy. The better 
developmental structures and amenities of urban areas makes it relatively easier for renters living 
in these communities to adopt cleaner fuels for their cooking and lighting needs. Martey (2019) 
additionally identifies preferences, ownership rights and building structure as potential 
mechanisms for the heterogeneity effects.  
Our findings reinforce the role of higher socio-economic status on energy choices. Low-income 
group homeowners in Rwanda who are usually based in the rural areas of the country are more 
likely to move from dirty lighting and cooking fuels to cleaner options with improvement in 
income levels. Programs and policies targeted at eradicating poverty will, therefore, enhance 
cleaner household energy choices. These programs in effect will improve health conditions of 
households and thus result in positive spillover effects on the environment.  
The study is limited by data as a result we were unable to contextualize household’s energy 
decisions by tenancy status. The literature can benefit from future studies that additional include 
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primary and qualitative data as well as highlighting how existing building designs can inform fuel 
choices. Additionally, national surveys should consider collecting more data on various energy 
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Appendix A: Additional Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1: Composition of other types of cooking fuels 
Other cooking Fuels Frequency 




Crop Waste 90 
Others 116 
Total 386 

































Table A2: Summary statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Variables Observation Mean SD Min Max 
Demographic/Socioeconomic      
Male headed households 14580 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Age of household head 14580 45.15 15.64 14 109 
Education of household head 14580 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Household size 14580 4.41 2.11 1 22 
Dependency Ratio 14580 0.82 0.76 0 7 
Ratio of women to men 14580 1.14 0.76 0 9 
Poverty Status 14580 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Wage Salary 14580 0.24 0.43 0 1 
log per-adult-eq. non- energy 
expenditure 
14580 12.53 0.76 9.87 17.24 
log per-adult-eq. energy 
expenditure 
14580 0.82 0.76 0 7 
Geographical      
Urban 14580 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Kigali City 14580 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Southern Province 14580 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Western Province 14580 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Northern Province 14580 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Eastern Province 14580 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Housing Characteristics      
Access to Electricity 14580 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Number of rooms 14580 3.55 1.24 1 11 
Number of Sleeping rooms 14580 2.11 0.88 1 8 
Number of households 
sharing dwelling 
14580 0.11 0.57 0 15 
Years of inhabitance 14580 9.39 10.51 0 79 
Roofing Material 14580 1.37 0.48 1 3 
Floor Material 14580 1.38 0.65 1 4 
Exterior wall material 14580 1.69 0.93 1 3 
 Variables of Interest      
Renting 14580 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Dwelling type 14580 0.08 0.27 0 1 







Appendix B: Probit estimation 
Table B1: Probit Estimates of lighting energy choices 
 Lighting Energy Sources 
 Panel A 
Tenancy/Residency 
Status 
Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
1(a) 2(a) 3(a) 4(a) 5(a) 
Renting 0.036*** -0.019*** -0.044*** -0.029** 0.024*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.01) (0.012) (0.008) 
Dwelling type 0.084*** -0.029** -0.022 -0.118*** -0.044** 
(Compound housing) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) 
Housing var. NO NO NO NO NO 
Demographic var. YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic var. YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi 2 (df) 1650(17) 307(17) 579(17) 1767(17) 506(17) 
P value 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 
 Panel B 
Tenancy/Residency 
Status 
Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
1(b) 2(b) 3(b) 4(b) 5(b) 
Renting 0.017*** -0.007 -0.040*** -0.010 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
Dwelling type 0.014*** -0.014 -0.025 -0.027 0.0260* 
(Compound housing) (0.005) (0.011) (0.018) (0.028) (0.016) 
Housing variables      YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald chi 2 (df) 843(29) 417(29) 766(29) 1352(29) 481(29) 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 
Notes: These are marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors based 
on the cluster divisions of EICV 5 data are in parentheses. Inverse probability sampling weights were used. 















Table B2: Probit estimates of cooking energy choices 
 Cooking Energy Sources 
Tenancy/Residenc
y Status 
Fuelwood Fuelwood Charcoal Charcoal Other Other 
1(a) 1(b) 2(a) 2(b) 3(a) 3(b) 
Renting -0.066*** -0.040*** 0.058*** 0.029*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dwelling type -0.042*** -0.026*** 0.023*** 0.001 0.003 0.009* 
(Compound 
housing) 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
Housing variables     NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Demographic var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Wald (df) 1907(17) 2244(29) 1856(17) 1985(29) 587(17) 675(29) 
Pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 
Observations 14,580 14580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 
Notes:  marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. We 
accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and geographical variables 

































Appendix C: Biprobit estimation by income quartiles 
Table C1: Lighting energy choices by income quartiles. 
 Lighting Energy Sources 
Tenancy/Residency 
Status 
Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Solar Torches Other 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Renting      
Quartile 2 (n=3644) -0.018 -0.074* 0.053 -0.040 0.061 
 (0.057) (0.043) (0.060) (0.074) (0.044) 
Quartile 3 (n=3648) 0.083 0.006 -0.059 -0.091 0.027 
 (0.052) (0.026) (0.052) (0.071) (0.043) 
Quartile 4 (n=3642) 0.137*** -0.049 0.007 -0.124** 0.005 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.049) (0.059) (0.037) 
Dwelling type      
Quartile 2 (n=3644) 0.101*** 0.006 -0.036 -0.132* -0.027 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.051) (0.068) (0.037) 
Quartile 3 (n=3648) 0.039 0.000 -0.018 -0.107 -0.044 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.058) (0.067) (0.034) 
Quartile 4 (n=3642) 0.059** -0.026 -0.022 -0.028 -0.033 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.043) (0.049) (0.024) 
Housing variables      YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic variables YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Biprobit marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. We accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and 



















Table C2: Cooking energy choices based on income quartiles. 
 Cooking Energy 
Tenancy/Residency Status Fuelwood Charcoal Other 
(1) (2) (3) 
Renting    
Quartile 2 (N=3,644) -0.116*** 0.113*** -0.028 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.034) 
Quartile 3 (N=3,648) -0.130*** 0.052** 0.097*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.031) 
Quartile 4 (N=3,642) -0.094*** -0.065 0.035 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.023) 
Dwelling type    
Quartile 2 (N=3,644) 0.009 -0.037** 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) 
Quartile 3 (N=3,648) -0.013 0.007 -0.031* 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) 
Quartile 4 (N=3,642) 0.009 0.005 0.007 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.009) 
Housing variables   YES YES YES 
Demographic variables YES YES YES 
Geographic    variables YES YES YES 
Notes: Biprobit marginal effect estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. We accounted for probability sampling weights. Housing, Socio-demographic and 
















Appendix D: Post estimation Test 
Table D1: Mean differences between female and male household heads cooking energy choices 
Suest test Fuel wood Charcoal Other  
Chi 2(28) 39.00 39.83 88.49 
Prob > chi2 0.0809 0.0684 0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table D2: Mean differences between female and male household heads lighting energy choices 
 Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Torches Other  
Chi 2(27) 79.62 92.69 155.79 67.68 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table D3: Mean differences between rural and urban households’ cooking energy choices 
Suest test Fuel wood Charcoal Other  
Chi 2(27) 138.26 258.32 202.41 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table D4: Mean differences between rural and urban households’ lighting energy choices 
Suest test Electricity Oil Lamp/lantern Torches Other  
Chi 2(27) 520.57 434.56 173.90 230.17 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 












Appendix E: Supplementary Results 
Table E1: Full Biprobit Results for cooking energy indicating other determinants 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Fuelwood Charcoal othercook 
renting -0.106*** 0.0768*** 0.0271 
 (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0171) 
dwellingtype -0.00196 -0.0107 0.00205 
(Compound housing) (0.00888) (0.00742) (0.00544) 
male 0.00275 -0.00782 0.00271 
 (0.00516) (0.00520) (0.00339) 
agehhd 0.00121*** -0.00108*** -0.000273** 
 (0.000174) (0.000182) (0.000120) 
hhsize -0.00254* 0.00208 0.00119 
 (0.00137) (0.00138) (0.00104) 
Hheducation 0.00704 0.00508 -0.00546 
 (0.00562) (0.00647) (0.00391) 
povertystatus -0.0209*** -0.0557*** 0.0346*** 
 (0.00663) (0.00747) (0.00468) 
wage_salary 0.0338*** -0.0322*** -0.00184 
 (0.00532) (0.00592) (0.00369) 
log_non_energy_ae -0.0640*** -0.00243 0.0364*** 
 (0.00460) (0.00402) (0.00358) 
log_enerex_ae -0.00937*** 0.0211*** -0.00267*** 
 (0.000925) (0.00128) (0.000575) 
depen_ratio 0.00752** -0.00418 -0.00859*** 
 (0.00318) (0.00332) (0.00269) 
ratio_wm -0.00102 0.00632*** -0.00436*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00183) (0.00148) 
Numrooms 0.00537** -0.00300 -0.000920 
 (0.00217) (0.00219) (0.00166) 
Sleeprms -0.00154 0.00351 0.000812 
 (0.00324) (0.00322) (0.00224) 
sharedwell -0.000806 0.00633** -0.00595*** 
 (0.00409) (0.00308) (0.00209) 
AccessElectric -0.0179*** 0.00206 0.00240 
 (0.00514) (0.00549) (0.00433) 
inhabited_yrs 0.000861*** -0.00132*** 0.000131 
 (0.000284) (0.000322) (0.000201) 
External walls:    
2.Cement -0.00722 -0.0153** 0.0106* 
 (0.0101) (0.00748) (0.00611) 
3.Other 0.0144*** -0.0243*** 0.00476 
 (0.00444) (0.00475) (0.00320) 
Roof:    
2.Clay tiles 0.0479*** -0.0588*** -0.00852** 
62 
 
 (0.00547) (0.00581) (0.00405) 
3.Other 0.0500 -0.0582 -0.0152 
 (0.0580) (0.0386) (0.0153) 
Floor:    
2.floormat -0.0246*** 0.0426*** -0.00717 
 (0.00609) (0.00665) (0.00476) 
3.floormat -0.00969 -0.00789 0.000445 
 (0.0111) (0.00982) (0.00621) 
4.floormat -0.0191 0.0394** -0.0157 
 (0.0153) (0.0161) (0.0110) 
ur -0.0809*** 0.0696*** 0.00564 
 (0.00463) (0.00473) (0.00450) 
KigaliCity -0.0556*** 0.0479*** -0.00787* 
 (0.00665) (0.00655) (0.00463) 
SouthernProvince 0.0121* 0.0161** -0.0217*** 
 (0.00626) (0.00665) (0.00497) 
WesternProvince -0.0242*** 0.0525*** -0.0360*** 
 (0.00561) (0.00594) (0.00583) 
NothernProvince 0.00261 0.0189*** -0.0213*** 
 (0.00642) (0.00684) (0.00479) 
Observations 14,580 14,580 14,580 















Table E2: Full Biprobit results for lighting energy indicating other determinants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Electricity oil_lamp_lantern Solar Torches Other 
renting 0.088*** -0.029* -0.0233 -0.104*** 0.049** 
 (0.025) (0.0167) (0.0238) (0.0325) (0.0198) 
dwellingtype 0.040*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.069** -0.026* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.028) (0.015) 
male -0.00705** 0.00595 0.0190*** 0.0131* -0.0211*** 
 (0.00351) (0.00453) (0.00582) (0.00794) (0.00598) 
agehhd -0.000103 0.000175 -0.000576*** 0.000468* -9.26e-05 
 (0.000112) (0.000146) (0.000182) (0.000259) (0.000198) 
hhsize -0.000839 -0.00188 0.0104*** -0.00555** -0.00554*** 
 (0.000757) (0.00132) (0.00137) (0.00230) (0.00187) 
Hheducation 0.00822** -0.00161 0.0205*** 0.0152** -0.0218*** 
 (0.00378) (0.00421) (0.00554) (0.00743) (0.00566) 
povertystatus -0.00781* -0.00121 -0.0347*** 0.00546 0.00887 
 (0.00404) (0.00570) (0.00652) (0.00998) (0.00771) 
wage_salary 0.00395 -0.00894** -0.0190*** 0.0268*** 0.000668 
 (0.00361) (0.00428) (0.00537) (0.00728) (0.00556) 
log_non_energy_ae 0.00292 -0.0175*** 0.0349*** -0.0152* -0.0207*** 
 (0.00289) (0.00528) (0.00556) (0.00919) (0.00704) 
log_enerex_ae 0.00775*** 0.0114*** -0.0190*** 0.00440*** -0.00297*** 
 (0.000373) (0.000879) (0.000735) (0.00121) (0.000958) 
depen_ratio 0.00648*** 0.00466* -0.00437 -0.00273 -0.000713 
 (0.00184) (0.00239) (0.00307) (0.00439) (0.00344) 
ratio_wm -0.00122 0.000718 0.00192 0.00420 -0.00628** 
 (0.00113) (0.00168) (0.00190) (0.00303) (0.00245) 
Numrooms -0.000845 0.00500** 0.0108*** -0.00943** -0.00811*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00218) (0.00231) (0.00377) (0.00297) 
Sleeprms 0.000604 0.000116 -0.00130 0.000243 0.00109 
 (0.00180) (0.00322) (0.00342) (0.00572) (0.00455) 
sharedwell -0.000614 0.0124** -0.00134 -0.0102 -0.000264 
 (0.00324) (0.00592) (0.0134) (0.0178) (0.00919) 
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AccessElectric 0.152*** -0.212*** 0.0909*** -0.677*** -0.431*** 
 (0.00583) (0.0194) (0.00533) (0.0179) (0.0243) 
inhabited_yrs 0.000195 0.000454** -2.41e-06 -0.000781** 0.000181 
 (0.000150) (0.000224) (0.000248) (0.000372) (0.000284) 
2.Cement 0.00898 0.00407 -0.0307*** -0.0694* 0.0212 
 (0.00559) (0.0191) (0.00938) (0.0384) (0.0293) 
3.other 0.000724 0.0168*** -0.000442 -0.0470*** 0.0173*** 
 (0.00274) (0.00394) (0.00461) (0.00695) (0.00549) 
2.Claytiles -0.0137*** -0.0174*** 0.00133 0.0347*** -0.0125** 
 (0.00362) (0.00480) (0.00529) (0.00807) (0.00608) 
3.other -0.00310 0.0176 -0.0746*** 0.0307 -0.00899 
 (0.298) (0.0622) (0.00301) (0.0780) (0.0562) 
2.floormat 0.00881*** 0.00227 0.0146** -0.0675*** 0.0219** 
 (0.00326) (0.00668) (0.00674) (0.0129) (0.0103) 
3.floormat 0.0200*** 0.0303*** 0.00854 -0.0539*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.00608) (0.00986) (0.0107) (0.0176) (0.0127) 
4.floormat 0.0160*** 0.0394** 0.00554 -0.0648** 0.00663 
 (0.00622) (0.0188) (0.0139) (0.0272) (0.0205) 
ur 0.0347*** 0.0387*** -0.127*** -0.133*** 0.0866*** 
 (0.00499) (0.00675) (0.0121) (0.0131) (0.00914) 
KigaliCity 0.0165*** -0.0397*** -0.0804*** -0.141*** 0.154*** 
 (0.00517) (0.0101) (0.0154) (0.0195) (0.0133) 
SouthernProvince 0.00871** -0.0302*** -0.00382 -0.000969 0.0459*** 
 (0.00366) (0.00568) (0.00654) (0.0103) (0.00849) 
WesternProvince 0.0178*** -0.0410*** 0.0109* -0.0667*** 0.0814*** 
 (0.00352) (0.00552) (0.00609) (0.00982) (0.00805) 
NothernProvince 0.0141*** -0.0668*** -0.0488*** 0.0315*** 0.0678*** 
 (0.00363) (0.00668) (0.00722) (0.0104) (0.00829) 
Observations 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 




Chapter 3: Competition and Gender in the Lab vs Field: Experiments with 
Off-Grid Renewable Energy Entrepreneurs in Rural Rwanda. 
Rebecca A. Klege and Martine Visser 
 
Abstract 
Applications of lab experiments to real-world phenomena are limited. We fill the gap by examining 
how gender attitudes and performance under competitive situations in the lab reflect 
microenterprise outcomes in the renewable energy sector of Rwanda – a country with progressive 
gender policies despite its traditional patriarchal setup. We use the standard Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) experimental design in addition to a unique dataset from off-grid 
microenterprises, managed by entrepreneurs who had been working in mixed and single-sex teams 
prior to the lab experiments. After a piece-rate and a tournament compensation schemes, 
participants are offered to the opportunity to choose their compensation scheme between these two 
options in a third round. We find that female entrepreneurs are not less likely to compete and are 
not outperformed by male entrepreneurs. This stands in contrast to several studies, mostly 
conducted on university students of developed countries. Furthermore, we leverage administrative 
and self-reported business data to show that the female entrepreneurs who chose to compete in the 
lab perform as well as their male counterparts, providing some external validity to our lab results.  
 
 Keywords: Competition, Gender differences, Entrepreneurs, Performance, Renewable Energy  









1.  Introduction                                                                                                                                                              
Traditional job markets are mostly male-dominated despite recent efforts by development 
organisations to close the gender gap. Women often face various social restrictions (including 
overseeing most household chores, receiving less schooling, and lower returns to their labour) in 
both developed and developing countries (World Bank, 2015). This problem is more severe in 
rural areas, where social barriers such as culture and social norms play a significant role.  
Despite the well-established advantages associated with the provision of modern energy sources 
to rural communities, studies in the renewable energy literature have shown that provision of 
energy sources alone is not enough to achieve the desired empowerment levels and economic 
freedom for women. Women's journeys towards better welfare opportunities and livelihoods could 
be fast-tracked if they were well represented at all levels of the energy supply chain (Baruah, 2017; 
2015). Entrepreneurship has, therefore, been used as a breakthrough point for women in this sector 
(Clancy et al., 2012; Clancy, Oparaocha & Roehr, 2004). This has resulted in several initiatives 
and projects targeted at female entrepreneurship. Typical examples are the Solar Sisters initiative, 
Women's Integration into Renewable Energy (WIRE) and Women's Entrepreneurship in 
Renewables (wPOWER) under the Energy4Impact initiative. 
Though entrepreneurship is a vital tool for promoting women's empowerment, it is essential to 
note that a predominant characteristic associated with successful entrepreneurship is the ability to 
compete (Shane, Locke & Collins, 2003). Women have been shown to be less willing to compete 
and in some situations outperformed by men under competitive conditions  (Dato & Nieken, 2014; 
Niederle, & Vesterlund, 2011; 2008; 2007; Ergun, Rivas & García-Muñoz, 2010; Croson & 
Gneezy, 2009; Datta Gupta, Poulsen & Villeval, 2005). This suggests that, apart from the well-
established social barriers affecting women's participation in the labour market, females' 
unwillingness to compete can also influence their performance levels even after taking up 
entrepreneurial roles. Hence, a deliberate attempt to empower women in the renewable energy 
industry through entrepreneurship initiatives may have limited potential if due consideration is not 
given to women's competitiveness and performance abilities. 
To date, very little is known about the competitive and performance abilities of women working 
as sales point entrepreneurs in the renewable energy sector.  Our study contributes to the global 
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discussion on women's competitive decisions and performance levels by using lab-in-the-field 
experiments to first examine how gender attitudes towards competition differ amongst village-
level entrepreneurs (VLEs) in Rwanda. The study then demonstrates how performance under 
competitive situations in the lab reflects microenterprise operations in the field by using a unique 
dataset from off-grid microenterprises managed by entrepreneurs already working in mixed and 
single-sex teams since 2016. 
Rwanda provides a unique study context for a number of reasons.  Though a traditionally 
patriarchal society, the country is today frequently cited for its commitment towards women's 
participation and gender equality policies (Burnet, 2011). This comes after the 1994 genocide, 
which saw the death of at least 500,000 people, the majority of whom were men (Debsscher & 
Ansoms, 2013). Many women became widows and took over traditional male-dominated social 
and economic activities. The government of Rwanda has since implemented several gender 
policies, such as the integration of gender as a fundamental right in the constitution, enforcing a 
gender quota system for local and national government, and the creation of its first Ministry of 
Gender Equality. These top-down approaches brought about improved economic and career 
opportunities as well as higher levels of women's participation in government. Although such 
policies have substantially improved the postcolonial patriarchal gender roles, rural women are yet 
to harness the full benefits of the government's women-friendly policies (Burnet, 2011).  
Furthermore, the renewable sector of Rwanda is booming as the government of Rwanda is 
determined to promote private sector involvement, in its quest to accelerate rural electrification to 
off-grid communities in order to provide energy access to its entire population. However, women's 
participation in the private energy sector of Rwanda is low, as there are no gender policies 
governing the private energy sector (Parshotam & van der Westhuizen, 2018). Examining women's 
competitiveness in this context not only enriches this branch of the economic literature but also 
provide key insights into women's abilities in the private energy sector of Rwanda. 
To implement our objective, we partnered with Nuru Energy – a for-profit social enterprise. Nuru 
Energy provides low-cost solar mobile phone and light recharging centres to off-grid poor 
communities in rural Rwanda. They operate by delivering power in the form of rechargeable light-
emitting diodes (LEDs) via local village enterprises. LEDs are recharged by a centralised pedal-
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and-solar-powered recharge station, which is operated by community-run microenterprises. As 
part of a more extensive study (Clarke et al., 2020; Visser et al., 2019) to understand the role of a 
gender quota business model in empowering women, 136 new microenterprises in Rwanda have 
been established. Villages were randomised into three treatment arms such that in each village, the 
enterprise is owned and operated by either an all-male team, an all-female team or a mixed gender  
team, each consisting of four members, for a total of 544 microentrepreneurs. While such a gender 
quota-based business model provides an enabling environment for entrepreneurship and self-
employment for women, it is essential to further investigate attitudes towards competition in such 
a context and examine whether performance in the lab reflects microenterprise activities in the 
field. 
This study measures willingness to compete and performance under competition using the standard 
experimental design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) on a subsample of 374 entrepreneurs from 
the off-grid microenterprises described in the preceding paragraph. Subsequently, field outcomes 
– sales and self-reported incomes from microenterprise operations – are used to measure the field 
performances of gender teams. Our study shows that women operating off-grid microenterprises 
in Rwanda do not shy away from competition and perform as well as men in the lab. This outcome 
is mirrored in the field: female lab participants who self-selected into competition also have similar 
business performance as their male counterparts during the first three months of operation. 
Although our lab sample is broadly representative of the larger RCT sample, we are careful not to 
generalise our results due to potential selection limitations as there is a possibility that results for 
the different gender compositions could vary for the larger sample, or over a more extended period 
of time. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related literature. The 
experimental design and data used for the study are detailed in Section 3. This is followed by the 
empirical strategy of the study in Section 4. Results and discussion of findings are reported in 




2.  Related Literature  
A growing experimental literature has explored gender differences in attitudes towards 
competition with a focus on three broad areas: competition entry decisions, performance levels 
and gender composition of competing groups.2 Results show that women are less willing to 
compete (Zhong et al., 2018; Apicella et al., 2017; Sutter & Glaetzle-Ruetzler, 2015; Booth & 
Nolen, 2012; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007) and may have lower performance levels than men 
when they do compete (eg., Dariel et al., 2017; Dato & Nieken, 2014; Niederle et al. 2013). This 
may partly explain why women are less represented in the labour market and why, at the 
subsistence level, female-operated firms are less profitable than those operated by their male 
counterparts (Buvinic & Furst-Nichols, 2016). In some cases, findings suggest no significant 
difference in performance between men and women (De Pola et al., 2015, Niederle & Vesterlund, 
2007, Barron et al., 2020). 
The literature on competition has, however, been skewed towards university student-based 
experiments in Western societies (See Appendix A for a summarised review of studies on students 
and non-students' samples including their respective study area to date). Developments in the 
literature show that culture or the context in which these experiments are conducted can influence 
competitive outcomes. Gneezy et al. (2009) explain this by comparing patriarchal and matrilineal 
societies. Whereas the observed gender gap in the patriarchal society of Masai in Tanzania 
emulates most findings in Western countries, the matrilineal society of Khasi in northeast India 
shows a reversed gender gap. A follow-up study by Andersen et al. (2013) shows that, although 
no gender gap exists between these two societies at age 7, by age 15, these two communities start 
exhibiting very different characteristics towards competition. These studies have since paved the 
way for more society-specific studies (Booth et al., 2018; Bönte et al., 2018; Dariel et al., 2017; 
Cassar et al., 2016; Apicella and Dreber, 2015).  
Although the competition literature is extensive, to date, applications of such experimental studies 
are limited.  Little is known about the extent to which competition measures in the lab relate to 
real outcomes.  Studies have attempted to examine competition in real-world situations or by using 
natural field experiments (Ors et al., 2013; Paserman, 2007; Lavy, 2012); however, the direct link 
 




of competition measures to real-world outcomes is still scarce. Zhang (2013) and Buser et al. 
(2014) directly examine how competition predicts educational choices of students. Both studies 
show that choices in the lab under competitive incentives correspond to choices of study but were 
unable to study students' performance outcomes under exam conditions. Berge et al. (2015) argue 
that an individual's decision to compete does not necessarily imply success in the real world.  To 
test this, they use small-scale entrepreneurs in Tanzania. Findings from Berge et al. (2015) show 
a positive association between competitiveness in the lab and field choices. Their study, however, 
did not explicitly examine the gender differences associated with their results. 
Our study fills the gap in the competition literature by using a unique dataset from entrepreneurs 
operating in specific gender groups (all-male, all-female and mixed-gender teams) in rural Rwanda 
to examine the relationship between lab and field outcomes. The study, therefore, does not only 
contribute to the competition literature but will also provide insights into the ability and 
performance of women, which is of relevance to microenterprise development in the renewable 
energy sector. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Data  
Our sample subjects are entrepreneurs operating off-grid microenterprises in the Rulindo and 
Ruhango districts of Rwanda, as part of a larger randomised control trial (RCT) focused on the use 
of a gender quota business model to empower women in the renewable energy sector (Visser et al. 
2019, Clarke et al. 2020). These entrepreneurs have been operating in randomly assigned gender 
groups since 2016, with each group consisting of four members. Their core role is to recharge 
lights for customers at a fee.  
Entrepreneurs in the larger randomised control trial study were recruited as follows. First, 272 
villages in the Rwanda district of Rulindo and Ruhango were sampled to participate in a new Nuru 
business model. With the assistance of village leaders, villages were approached about the 
opportunity of setting up solar recharge stations with each station to be run by a four-person 
microentrepreneur team. For the purposes of the field experiment, interested villages were 
randomly sorted into three groups (all-male, all-female, and mixed teams). Community members 
formed their groups without any restrictions from the research team apart from the gender 
composition request. Prospective microentrepreneur teams were then requested to raise an 
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investment capital (commitment fees) of 40,000 Rwandan Francs (~50USD) in exchange for their 
start-up recharging equipment. All 272 villages raised these commitment fees prior to assigning 
treatment groups. Potential microenterprises were informed that their village had a 50% probability 
of being selected into the first phase of the new Nuru business. Thus, half of the sample was 
randomly assigned to a treatment arm.  Villages who were selected to a control group had their 
money returned to team members, while villages who were selected into the treatment group 
received recharging equipment and 100 lights per each village to commence business. The 
operations and management decisions were solely up to members of the team. Also, given that 
community members could form their own gender teams, there is a potential that team members 
could be familiar with each other before the commencement of business. Clarke et al. (2020) and 
Visser et al. (2019) provide a detailed account of the randomisation process. 
As of March 2017, before conducting the experiments, there were 129 actively working 
microenterprises (one per village). This provided the study with a total population size of 516 
entrepreneurs.3 Out of the 516 actively working entrepreneurs, 374 participated and completed the 
experiment.4  
3.1 Potential Selection Bias 
To better understand how the 374 lab participants compare to the larger sample of 516 operational 
VLEs and to examine any potential selection bias, we compare the socioeconomic and business 
characteristics of lab participants with those who did not participate in the experiment. Table B1, 
Appendix B report results from the balance test.  Results show no significant differences in age, 
the number of working hours, household income, household expenditure, the probability that an 
entrepreneur had a household member in wage employment and the likelihood that VLEs had an 
adequate roof. Besides being not statistically significant, the coefficients are small, and the 
confidence intervals are narrow. Furthermore, results show that experimental participants and non-
participants were equally likely to have been assigned to a male, female or mixed-gender group. 
We also find that lab participants and non-participants were equally likely to be in either Rulindo 
 
3 129 x 4 = 516 
4 Most entrepreneurs who could not make it were not either available during the information 
stage or had other engagements on the day the experiment was conducted. 
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or Ruhango district. In addition, there are no significant differences in the proportion of VLEs 
reported to feel happy and in their level of patience as measured in the survey. 
However, there are a few statistically significant differences. First, lab participants had 11.7% 
more recharges than non-participants. At the mean value of 307 recharges, This difference amounts 
to 36 additional recharges over the entire three-month period, roughly two additional recharges 
every 5 days. Despite being statistically significant, this does not amount to an economically 
significant difference. Second, lab participants were 3.7 percentage points more likely to have 
secondary education than non-participants. This difference could be a cause for concern if 
education were a predictor of performance in the field. However, we show this not to be the case 
in Table 6 below. Lastly, entrepreneurs who participated in the experiment were slightly less 
dissatisfied about their emotional health than non-experiment participants at the 90% of 
confidence, but the lack of difference in happiness or patience suggests there are no systematic 
differences in this regard. 
Taken together, the evidence in this table suggests that the sample of participants in the lab 
experiments is broadly similar to microentrepreneurs who did not participate in the lab 
experiments, and hence our lab results could plausibly hold for VLEs who did not participate in 
the lab experiments. At the very least, our results would be informative of the slightly more 
competitive microenterprises. 
3.2 The Experiment 
We conducted a series of experiments focused on entrepreneurs' attitudes towards competition, 
risk aversion and prosocial measures. A total of 24 experimental sessions were conducted by the 
same experimenter between March and June 2017.  The sessions were conducted in school 
classrooms across 19 sectors (villages are grouped in sectors). Prior to the day of the experiment, 
individual entrepreneurs were personally invited to participate in the experiment and to 
additionally indicate their potential availability. Participants who indicated their availability were 
given further information about the specific venue and the time to arrive at the experiment venue. 
We made a phone call to remind them about the event the day before the experiment.  Given the 
long distances participants needed to travel to the various experimental venues, we offered to cover 
the transportation cost of participants who showed up for the event. A minimum of 4 and a 
maximum of 8 groups were invited to each session depending on their proximity to the experiment 
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venue. The average number of participants per each session was 18, with a maximum number of 
30 people. Below, we describe in detail the experimental design and procedures of the two 
behavioural measures utilised in this study, namely the competition and risk experiment. Detailed 
instructions used for the experiment can be found in the supplementary material. 
The competition games follow the standard experimental design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
with minor alterations in the payoffs offered to participants. VLEs solved real problems under 
piece rate and tournament incentivised schemes. For each session, VLEs were presented with a set 
of 20 simple addition problems to be solved in five minutes with no performance feedback between 
tasks. The addition problems were handed to VLEs in a booklet form such that each page had only 
one problem, as presented below: 
 
75 85 60 15 ANSWER5 
 
VLEs were not allowed to use calculators. However, the booklets in which the problems were 
solved had enough space for scratch work. Instructions and incentives were read out loud to VLEs 
in Kinyarwanda (the official local language of Rwanda) before the start of each task. Participants 
performed these tasks (consisting of 20 problems each) under three different incentive schemes, 
namely: piece rate, tournament and preferred incentive scheme. 
In the first round (piece rate), participants earned 50 Rwandan francs (RWF) –approximately 0.055 
United States Dollars (USD) – for each correct answer provided. In the second task (tournament), 
participants competed in randomly assigned gender groups (mixed and single sex) of between two 
and six members. The study aimed to assign participants to only groups of four consistent with 
VLEs' group sizes in the field. However, since we had no control over the exact number and gender 
of participants who showed up for the sessions, we had to assign some participants to groups other 
than the intended group size of four. Most of our sample (224 out of 374 participants) participated 
in groups of four members, with 135 participants assigned to groups of 3 or 5 members. Table B2, 
Appendix B shows the group size distribution. The designated groups assigned to participants in 
 
5 For instance, participants were expected to add these four numbers and provide the answer (235 
– for this example) in the space labelled ANSWER, which was left empty on the actual decision 
sheets for all twenty questions. 
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the experiment were different from VLEs' actual microenterprise gender groups in the real world. 
This guaranteed the anonymity of group members and limited any potential informed decisions 
that could arise when the identity of team members is known to participants. Subjects were, 
however, informed about the demographic distribution of their respective groups (age, marital 
status and gender distributions).6  
In the second round (tournament), participants were requested to solve a second set of addition 
problems. In contrast to the first task, only the participant with the highest score in each group 
received a payment. The amount was of 150 RWF (approximately 0.17 USD), which is three times 
more than the piece rate amount, for each correct answer. Other members of the group received 
nothing for their effort. In the situation of a tie, earnings were split equally among the top 
performers of the group. 
In the third round (preferred incentive scheme) we offered VLEs the opportunity to choose a 
preferred payment incentive between the piece rate or the tournament payment scheme.  Subjects 
then solved a third set of addition problems. VLEs who chose the tournament compensation 
scheme now had their scores from the third round compared to those of their group's opponent's 
scores from task 2.7 
We continued with a risk experiment after VLEs completed the competition games.  The risk 
experiments closely follow Brick and Visser (2015), which was based on the earlier design of 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) as well as Moore and Eckel (2006). This proceeds as follows: VLEs 
were asked to make twenty-two choices, with each choice providing VLEs with two options. The 
first option provided VLEs with a sure payoff (increasing from 160 RWF (~ 0.18 USD) in the first 
choice to 580 RWF (~ 0.64 USD) in the twenty-second choice).  The second option offered a 
lottery with a 30% probability of receiving 1200 RWF (~1.33 USD) and a 70% probability of 
receiving nothing.  A risk-averse VLE will chose the sure pay-off while a more risk-loving VLE 
will prefer the lottery. A spinning wheel was used to determine the payoffs for VLEs who preferred 
 
6 This enabled the study to inform participants about the gender distribution of groups in a more 
subtle way by also including age and marital status. 
7  Thus, if a VLE chose to compete in Task 3, he/she receives RWF150 if his/her score in Task 3 
is greater than his/her group members’ score in the previous task (Task 2); if not, the VLE receives 
nothing. This is to ensure that a decision by a group member to choose the piece rate payment 
incentive does not affect comparison of scores in the third task (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011). 
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the gamble. The choices of subjects enabled the study to calculate risk measures using VLEs' 
switching points between the sure payoffs and the lottery (Booth et al., 2018; Vieider et al., 2015; 
Brick & Visser 2015). 
Participants were provided with feedback about their performance at the end of the experiment 
after all tasks were completed (including the risk task). Also, participants were paid for all tasks 
according to their performance with earnings ranging from 2000RWF (~2.09 USD) to 12500 RWF 
(~13.09 USD). The average earning received by participants was of 6000RWF (~6.28 USD). The 
experiment lasted for approximately 2 hours. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides details of entrepreneurs' backgrounds and an overview of field outcomes used in 
the analysis. VLEs' background information is obtained from survey data conducted as part of the 
larger RCT study detailed in Clarke et al. (2020) and Visser et al. (2019). The average village-
level entrepreneur is married, 42 years of age, risk-averse, and has at least primary education (7 
years of schooling) and household size of 11 people. 
 
Table 1: Background and Field Variables 
Variable Observation Mean Min Max 
Background     
Age 374 42.19 18 76 
Education 374 6.9 1 16 
Female 374 0.49 0 1 
Marital Status 374 0.90 0 1 
Household size 343 11 1 12 
Household Head 336 0.59 0 1 
District = Rulindo 374 0.35 0 1 
Risk measure (Switching 
Point) 
374 6.33 1 22 
Business Outcomes     
Number of recharges in 3-
month period (Sales) 
374 307.62 40 640 
 Income from Business 335 946.62 0 9000 
Note:  Age is the age of the VLE in years, education is in years of schooling, Female is a dummy showing 
whether the VLE is male or female, Marital status indicates whether VLE is married. Household size is the 
number of people living in VLE's household. Household head shows whether the VLE is a household head. 
Risk measure shows the level of VLEs' attitudes towards risk-taking, ranging from 1 (highly risk-averse) 
to 22 (risk-seeking). For the microenterprise outcomes, recharge frequency, which is used as a proxy for 
sales, is the number of times VLEs recharge lights for customers.  Income is VLEs' self-reported income 
(in RWF) from operating the microenterprise. Source: Authors’ own calculations using survey data 
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For field outcomes, we use administrative data on the number of recharges during the first three 
months of business operations and complement this information with self-reported incomes of 
VLEs, which measures the performance levels of microenterprises. Nuru Energy has a centralised 
server that regularly receives recharge data from the various enterprises. The centralised data 
station provides the study with the sales information for each microenterprise. Self-reported 
incomes from business operations are obtained from the survey data to complement the 
administrative information. Specifically, we consider the total number of recharges of lights for 
the three first months of business operations and the average income per month. A Nuru 
microenterprise on average has a total of 307 recharges in those three months, with the average 
VLE reporting an income of 946 RWF per month. 
Table 2: Gender Group Composition 
Gender groups Observation Proportion 
Experimental group composition   
All-male teams (%) 131 35.03 
All-female teams (%) 130 34.76 
Mixed gender teams (%) 113 30.21 
Microenterprise group composition   
All-male teams (%) 127 33.96 
All-female teams (%) 128 34.22 
Mixed gender teams (%) 119 31.82 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using experimental and survey data 
 
Table 2 shows the gender distribution of teams in the experiment and the field. In the experiment, 
131 (35%) participants were assigned to all-male teams, 130 (34.8%) participated in all-female 
teams, and 113 (30%) were allocated to in mixed gender teams. For the microenterprise gender 
group compositions, 127 (34%) were in all-male teams, 128 (34%) operated in all-female teams 
and 119 (32%) worked in mixed-gender teams. This shows an approximately equal gender 
distribution for both entrepreneurial and experimental groups with no significant difference 
between the two distributions.  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The study aims at examining entrepreneurs' attitudes towards competition and comparing 
entrepreneurs' performance levels in the lab to performance in business. For entrepreneurs' 
attitudes towards competition, we estimate a standard probit model depicted in equation 1: 
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Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = 1)𝑖 = Φ(𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑋𝑖 +𝛾4𝑉𝑖 + ℰ𝑖)  … (1) 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable measuring the willingness of entrepreneurs to 
participate in a competition such that 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 = 1 if the VLE chooses the tournament 
and 0 if the VLE chooses piece rate in the third round of the experiment. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 = 1 indicates 
that a participant is female. Other explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖 include scores from round 2, 
susceptibility to time pressure and response to competition against peers,8 risk preferences, number 
of VLEs per session, and group size, are standard explanatory variables included in estimations of 
willingness to compete (Booth et al., 2018, Dariel et al., 2017, Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). We 
also control for VLEs' background indicators 𝑉𝑖 (age, education, marital status, household size, 
household head, geographical districts of operation, and gender composition of the VLE teams in 
the field). 
To examine how entrepreneurs' performance levels compare to field outcomes, we estimate 
equation 2 using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation approach: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 Gender_Teamsi + 𝛾3𝑋𝑖 + ℰ𝑖                       (2) 
Equation 2 is estimated for lab and field outcomes.  For lab outcomes, the dependent variable 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is VLEs' scores under competition, calculated as the number of correct answers in 
task 3. Gender_Team is the real-world gender teams in which entrepreneurs are working all-male, 
all-female or the mixed gender teams. Each team consist of four members such that the all-male 
and all-female teams have four males and four females respectively per gender group, while the 
mixed gender teams have two males and two females working together in a group. Individual 
background characteristics remains the same as in equation 1. For field outcomes, we use the 
recharge frequency of lights (sales) and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of self-reported 
incomes from VLEs to measure performance.  We face the problem of some VLEs reporting zero 
income when considering the self-reported incomes. The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation 
approximates the natural logarithm of that variable and allows retaining observations with zero 
self-reported income. Standard errors for the field estimation are clustered at the village level since 
 
8 Susceptibility to time pressure measures the difference between competition scores (task 2) and 
piece rate scores (task 1). Including this variable is a standard practice in all competition studies 
(see Booth et al., 2018, Dariel et al., 2017, Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). 
78 
 
the gender composition of VLE teams in the field was randomly assigned at the village level. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Performance in the Lab Under Piece Rate, Tournament and Preferred Incentive 
Treatments 
Table 3 shows the performance levels of VLEs in the lab for all treatments. In the first two rounds 
(Piece rate and Tournament), VLEs scored an average of 7.73 and 9.83 correct answers, 
respectively. This performance varies from 7.54 to 8.16 for single and mixed gender groups under 
the piece rate incentive. Men significantly perform better in the all-male groups, with an average 
score of 8.23 than females in the all-female groups, who scored 6.85 on the average (P-value = 
0.003).  In the mixed-gender groups, both men and women show no performance differences under 
the piece rate incentive (P-value = 0.262) 
For the tournament incentive, performance ranges from 9.49 to 10.64 for single and mixed gender 
groups, with the all-male groups performing better than the all-female groups (P-value = 0.023). 
Performance under the tournament also improved significantly despite a high correlation between 
piece rate and tournament scores of approximately 0.73 and 0.72 for men and women respectively. 
On average, all gender groups solved two more problems under the tournament compensation 
scheme compared to the piece rate scheme with no significant difference (P-value = 0.488). This 
suggests no gender difference associated with improvement in performance after moving from the 
piece rate (task 1) to the tournament round (task 2). Improvement in performance from task 1 to 












Table 3: Performance Levels of VLEs in the Lab 
Variable   Obs Whole 
Sample 
Male Female Diff P-value 
Piece rate (Task 1) Overall 374 7.73 8.38 7.06 1.32 0.002*** 
 Single- sex 261 7.54 8.23 6.85 1.39 0.003*** 
 Mixed  113 8.16 8.69 7.57 1.12 0.262 
Tournament (Task 2) Overall 374 9.83 10.56 9.09 1.47 0.004*** 
 Single- sex 261 9.49 10.12 8.85 1.28 0.023** 
 Mixed  113 10.64 11.52 9.66 1.86 0.062* 
Task 2–Task 1 Overall 374 2.10 2.17 2.03 0.15 0.488 
 Single- sex 261 2.0 1.89 2.0 -0.11 0.793 
 Mixed  113 2.48 2.83 2.09 0.74 0.292 
Preferred incentive (Task 3): 
Tournament Overall 172 11.7 12.19 11.22 0.98 0.256 
 Single- sex 119 11.18 11.69 10.57 1.11 0.204 
 Mixed  53 13 13.35 12.6 0.75 0.872 
Piece rate Overall 201 10.39 11.06 9.78 1.28 0.015** 
 Single-sex 141 10.34 11.07 9.72 1.35 0.021** 
 Mixed 60 10.5 11.03 9.93 1.10 0.353 
Task3 – Task 2 Overall 172 1.02 1.03 1.02 0.01 0.730 
(Tournament Single -sex 119 1.03 1.07 0.98 0.09 0.788 
Choosers) Mixed 53 1.02 0.92 1.12 -0.19 0.899 
Note: P-values are from the Mann Whitney U tests. Values in the “whole sample”, “male” and “female” 
columns are averages for the full sample and each group, respectively. 
We also present average scores for the third task under the preferred incentive treatment. VLEs 
who chose to compete solved an average of 11.7 problems, with performance varying from 11.18 
to 13 for single and mixed gender teams respectively. There is no significant difference in 
performance for all-male and all-female teams (11.69 for men and 10.67 for women) with a 
corresponding P-value of 0.204. Similarly, men and women in mixed gender groups have identical 
performance levels (13.35 and 12.6, respectively, P-value = 0.872).  Comparing performance in 
task 2 (tournament) to task 3, Table 2 shows a slight increase in performance for VLEs who chose 
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to compete and those who did not.  Both men and women solved an average of one more problem 
in Task 3, but this difference is not statistically significant (P-value = 0.730).  The improvement 
in performance under the preferred incentive treatment cut across all gender groups, with no gender 
group improving more than the other. 
 
Figure 1: CDF of Correctly Solved Problems (Task 1: Piece Rate & Task 2: Tournament) 
 
In Figure 1, we show the cumulative distributions for piece rate and tournament treatments by 
gender. This shows the cumulative probability of correctly solving a given number of problems. 
The figure clearly emphasises the existing gender gap reported in Table 2 under the first two tasks 
(Piece rate and Tournament). In both incentive schemes, women show a higher chance of solving 
a lower number of problems than men. This indicates higher performance levels for men than 
women. 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distributions of VLEs who chose to enter the competition under the 
preferred incentive scheme (task 3). In the first graph, we show the cumulative probability of 
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solving a given number of problems for VLEs assigned to mixed gender teams during the 
competition games. The cumulative distributions for single-sex teams are shown in the second 
graph in the right panel. The third graph in Figure 2 shows the distribution for all VLEs (combined) 
irrespective of their gender group assignment. 
 
Figure 2: CDF of Correctly Solved Problems (Task 3: Tournament) 
 We find no substantial difference in the cumulative distributions either men or women. Mixed 
and single-sex teams show similar performance trends for both men and women. However, in the 
single-sex teams, women show a slightly higher cumulative probability distribution for lower 
scores than men. The probability of correctly solving a given number of problems under the 
tournament in task 3 overall is similar for both men and women. 
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5.2 Entrepreneurs’ Willingness to Compete 
This section first analyses competition entry decisions of VLEs. Out of the 374 VLEs who 
participated in the experiment, 172 (46%) chose to compete in the third experimental round.  
Comparing the 46% of participants who chose to compete in our sample to other tournament entry 
rates (29.6% to 54%) from previous studies (Dariel et al., 2017; Apicella et al., 2017; John, 2017; 
Khachatryan et al., 2015; Gneezy et al., 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007)9 we see that, while 
our reported competition entry rate generally falls within the topmost percentile, it does not deviate 
from previously reported rates.  Female entrepreneurs select into competition 43% of the time, 
while men select into competition 49% of the time. The Fischer exact test (P=0.299) indicates that 
this difference between women's and men's competition entry is not statistically significant. While 
there is a possibility that high-ability participants may self-select into the competition, subjects in 
our study did not receive any form of performance feedback between experimental rounds, 
enabling the study to hedge against such potential selection bias. We, however, acknowledge that 
participants are still likely to have beliefs about their ability, but this caveat is inherent to all 
experiments of this type.  
Table 4 shows the results for tournament entry decisions of entrepreneurs based on experimental 
gender group composition.  Columns 1 – 3 show that females are not less likely to compete than 
males. Instead, there are a number of predictors of competition that we analyse in turn. For 
instance, education and risk-taking are more important predictors of competition entry decisions 
in the single-sex teams than in the mixed gender teams. Risk preferences (being risk-loving) is an 
important predictor of competition entry in the all-female groups (Column 4), whereas it does not 
play a significant role in mixed gender teams. Males with higher education levels in the all-male 
experimental groups are more likely to compete.  Married women are more likely to enter 









9 We detail many more studies in Appendix A 
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Table 4: VLE's Competition Entry Decisions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Whole Sample Mixed Single Female Male 
Females 0.0461 0.0478 0.0253   
 (0.108) (0.180) (0.128)   
Experimental single-sex teams 0.0285     
 (0.0706)     
Scores from round 2 0.0178** 0.0400*** 0.0069 0.0051 0.0049 
 (0.0079) (0.0112) (0.0104) (0.0160) (0.0139) 
Tournament - Piece rate -0.0192* -0.0412*** -0.0087 0.0127 -0.0146 
 (0.0104) (0.0156) (0.0141) (0.0217) (0.0185) 
Number of participants per 
session 
-0.0036 -0.0274** 0.0012 0.0021 0.0052 
 (0.0052) (0.0112) (0.0061) (0.0094) (0.0085) 
Risk taking (Switching Point) 0.0089** 0.0104 0.0109*** 0.0117* 0.0049 
 (0.0036) (0.0067) (0.0042) (0.0064) (0.0063) 
Education 0.0252** 0.0201 0.0315** 0.0350 0.0313* 
 (0.0109) (0.0169) (0.0141) (0.0219) (0.0188) 
Household head 0.0213 -0.0600 0.0746 0.160 -0.204 
 (0.0811) (0.141) (0.0923) (0.118) (0.194) 
Household size -0.0219 -0.0412 -0.0167 -0.0210 -0.0098 
 (0.0152) (0.0267) (0.0181) (0.0270) (0.0262) 
Age -0.0017 0.0082 -0.0038 6.41e-05 -0.0048 
 (0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0030) (0.0048) (0.0041) 
Rulindo District 0.0281 -0.0297 0.0489 0.0740 0.0423 
 (0.0780) (0.098) (0.122) (0.185) (0.190) 
Married 0.0542 0.176 0.0056 0.234* -0.229 
 (0.0920) (0.140) (0.115) (0.141) (0.228) 
Field Gender Composition      
2.All- Females -0.0233 0.0985 0.0057   
 (0.110) (0.173) (0.136)   
3.Mixed 0.0309 0.220* -0.0035 0.0357 0.0088 
 (0.0788) (0.122) (0.0949) (0.109) (0.0966) 
Group Size      
2 0.268  0.229  0.244 
 (0.241)  (0.258)  (0.272) 
3 -0.144 -0.0424 -0.191 - 0.181 
 (0.0995) (0.191) (0.118)  (0.200) 
5 0.0122  -0.0228 -0.0793 0.0597 
 (0.0738)  (0.0757) (0.108) (0.114) 
6 0.172  0.124  0.224 
 (0.144)  (0.154)  (0.162) 
Observations 335 102 233 109 115 
Log pseudolikelihood -212.92 -57.19 -147.87 -68.45 -70.55 
Results are marginal effects from a Probit estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 




Controlling for the different gender compositions in the field, we find that entrepreneurs operating 
mixed gender microenterprises and assigned to a mixed gender team in the lab are more likely to 
choose into competition. We find no significant effect for other field gender teams. We 
additionally control for the differences in group sizes encountered during the experiment. Appendix 
B, Table B4 further reports estimations when we restrict the analysis to only groups sizes of four, 
with similar results. In both cases, results show that differences in group sizes do not significantly 
impact the choice into tournament. Overall, findings suggest no gender gap in competition entry 
amongst entrepreneurs operating off-grid microenterprises in rural Rwanda. 
Although our finding of no gender gap in competition entry contradicts a large body of literature 
which shows that women are reluctant to make competition entry decisions (Croson & Gneezy, 
2009), it is perhaps not surprising in the context of Rwanda given its history and progressive gender 
mainstreaming policies implemented subsequently. Following the 1994 genocide which mainly 
targeted men and boys, 70% of Rwanda's population were women. 
This forced the country to involve women in the rebuilding of the nation. As a result, traditionally 
male-dominated positions were offered to women. These national gender policies have gradually 
permeated the perceptions of the younger generation, which is evident in the baseline survey data 
collected as part of the larger RCT study. In the survey, children of VLEs were asked questions 
about their general gender perceptions. Their beliefs suggest that wives should be equally educated 
as husbands, boys should not get more resources for education, and daughters should have similar 
rights as sons in terms of inheriting property (as reported in Appendix B, Table B3).   
In line with these beliefs, Burnet (2011) also identifies that the deliberate gender policies 
implemented by the government have translated into notable successes at the local level.  These 
successes include increased levels of respect from village members and family, improved decision 
making at the household level, women's access to education, and enhanced capacity for women to 
freely speak and be heard at village meetings. This is an indication that the gender equality agenda 
in Rwanda is gradually changing perceptions and empowering women to take on challenging roles 
irrespective of the entrenched cultural barriers still existing in the country. It is likely that the 
progressive women's empowerment policies in Rwanda may be a contributing factor to explain 





Further, the original business model of Nuru before the current gender quota system under study 
also demonstrates how women expressed great interest in the entrepreneurship prospects of the 
Nuru program. Thus, the willingness of women to take on entrepreneurship roles despite its 
associated competitive characteristics could be an additional explanatory factor as to why no 
gender differences exist in the tournament entry decisions of VLEs.  A more recent study by Dariel 
et al. (2017) supports our finding by showing that women in the United Arab Emirates are willing 
to participate in competition. Their results were also obtained in the context of a very entrenched 
patriarchal society after several policies towards women's empowerment and women's 
participation in the labour market were put in place.  
 
Risk-taking and competitiveness, though different concepts, can be related in nature. Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) explain that competition involves uncertainty in earnings, such that any gender 
gap associated with risk preferences can influence decisions to compete. Our results show that 
VLEs with more risk-taking orientations are more likely to choose competition in single-sex teams, 
particularly in the all-female teams, but this is not the case for the mixed and all-male teams. The 
relationship between risk attitudes and competition entry decisions is well established in the 
literature.  For instance, van Veldhuizen (2017) and Bartling (2009) show that less risk-averse 
individuals self-select into competition. As a result, the gender gap observed in competition entry 
decisions is significantly driven by differences in risk attitudes. Similarly, Cardenas et al. (2012) 
explore this concept by comparing results from two countries: Sweden and Colombia. They find a 
positive relationship between risk-loving individuals and competitiveness in Sweden but find no 
such relationship amongst Colombian boys and girls. In line with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), 
they conclude that, whereas risk-taking is a key driver of competition entry decisions, other factors 
such as overconfidence could also influence decisions to compete.  Our results that risk-loving 







5.2 Performance in the Lab vs Field 
In this section, we compare business performance in the field of women who decided to compete 
in the lab to their male counterparts. We further discuss how performance levels of gender teams 
in the lab compare to the performance in the field. Table 5 reports performance of entrepreneurs 
who chose to compete in the third round of the experiment. These are the main results in this study. 
Column 1 shows that the gender composition of teams in the lab experiment did not affect 
performance in the lab.  All-female and mixed gender teams perform as well as all-male teams in 
the lab. Next, columns 2-4 show no gender differences in performance controlling for different 
sets of covariates, including the gender composition of field teams (Columns 3 and 4). Our 
preferred specification is Column 4, which also includes group size fixed effects.  
 
A large body of literature finds that opponents' gender influences performance under competition, 
such that women tend to perform better in single-sex environments than in co-gender environments 
(Delfgaauw et al., 2013; Booth & Nolen 2012; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2008; Gneezy et al., 2003).  
These studies suggest that the gender gap increases when women compete with men – the basis 
for the continuous debate about single-sex schools relative to mixed gender schools.  However, 
Lee, Niederle and Kang (2014) test the gender composition of teams by examining whether single-
sex schooling reduces the gender gap in performance. Contrary to other studies, their study reveals 
that single-sex schools do not necessarily reduce the gender gap in competitiveness. This is 
consistent with our finding that performance of women does not improve under single-sex 
tournaments.  A subsequent study by De Paola et al. (2015) is also consistent with our finding that 









Table 5: Performance in the Lab 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Consistent with Lee et al. (2014) and De Paola et al. (2015), we find that competing in single-sex 
teams does not improve performance in the lab. While the gender of VLEs and the gender 
composition of teams does not affect performance under competition, education is a significant 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Females  -1.219 -1.088 -0.616 
  (1.187) (1.565) (1.596) 
Experimental gender 
group: 
    
All-Female Teams -0.820    
 (1.088)    
Mixed Teams 1.053    
 (1.162)    
Mixed Teams x Male  1.704 1.676 1.645 
  (1.396) (1.420) (1.452) 
Mixed Teams x Female  1.385 1.189 0.891 
  (1.220) (1.258) (1.298) 
Field gender Composition:     
All-Female Teams   -0.087 -0.318 
   (1.543) (1.558) 
Mixed Teams   0.801 0.695 
   (1.043) (1.051) 
Age -0.031 -0.026 -0.021 -0.018 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Education 0.772*** 0.764*** 0.765*** 0.765*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
Rulindo District 0.250 0.092 0.117 -0.140 
 (0.990) (1.023) (1.027) (1.175) 
Household head 0.153 -0.406 -0.429 -0.381 
 (0.971) (1.142) (1.141) (1.139) 
Household size 0.365* 0.330 0.306 0.352 
 (0.214) (0.211) (0.219) (0.225) 
Married 1.532 1.604 1.469 1.424 
 (1.430) (1.400) (1.386) (1.327) 
Risk taking (Switching 
Point) 
-0.021 -0.026 -0.027 -0.033 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
Constant 3.749 4.331 4.069 3.649 
 (2.755) (2.842) (2.833) (5.338) 
Group Size No No No Yes 
Observations 154 154 154 154 
R-Squared 0.303 0.308 0.314 0.322 
88 
 
predictor of VLEs' performance under competition. This is expected given the nature of the tasks 
that participants were asked to perform.  
Previous studies demonstrate the importance of education as a key driver of performance when 
evaluating outcomes such as labour productivity and economic competitiveness (Cabrera & Le 
Renard, 2015; Sahlberg, 2006).  In Rwanda, significant progress has been made by the government 
to ensure universal education access. For instance, the National Gender Policy (2010) and Girls' 
Education Policy (2008) address gender gap issues through affirmative quota systems.  More 
women after the genocide now have access to education, with many rural families convinced about 
the importance of educating girls (Burnet, 2011). The World Bank indicators show that between 
1990 and 1992 (before the genocide) 14,000 fewer girls than boys accessed primary education; 
however, by 2008, approximately 16,000 more girls than boys were in primary schools. The 
increase in access to education for women could be a contributing factor for the high 
competitiveness levels of Rwandan women.  
Results also show a weak significant level for household size in Column 1, which might originate 
from competition within the household for limited resources. Downey (1995) explains that 
household heads and parents have finite resources such as time, energy, and money. They are 
forced to share these limited resources with children and other members as the household increases 
in size, which can result in the dilution of resources. The fact that VLEs from larger households 
perform better compared to smaller households may be due to the urgent need to provide for 
household members, which increases their desire to perform well in return for higher experimental 
payoffs. 
In Table 6 (Columns 1-4), we report results related to performance in the field. The dependent 
variable in columns 1 and 2 is the number of recharges in the first three months of business 
operation. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is self-reported business income. The sample 
in this table is formed by the VLEs who self-selected into competition in the third round of the lab 
experiments. As with the experimental results, field outcomes indicate no significant differences 
in performance based on the gender composition of teams. An important caveat to keep in mind is 
that business performance data refers to the first three months of operation only, so subsequent 
differences in business performance could arise with the pass of time. 
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Married men and women also tend to have lower sales performance levels, although married 
women are more likely than unmarried women to choose competition in our experiment. This 
finding contradicts studies in the entrepreneurship literature (Fairlie & Robb, 2009; 
Wickramasinghe & De Zoyza 2008), which suggest a positive relationship between marriage and 
business performance. These studies also explain that married women tend to have lower business 
performance levels than men. Our finding that married people do not perform as well as single 
people in business might be explained by a number of factors, including the additional time married 
people invest in maintaining their families, which may reduce hours of work and in effect, reduce 
business performance.  
Table 6: Performance in the field 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log (Sales) Log (Sales) Income Income 
 Females  -0.338  0.463 
  (0.224)  (2.099) 
Field Gender Composition:     
All-Female Teams 0.048  0.550  
 (0.142)  (1.191)  
Mixed Teams 0.018  -0.128  
 (0.151)  (0.911)  
Mixed Teams x Male  -0.012  0.396 
  (0.166)  (1.016) 
Mixed Teams x Female  0.033  -1.506 
  (0.181)  (1.193) 
Age 0.001 0.000 -0.038 -0.034 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.038) (0.038) 
Education 0.010 0.007 -0.138 -0.152 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.105) (0.108) 
Rulindo District -0.218 -0.294** -0.540 -0.947 
 (0.142) (0.148) (0.857) (1.002) 
Household head 0.138 0.142 0.914 0.294 
 (0.091) (0.120) (0.902) (1.094) 
Household size 0.026 0.022 -0.166 -0.169 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.214) (0.217) 
Married -0.262** -0.260** -0.319 -0.310 
 (0.128) (0.125) (1.332) (1.320) 
Risk taking (Switching Point) 0.005 0.006 0.061 0.060 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.044) (0.045) 
Experimental gender groups No Yes No Yes 
Constant 5.524*** 6.006*** 6.701*** 5.017*** 
 (0.271) (0.319) (2.198) (0.707) 
Observations 154 154 149 154 
R-Squared 0.0816 0.131 0.0512 0.139 
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Village clustered standard errors for all field estimations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Business performance of women has been constantly underestimated (Brush and Cooper 2012; 
Minniti and Naude 2010; de Bruin et al. 2007; Ahl 2006) based on broader characteristics and 
context-related factors such as industry type, field experience and business size (Baker and Welter, 
2017). Sappletton (2018) shows that the underestimation of women and the observed differences 
between female and male-owned businesses is due to the unequal comparison of business models 
in a given industry. For instance, women often engage in retail businesses focused on serving local 
markets. Such businesses are smaller in size, have lower growth rates and yield lower profits 
despite their high competition levels. Emerging management literature demonstrates how 
measures of business performance such as business sizes and growth rates of industry tend to 
favour men, whereas no performance differences are associated with more specific indicators such 
as profitability, number of employees, number of orders and closure rates (Zolin 2013; Robb & 
Waston 2012). Among the lab participants who self-selected into competition, who are a selected 
subset of villages in the study by Clarke et al. (2020), male-owned enterprises did not outperform 
female-owned enterprises during the first three months of operation. This resonates with Zolin 
(2013) and Robb & Waston (2012), given that we compare the performance of entrepreneurs 
working in the same industry under the same business model with similar terms and conditions. 
The external validity of experiments is often low and continuously criticised by empirical 
researchers.  The artificiality under which lab experiments are conducted makes it difficult for 
real-world generalizability (Schram, 2005).  Roe and Just (2009) argue that the best way to 
overcome the limitations associated with a single research method is to apply multiple approaches 
to the same phenomenon.  Showing that similar results can be achieved when experimental results 
are compared to real-world operations of microenterprises corroborates the external validity of our 
findings.  
 Recent years have also seen the government of Rwanda depend heavily on the private sector's 
participation in implementing off-grid solutions due to the fast pace at which the state wishes to 
attain 100% electricity access.  As a result, national policies have contributed substantially to the 
rapid growth of the private sector, especially for solar companies.  The government has also taken 
steps towards increasing gender equity energy policies in the country, yet private companies are 
still not required to include gender mainstreaming in their operations (Parshotam & van der 
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Westhuizen, 2018).  Despite the support from the government, women's participation in the private 
sector is limited, as some companies potentially see the inclusion of women as a limitation for the 
maximisation of revenue (Parshotam & van der Westhuizen, 2018).  
 
6. Conclusion 
A large body of literature investigates gender differences in competition among student subjects 
in the lab. Yet, the application of such studies to a real-world phenomenon is scarce. This study 
examines competitiveness from the perspective of gender inclusivity in the renewable energy value 
chain in a context where the government of Rwanda is determined to promote private sector 
involvement, in their quest to accelerate rural electrification to off-grid communities. 
Our study adds to the existing literature on competitiveness and gender by being the first to test 
these concepts in the renewable energy sector, using a unique subject pool of entrepreneurs 
operating off-grid gender-focused microenterprises in rural Rwanda – a country globally known 
for its progressive gender policies. Further, the extent to which competition results in the lab reflect 
real-world situations has not received much attention in previous studies. This study provides new 
evidence to support the extent to which experimental results are consistent with profitability in the 
field, to corroborate the external validity of our findings. 
Our findings show that, under competitive situations in the lab, women operating off-grid 
microenterprises in Rwanda are not less willing to enter competition; female VLEs perform as 
well as men when they work in both all-female and mixed gender groups, and gender of opponents 
does not affect their performance. Results also show that, in single-sex groups, education and risk-
taking are key drivers of the decision to compete; in the all-female teams, risk-loving women are 
more likely than risk-averse women to compete. Consistent with our experimental results, field 
findings also show no statistically significant differences in business performance between male 
and female VLEs that self-selected into competition in the lab experiments. One important caveat 
is that we use only the first three months of operations, so we cannot reject that differences in 
business performance could appear later on. Furthermore, this result is informative only of the 
VLEs more prone to competition, not for the average VLEs. 
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While the study unleashes the applicability of experimental results by adding to the competition 
literature, our research also provides insights into the private energy sector.  Currently, women's 
participation in the private energy sector of Rwanda is low, as some companies potentially see the 
inclusion of women as a limitation for revenue maximisation (Parshotam & van der Westhuizen, 
2018). By showing that women entrepreneurs can be as competitive as men entrepreneurs, and that 
women who self-select into competition can perform as well as males that do so, our study provides 
an impetus for private energy companies in Rwanda to reconsider the involvement of more women 
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Appendix A: Compiled Studies 
Table I: List of Studies Based on Niederle–Vesterlund (2007) Experimental Design 
Student Subjects 





 Zhong et al. (2018)  Singapore Addition 197 49% 25% 
Dariel et al (2017) UAE Addition 147 50% 54% 
Apicella et al. (2017)  USA Addition 100 58% 38% 
Halko & Saaksvuori (2017)  Finland Addition 80 74% 54% 
Reuben, Wiswall & Zafar, 
(2017)  
USA Addition 257 54% 27% 
Buser, Dreber & Mollerstrom, 
(2017)  
USA Addition 104 52% 28% 
 Berlin & Dargnies (2016)   France Addition 228 63% 35% 
 Brandts, Groenert & Rott, 
2014)  
Spain Addition 112 59% 30% 
Wozniak et al. (2014)  USA Addition 128 54% 31% 
Niederle et al. (2013) USA Addition 84 74% 31% 
Cadsby et al. (2013) Canada Addition 132 36% 9% 
 Price, (2012)  USA Addition 310 66% 49% 
Mueller & Schwieren (2012)  Germany Addition 127 42% 26% 
Kamas & Preston (2012)  USA Addition 310 41% 23% 
 Dargnies (2012)  France Addition 76 85% 51% 
 Balafoutas, Kerschbamer & 
Sutter (2012)  
Austria Addition 134 59% 31% 
Balafoutas & Sutter (2012)  Austria Addition 72 64% 30% 
Healy & Pate (2011)  USA Addition 192 81% 28% 
Niederle & Vesterlund (2007) USA Addition 80 73% 35% 
Other tasks 
Buser, Gerhards & van der 
Weele, (2018)  
Denmark Mix 297 42% 26% 
Banerjee, Gupta & Villeval 
(2018)  
India Memory task 168 22% 16% 
Wozniak et al. (2014) USA Verbal 128 54% 31% 
 Gupta, Poulsen & Villeval, 
(2013)  
France Mazes 100 60% 34% 
Shurchkov  (2012)  USA Verbal 128 39% 30% 
Buser et al. (2017b) Denmark Mix 297 42% 26% 





Non-student Subjects  




Male  Female 
Adults 
Bönte et al. (2017) Germany Math 225 56% 45% 
 Cassar, Wordofa 
& Zhang (2016)  
China Addition 358 36% 26% 
Apicella and 
Dreber (2015) 










































Buser, Peter & 
Wolter (2017)  
Switzerland Addition 249 68% 51% 
Alma°s et al. 
(2016) 
Norway Addition 483 52% 32% 
 Sutter et al. 
(2016)  
Austria Addition 246 44% 21% 









Ruetzler, (2015)  
Austria Addition 717 40% 19% 
 Lee, Niederle & 
Kang (2014)  
South Korea South Korea 640 30% 22% 
Dreber, von Essen 

















Appendix B: Additional Estimates 
Table B1: Difference in characteristics between experimental and non-experimental Sample 
Variables Lab Indicator 
Age -0.0007 
 (0.0017) 
Number of Working hours 3.77 e-08 
 (3.14e-08) 
Household Income -3.55e-07 
 (8.96e-07) 
Household Expenditure -3.48-07 
 (6.76e-07) 
Household Wage Employment 4.93e-08 
 (1.28e-07) 
Household roof 0.0016 
 0.0215 
Female Teams 0.0313 
 (0.062) 




Happiness level -0.0121 
 (0.009) 






Emotional Health -0.00881* 
 (0.0043) 
Constant 0.1607 
Observations  504 
R- Squared 0.2236 
Village-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes: This table compares characteristics of lab participants to the VLEs who did not participate 
in the experiment in terms of business and socioeconomic characteristics. The dependent variable 






Table B2: Distribution of Groups and Number of People per Experimental Group 
Number of 
people per group 
Female Group Male Group Mixed-gender 
Group 
Total Number of 
Groups 
2 --- 2 --- 2 
3 3 4 3 10 
4 14 16 26 56 
5 13 8 --- 21 
6 --- 2 --- 2 
 
 
Table B3: Baseline Differences in Expected Gender Behaviours by Children 
Variable  Male  Female Difference P-value 
Wives should be less educated than 
their husbands 
3.44 3.6 -0.3.6 0.34 
Boys should get more 
resources/opportunities for 
education than girls 
3.92 3.98 -0.05 0.64 
Girls should be allowed to study 
for as long as they like - as high as 
they want 
1.57 1.57 0.00 0.99 
Daughters should have a similar 
right in terms of inheriting 
property as sons 
1.72 1.82 -0.10 0.48 
Women should get equal 
opportunities in all areas of life  
1.6 1.59 0.00 0.92 
 
Notes: Responses ranges from 1- strongly agree, 2- agree, 3- neither agree nor disagree, 4 - 
disagree and 5-strongly disagree. Children of VLEs  agreed to the  following statements: girls 
should be allowed to study for as long as they like, daughters should have similar rights in terms 
of property as sons and women  should get equal opportunities in all areas of life,  responses. It is 
worth noting that children gave a neutral response to the following statement wives should be less 
educated than their husbands but disagreed with the statement boys should get more 
resources/opportunities for education than girls. These answers demonstrated the extent to which 
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perceptions about women are changing among younger generations living in rural areas of 
Rwanda. 
Table B4: VLE's competition entry decisions for group sizes of four only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Combined Mixed Single Female Male 
Dummy for Females 0.0102 0.0833 -0.132   
 (0.131) (0.171) (0.156)   
Scores from round 2 0.0195** 0.0436*** 0.00238 0.0147 -0.00804 
 (0.00962) (0.0107) (0.0158) (0.0229) (0.0238) 
Tournament - Piece rate -0.0236** -0.0481*** -0.0128 -0.00850 -0.0130 
 (0.0120) (0.0154) (0.0199) (0.0292) (0.0296) 
Number of participants per 
session 
-0.0116 -0.0282** -0.00797 -0.0145 -0.00319 
 (0.00709) (0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0175) (0.0170) 
Risk taking (Switching 
Point) 
0.00842* 0.0136** 0.00439 0.00588 -0.00592 
 (0.00466) (0.00639) (0.00726) (0.00954) (0.0133) 
Education 0.0360*** 0.0324** 0.0415** 0.0312 0.0518** 
 (0.0128) (0.0160) (0.0205) (0.0340) (0.0252) 
Household head -0.0533 -0.0622 -0.101 -0.0563 -0.0768 
 (0.102) (0.133) (0.146) (0.218) (0.278) 
Household size -0.0469** -0.0457* -0.0479* -0.0668* -0.000202 
 (0.0199) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0405) (0.0425) 
Age -0.00121 0.0114** -0.00679 0.000838 -0.0102* 
 (0.00371) (0.00484) (0.00445) (0.00757) (0.00589) 
Rulindo District -0.0277 -0.0913 -0.0342 -0.119 0.0660 
 (0.0929) (0.0963) (0.188) (0.241) (0.323) 
Married 0.0128 0.105 -0.163 0.221 
 
 (0.122) (0.153) (0.154) (0.233)  
Dummy for experimental 
single-sex teams 
0.0393     
 (0.0748)     
Field Gender Composition      
2.All- Females 0.125 0.180 0.228   
 (0.137) (0.166) (0.203)   
3.Mixed 0.186** 0.311*** 0.200 0.000740 0.280** 
 (0.0942) (0.111) (0.125) (0.191) (0.141) 
Observations 197 94 103 52 47 
Log pseudolikelihood -117.96 -48.06 -61.17 -32.18 -25.28 
Results are marginal effects from a Probit estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 









“Thank you for coming. My name is [NAME], I am a doctoral fellow at the University of Cape Town, 
South Africa. These are my colleagues [NAMES]. We have invited you here to play simple economic 
games. 
 
You will earn money for participating in today’s experiment. For your participation, you will be paid F1000. 
This means you are starting the day with F1000. 
 
You will play today’s games in 3 parts 
You can make additional money based on your decisions. 
How much money you make solely depends on the decisions you make during the games. This means it is 
very important you pay attention and understand the rules of the games, which I am going to explain at the 
beginning of every game.  
At the end of the day, the amount you earned will be paid to you IN CASH. 
Please do not talk to anyone when we start playing the games. If at any stage of the game, you have ANY 
question just raise your hand and someone will come to you in private to answer your question.  
Participating in the games is voluntary. If you decide not to continue with the games, you may leave at any 
stage even after we have started playing the games but note that you will not earn any money for 
participating.  
At this point, if you wish to continue with the experiment, you may sign the consent form that my assistants 
are bringing around right now. [HAND OUT THE CONSENT FORMS AND READ TO THEIR 
UNDERSTANDING] 
 
Do we have anyone who needs assistance? [IF YES, WE ASSIST WHERE NECESSARY] 





We are going to share a second form to capture some demographic details before we continue with the 
various games. Under no circumstance will this information be used to identify the decisions you make in 
the games.  [HANDOUT IDENTIFICATION FORMS]    
 
Your experiment number is written on the topmost part of your tables. Is everyone done with filling out the 
forms? [GIVE ASSISTANCE WHERE REQUESTED] Okay, someone is coming around to collect the 




Part 1:  Game 1 
 
You will play three games in this part. In the first game, you are asked to add simple numbers together. 
All you must do is to write down the answers to as many problems as possible in 5 minutes.  
Example: [POINT TO THE POSTER AND DO AN EXAMPLE] 
 
We will time you throughout the tasks. After 5 minutes, I will ask you to stop. Each correct answer to 
the problem will earn you RWF 50. This means if you solve three problems correctly, you earn 3X 
RWF 50 = F150, if you solve four problems correctly you will earn 4X RWF 50= RWF 200 and so 
forth.  There are 20 questions in total to be solved. That means if you get all 20 problems correct you 
will earn a maximum of 20 X RWF 50 = F1000 for this game. 
 
Now, your decision sheets for this game comes in the form of a booklet: one problem on each page. 
So, after solving a question, you turn to the next page and continue solving until the 5 minutes is up.  
The use of mobile phones/calculators are not allowed in this session. 
 
Once again, do not talk to anyone during the games. 
 
After you finish with all the games, your results for this part will be given to you individually at the 





[DISTRIBUTE BOOKLETS] Do not open your booklets until asked to do so. 
 
[AFTER EVERYBODY HAS GOTTEN THEIR BOOKLETS] Now, write down your experimental 
number which was given to you at the start of the day in the blank space on your booklets. [POINT TO 
POSTER] 
 
Okay! Let’s continue, Solve as many problems as you can in 5 minutes. You can now open your 
booklets and start! 
After 5 minutes, stop solving!  Pencils Down! [COLLECT BOOKLETS] 
 
Game 2 
 Again, in this game, you are asked to add as many numbers as you can in 5 minutes. The difference 
now is that for this game, you will be part of a group. The people in your group will be randomly 
picked from this room. We will hand over to you some basic information about your group 
members. However, you will never know the names of the other people in your group, and they will 
never know your name.  
Your performance in this round will be compared to the other members of your group. Only the 
person with the highest score in each group will be paid for this round. The amount paid to the 
person who solved the highest number of problems for each group is now RWF 150 for each 
problem solved correctly. That is the winner of this game for each group earns RWF 150 for each 
correct problem.  
This means if the highest score in the group is 10, the person who had the 10 will earn RWF 150 
X 10 = RWF 1500 
Once again there are 20 problems in total to be solved so the highest amount, the winner for each 
group can make 20 X RWF 150 = RWF 3000 
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If two or more people have the same score in a group, the earnings will be split among the top 
performers of the group equally. 
For example: If in a group, two people have the same score, which is also the highest score of the 
group, let’s say their score was 5. Then it means the earnings become 5 X RWF150=RWF750. In 
this case, the F750 will be shared equally between these two winners. This means they will receive 
F375 each. 
Remember if you are not the winner of your group you earn NOTHING for this game. 
Any question? Great! Now let’s start with the game. 
[DISTRIBUTE BOOKLETS WITH THE BASIC INFORMATION OF GROUP MEMBERS] Do not 
open your booklets until asked to do so. 
 
[AFTER EVERYBODY HAS GOTTEN THEIR BOOKLETS] Now, write down your experimental 
number which was given to you at the start of the day and your group numbers [SHOW THEM 
WHERE THEY ARE] in the blank space on your booklets. [POINT TO POSTER]. ASSISTANTS GO 
ROUND TO EXPLAIN THE BASIC INFORMATION OF GROUP MEMBERS TO 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Okay! Let’s continue, Solve as many problems as you can in 5 minutes. Remember, you are now in 
groups. You can now open your booklets and start! 
 
After 5 minutes, stop solving!  Pencils Down! [COLLECT BOOKLETS] 
 
Game 3 
In this game, you will go through the additions again in 5 minutes as done in previous games. But now 
you can choose which way you want to be paid. Do you want to be paid by your individual performance 




As I said in Game 1, you are paid RWF 50 for each correctly solved problem. In Game 2, if you are 
the winner of your group, you get three times higher the amount paid for each correct problem. That 
is, you earn RWF 150 for each correct problem. 
 
Since we have a total of 20 problems, it means if you choose to be paid by your own performance as 
done in Game 1 the maximum amount you can make is RWF 1000 but if you choose to play in a group 
as done in Game 2 the maximum amount you can earn is RWF 3000 if you are the winner. If you 
choose to play in a group and you are not the winner, you earn nothing for this game. 
 
So, if you choose to play the individual performance task, you will be paid RWF 50 for each problem 
solved correctly. However, if you choose to compare your performance to your group, you will earn 




Now, write your experimental number and choose how you want to be paid for this round on sheets 
in front of you [POINT TO POSTER]  
 




[      ] – Individual task payment         
 
[      ] – Group task Payment 
 
[ASSIST PARTICIPANTS] 
[ DISTRIBUTE DECISION BOOKLETS WHILES COLLECTING PREVIOUS SHEETS GIVEN OUT] 




Now, write down your experimental number (given at the start of the day) and group numbers [IN THE 
CASE OF THOSE WHO CHOSE TO PLAY IN GROUPS] in the blank space on your booklets  
Okay! Let’s continue, Solve as many problems as you can.  You can start! 
 
After 5 minutes, stop solving!  Pencils Down! [COLLECT BOOKLETS]”  
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Chapter 4: Risk attitudes, gender and business performance among off-grid 
renewable energy entrepreneurs in rural Rwanda. 
 
Rebecca A. Klege 
 
Abstract 
Theory predicts that entrepreneurs’ ability to take risks positively affect business success. Yet, 
empirical findings are mixed, with no available experimental evidence. We fill the gap by 
conducting a lab-in-the-field experiment among 374 entrepreneurs operating off-grid renewable 
energy recharge stations in assigned gender teams, to examine risk attitudes among entrepreneurs 
and the effect of risk aversion on business performance in rural Rwanda. Experimental results are 
additionally compared to subjective risk measures. Findings show a strong risk aversion among 
entrepreneurs. Results also reveal a negative relationship between risk aversion and business 
performance. Thus, entrepreneurs with high risk-taking abilities tend to record better sales. 
Contrary to experimental results, we find no significant relationship between risk attitudes and 
business performance for subjective risk measures. Women reveal higher risk aversion levels than 
men for both experimental and survey risk measures. Despite the gender differences in risk 
aversion, women are not outperformed by male entrepreneurs. Additional factors influencing the 
risk attitudes of entrepreneurs’ and the implications of results are discussed. 












Risk-taking and uncertainty are essential drivers of entrepreneurial success and can be traced back 
to the early works of Knight (1921) and Kihlstrom and Laffront (1979). Economic theory predicts 
that business owners tend to be less risk-averse than others (Koudstaal, Sloof & Praag, 2016). In 
effect, entrepreneurs’ risk attitudes are expected to affect business performance. Whereas 
economic literature has actively studied entrepreneurs risk-taking abilities by comparing them to 
non-entrepreneurs using both empirical and experimental techniques (Koudstaal et al., 2016; 
Holm, Opper & Nee, 2013;  Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013; Djankov, Roland & Zhuravkaya, 
2007), literature examining the effect of risk attitudes on business performance has been dominated 
by psychological and management studies (e.g. Boermans & Willebrands, 2017; Willebrands, 
Lammers & Hartog, 2012; Kraus et al.,2012; Naldi et al.,2007). As a result, previous studies that 
examine the relationship between risk and business performance has been reliant on psychometric 
and hypothetical measures of risk. 
The study extends the existing literature by conducting a lab-in-the-field experiment among 374 
entrepreneurs in rural Rwanda to examine the relationship between risk attitudes and business 
performance. These entrepreneurs have been operating off-grid renewable energy recharge stations 
since 2016 in assigned gender teams, as part of a more extensive randomized control trial (RCT) 
study focused on women empowerment in the renewable energy sector.  
Unlike previous studies, our study context is an interesting one. First, the government of Rwanda 
is promoting private sector participation in the energy sector as a pathway to achieve its target of 
providing electricity access for all. As a result, several entrepreneurship activities are springing up 
in the renewable energy sector, with many focused on using community members as sales agents. 
The entrepreneurs used for this study comes from the business model of Nuru energy – one of the 
leading solar energy providers in Rwanda. Examining the relationship between risk-taking and 
business performance in such a model will provide key insights into the abilities of sales agents 
which will better inform future community recruitment processes in the private renewable energy 
sector. Second, previous studies that have attempted studying the relationship between risk and 
business success relied on entrepreneurs operating different models in various industries. 
Sappleton (2018) argues that differences in business operations can lead to varied performance 
levels which could explain the mixed findings reported in the literature. Our study context provides 
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us with a subject pool of entrepreneurs working in the same sector, operating the same business 
models, with a similar number of customers as well as the same operational years in business. 
Given that entrepreneurs operate in gender teams, the study further explores the relationship 
between risk and business performance from a gender perspective. 
Experimentally, the multiple price list design,  following notable studies such as Booth et al. 
(2018), Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2016), Brick and Visser (2015), Brick, Visser and Burns 
(2012) and Holt and Laury (2002)  is used to elicit entrepreneurs risk attitudes. Survey risk 
measures were based on entrepreneurs self-reported ability to take risks on a scale of 1 (never take 
risks) to 5 (always take risks). Following the Willebrands et al. (2012) and Daniel and Mead 
(1998), the study employs sales levels as a measure for business performance. 
 Our experimental evidence reveals a strong risk aversion among entrepreneurs. Comparing our 
results to similar risk measures, we find that the risk aversion levels of our sample is not any 
different from small-scale farmers in Ethiopia and South Africa (Brick & Visser 2015; Akay et al., 
2012). Thus, entrepreneurs from this study are like ordinary farmers in other developing countries.  
Second, our study shows high-risk aversion negatively affects business success. As such, 
entrepreneurs in our sample with better risk-taking abilities tend to record better sales. 
Contrary to our experimental results, we find no significant relationship between risk and business 
performance when survey risk measures are used. However, women reveal higher risk aversion 
levels than men for both risk measures. Despite the gender differences in risk aversion, women are 
not outperformed by male entrepreneurs. Additional factors influencing the risk attitudes of 
entrepreneurs’ and the implications of results are discussed. Given that our experimental evidence 
confirms the general theoretical assertion that risk is vital for business success, there is a need for 
more future experimental studies to resolve the inconclusiveness of empirical findings. 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 review existing studies. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design, survey measures of risk and the measurement of business performance. The 
sample and data of the study are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and 
discussion of findings. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Every economic decision requires some level of risk-taking, explaining why the study of risk 
continues to dominate economic literature. Standard theory predicts that risk-taking is vital for 
entrepreneurship, which in turn propel the successfulness of a business (Kihlstrom & Laffont 1979; 
Kirzner 1973; Knight 1921; Cantillon 1755). Previous studies that examine risk attitudes of 
entrepreneurs compare them to non-entrepreneurs using both empirical and experimental 
approaches (see Appendix D for a comprehensive list of papers and methods). The most recent of 
such studies was by Koudstaal et al. (2016). Using a lab-in-the-field experiment, they compared 
entrepreneurs to both managers and employees in the Netherlands. They find that entrepreneurs 
risk attitudes were similar to managers but tend to be more risk-loving than employees.  
The relationship between risk attitudes and business success has instead been mixed and skewed 
towards psychological and management studies (see a review by Rauch et al., 2009). While some 
studies show a positive relationship between risk and firm performance (Boemans & Willebrands, 
2017; Wang &Yen, 2012; Ma et al., 2012) others find a negative relationship (Rezaei et al., 2018; 
Kollmann & Stockman, 2014; Lechner & Gudmundsson, 2014; Naldi et al., 2007; Tang et al., 
2007), a few found no effects (Thapa, 2015; Zhao, Seibert & Lumpkin, 2010) and even some show 
a U-shape relationship (Diez Esteban et al., 2017; Begley & Boyd, 1987).  Rauch and Freeze 
(2000) in a meta-analysis of six studies, find a negative relationship between risk-taking and 
business performance. Using data from Swedish firms, Naldi et al. (2007) report a negative 
association between risk-taking and business success. Caiendo, Fossen and Kritikos (2010) reveal 
that the relationship is rather non-linear as entrepreneurs with medium risk are more likely to 
survive compared to those with higher or lower risk-taking abilities.  
In developing economies, findings also seem to be inconclusive. Koop, Reu de and Frese (2000) 
examined the relationship between risk-taking and business success among entrepreneurs in 
Uganda and found a significant positive effect. A similar study looking at microenterprises in 
Southern Africa by Krauss et al. (2005) also show a positive effect. A study by Willebrands et al. 
(2012) based on small scale enterprises in Nigeria, analysed the relationship between risk-taking 
and business performance. Results from their study suggest that risk propensity negatively affect 
business success. A more recent study by Boermans and Willebrands (2017) using Tanzanian data 
on 611 entrepreneurs demonstrate that risk propensity and risk perceptions are two different 
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concepts. They conclude that while risk perceptions positively affect business performance, high-
risk propensity shows a negative effect. The inconclusiveness in previous studies has primarily 
been informed by psychometric and hypothetical measures of risk, based on survey data. Our study 
fills the gap by conducting a lab-in-the-field experiment among 374 entrepreneurs in rural Rwanda 
to examine the relationship between risk attitudes and business performance. 
 
3. Experimental and Survey Design 
Similar to the sample group used in Chapter 3, entrepreneurs in the larger randomised control trial 
study were recruited as follows. First, 272 villages in the Rwanda district of Rulindo and Ruhango 
were sampled to participate in a new Nuru business model. With the assistance of village leaders, 
villages were approached about the opportunity of setting up solar recharge stations with each 
station to be run by a four-person microentrepreneur team. For the purposes of the field experiment, 
interested villages were randomly sorted into three groups (all-male, all-female, and mixed teams). 
Community members formed their groups without any restrictions from the research team apart 
from the gender composition request. Prospective microentrepreneur teams were then requested 
to raise an investment capital (commitment fees) of 40,000 Rwandan Francs (~50USD) in 
exchange for their start-up recharging equipment. All 272 villages raised these commitment fees 
prior to assigning treatment groups. Potential microenterprises were informed that their village had 
a 50% probability of being selected into the first phase of the new Nuru business. Thus, half of the 
sample was randomly assigned to a treatment arm.  Villages who were selected to a control group 
had their money returned to team members, while villages who were selected into the treatment 
group received recharging equipment and 100 lights per each village to commence business. The 
operations and management decisions were solely up to members of the team. Also, given that 
community members could form their own gender teams, there is a potential that team members 
could be familiar with each other before the commencement of business. Clarke et al. (2020) and 
Visser et al. (2019) provide a detailed account of the randomisation process. 
 
3.1 Experimental Design 
The study adopts the multiple price list (MPL) choice tasks following the design closely by Brick 
and Visser (2015) and Moore and Eckel (2006) which is a variation of the original Holt and Laury 
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(2002) design. The MPL is a widely used design, employed by notable studies including Booth et 
al. (2018), Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2016), Brick, Visser and Burns (2012). 
Our experiment starts by presenting participants with a set of twenty-two paired lotteries with each 
decision pair consisting of two options: Option 1 – a certain payoff and Option 2 – a gamble. 
Appendix A presents the decision sheet used for the experiment. Detailed instructions are included 
as Appendix E10. Similar to Brick and Visser (2015) and Moore and Eckel (2016), the sure payoffs 
in option one increases from RWF11 160 (0.18 USD) to RWF 580 (0.64 USD) with RWF 20 
increments as participants move from the first choice ( row one) to the last choice (row twenty-
two). The second option offers participants a constant payoff of 30% probability12 of receiving 
1200 RWF (1.33 USD) and a 70% probability of earning nothing for all twenty-two decision rows. 
It is expected that extremely risk-averse individuals will prefer the sure payoff in the first decision 
row, whereas extreme risk-loving subjects will prefer the gamble in the last row. A risk-neutral 
individual will, however, switch from option two to one when the expected value of both options 
is the same (Harrison 2005). In our case, this will be at decision row 11. Thus, a rational decision-
maker who starts by choosing option one or switches from option two to option one at any given 
decision row is expected to continue choosing option one till the last decision row (twenty-two). 
The switching points provide the study with the certainty equivalent measures of participants. 
A common concern associated with multiple price list design is the presence of multiple switching 
points (Vieder et al., 2015; Brick et al., 2012; Galarza, 2009; Jacobson & Petrie, 2009; Harrison 
2005; Holt and Laury, 2002). Detailed instructions were provided to participants before the start 
of the experiment to minimize this potential problem. These instructions were read out loud in the 
official local language of Rwanda – Kinyarwanda – to the understanding of participants. The use 
of visual aids enables better comprehension amongst participants with low levels of education 
(Akay et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 2004; Corso, Hammitt & Graham, 2001). Posters, spinning 
wheels and coloured balls were therefore used to explain better the different choices and 
 
10 Experimental instructions were obtained from Brick and Visser 2015 and revised to suit of our 
study 
11 Rwanda Francs 
12 We maintained a constant probability throughout the experiment because participant had low 
educational levels and were not no familiar with such experimental procedures. 
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probabilities associated with each pay-off. A series of practise rounds before the start of the game13 
were played to confirm participants’ understanding of instructions before proceeding to the actual 
experimental sheets for the study. As a result, no multiple switching behaviour was recorded, and 
participants did not feel pressurized to switch or stick to specific choices. At the end of the 
experiment, a ball was drawn from a bag to determine which of the twenty-two rows will be played 
for real money. A spinning wheel was used to determine the payoffs of subjects who chose the 
lottery (option two).  
3.2 Survey design  
We also rely on an extensive survey questionnaire designed to study the impacts of gender quota 
business model as part of a large RCT study. The questionnaire was carefully designed after a 
series of stakeholder interviews and piloting phase.  Sections from the questionnaire used in this 
study include entrepreneurs general self-perceived risk preferences, demographic and socio-
economic indicators of participants which includes gender, age, marital status, geographical 
location, education, income and household size.  Entrepreneurs were also asked to provide 
information on their competitive abilities as well as their general happiness levels. Participants 
self-perceived risk ranged from a scale of 1 (never take risks) to 5 (always take risks). Happiness, 
on the other hand, ranges from 1 (not happy) to 10 (very happy). Entrepreneurs also either 
considered themselves as competitive (1) or not competitive (0).  
 
4. Sample and Data 
The study was conducted with a sample of 374 participants located in 129 villages of Rwanda.  
Our participants are entrepreneurs – energy service providers, recharging Nuru LED lights for 
community members off the national grid at a fee.  These entrepreneurs have been working in 
uniquely assigned gender teams (all-female, all-male and mixed-gender teams) of four members 
per team as part of a more extensive RCT study since 2016. Before conducting the experiment, a 
personal invitation was sent out to all entrepreneurs in the Rulindo and Ruhango districts of 
Rwanda operating the Nuru off-grid microenterprises.   Participants were allocated into different 
sector groups based on the distance to their respective villages with a total of 25 conducted lab-in-
 
13 The practice rounds used different scenarios similar to actual games played 
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the-field experimental sessions. Self-perceived risk measures, as well as entrepreneurs background 
and household’s information, are obtained from a more extensive survey conducted as part of the 
randomized control trial study, as discussed in Barron et al. (2019).  
Table 1 report the descriptive statistics profile for survey variables. The average entrepreneur is 
42 years of age with a low education level. For instance, most participants (87.43% of the sample) 
had only primary education with an average of seven years of schooling.  Only 1% of the sample 
reported higher education in the form of diploma or degrees.  Approximately 11 % of the sample 
had secondary or technical education (between 11-13 years of schooling). Given that the criteria 
for participation include the ability to read and write14 as an entrepreneur, all subjects had some 
form of education.  
Table 1: Survey variables 




Age  374 Age of entrepreneur 42 10.83 
Education  374 Education of the 
entrepreneur (in years) 
7 6.94 
Household size 342 Number of members 
living in the 
entrepreneur’s household 
5 0.79 
Female (%) 374 1=female, 0= male 0.49 0.50 
Married (%) 374 1= married, 0 = otherwise 0.90 0.29 
District 374 1= Ruhango, 2 = Rulindo 1.35 0.48 
Income 342 Income of entrepreneur 14,709 28917 
Happiness 342 Happiness level (0= not 
happy; 10= very happy) 
6 2.15 
Competitiveness 342 1 = competitive, 0= not 
competitive 
0.96 0.18 
Survey Risk 342 Self-reported risk (1 = 
never take risks; 5 
=always take risks) 
3.12 1.21 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using survey data 
The average household size of participants is five.  Most subjects are from the Ruhango district of 
Rwanda (64%) with the remaining 34% located in Rulindo district. The gender distribution of our 
subjects is almost equal.  Precisely, 49% of the sample are females, and the remaining 50.8% are 
males. Participants are mostly married (90%) with monthly personal income approximately RWF 
 
14 The nature of the study requires participants to be able to read and write as we wanted to limit 
any human interference during the decision-making process. 
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14,709 (15.48 USD) on the average. Overall, most entrepreneurs (97%) self-reported high levels 
of competitiveness and are relatively happy. The average self-reported risk measure shows that 
entrepreneurs sometimes take risks.   
 
4.1 Measuring experimental risk attitudes 
Entrepreneurs’ risk attitudes were informed by the number of safe choices. This enables the study 
to observe the associated switching points for each entrepreneur. The switching points provide a 
straightforward interpretation of risk attitudes without invoking assumptions surrounding the 
theory of utility maximization (Jin et al., 2017; Koudstaal et al., 2015; Brick & Visser, 2015). 
Using the switching points, we directly observe participants corresponding certainty equivalents. 
Appendix B presents the distribution of the number of safe choices made by participants and the 
associated switching points. Choices reveal that 54% of entrepreneurs are extremely risk-averse, 
10% are extremely risk-loving, and only 2% are risk-neutral.  
Following Brick and Visser (2015), Sutter et al. (2013) and Akay et al. (2012), the certainty 
equivalents of participants are used to create entrepreneurs’ risk aversion measures. This is done 




  where 𝐶𝐸 is the certainty equivalent of participants, 𝐶𝐸𝑈 denote the highest 
possible certainty equivalent and 𝐶𝐸𝑙 is the lowest possible certainty equivalent. When the value 
of the calculated risk measure (certainty equivalent ratio) is 0 it signifies risk-seeking behavior 0.5 
implies risk neutrality, and 1 indicates risk aversion. 
Table 2: Implied constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) ranges and risk classification   
Switching row Number of safe choices CRRA ranges Risk classification 
10-11 11-13 0.00< r < 0.09 
Risk neutral/ slightly risk 
averse 
6-9 14-17  0.09< r < 0.25 
 
2-5 18-21 0.25 < r < 0.40  
1 22 0.40 < r  






Although we avoid the reliance on the utility maximization theory, to enable successful 
comparison with notable studies such as Brick et al. (2012), Andersen et al. (2010), Andersen et 
al. (2008), Harrison and Ruström (2008),  and Holt and Laury (2002) we present the implied risk 
bounds in Table 2 with focus on risk-averse choices. Assuming a constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) utility function: U(x) = (x1−r)/ (1 − r) an entrepreneur who for instance switches from 
option two to option one between row six to nine reveals an implied CRRA range of 0.09 to 0.25. 
4.2 Measuring business performance 
Various indicators can be used to measure the success of a business. For instance, Krauss et al. 
(2005) used a single index based on an aggregation of sales, profit, and the number of customers 
to measure the success of a business. On the other hand, Koop, Reu de, and Freese (2000) measure 
business performance as the number of employees in a firm. Profitability seems to be a more 
attractive measure of business success; however, Daniels and Mead (1998) identify 1) incorrect 
reporting of profits among entrepreneurs, 2) improper records keeping, 3) seasonality and 4) recall 
bias as challenges associated with using profit to measure business success. They, however, 
identified sales as a relatively uncontroversial measure which can be easily remembered by 
entrepreneurs. Following Daniels and Mead (1998) and the fact that sales information (recharge 
frequency) from the Nuru model are directly transmitted to a centralized data hub eliminating any 
potential human errors, we use sales information as a measure for business performance. 
 
Table 3: Microenterprise variables 





Recharge Frequency 374 209 119.17 1 576 
Gender Teams:      
All-male teams (%) 127 0.34 - - - 
All-female teams (%) 128 0.34 - - - 
Mixed gender teams (%) 119 0.32 - - - 





Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of microenterprise variables. The light recharges range 
from 1 to 509, with an average of 209 recharges. Each village has one microenterprise. This 
enterprise is either owned together by an all-female team, an all-male team or a mixed-gender team 
consisting of four members. From our sample, 127 (34%) participants work in all-male teams, 128 
(34%) of our subjects operates in all-female teams and 119 (32%) work in mixed teams. This 
indicates an approximately equal distribution of the assigned entrepreneurial teams. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Self-perceived risk attitudes 
We first estimate the ordered probit regression to identify factors influencing entrepreneurs self-
reported risk attitudes in Table 4. We include age and gender, argued in the literature as exogenous 
determinants of risk (Dohmen et al., 2011). Like previous studies, (e.g. Kerri & Visser, 2015; 
Maart-Noelck & Musshoff, 2014; Akay et al. 2012; Dohmen et al., 2011; Tanaka et al. 2010) 
additional variables such as education, income, marital status and household size are included in 
the estimation. We also control for business characteristics – gender teams of operations as well 
as the location of the enterprise. In addition, we control for two self-reported behavioural measures: 
competitiveness and happiness. Previous studies neglect the relationship between individual’s 
happiness levels and risk-taking, although anecdotal evidence of such a relationship exists15. For 
instance, Goudie et al. (2014) show that happy people are less likely to take risks. Thus, accounting 
for happiness enables the study to further comment on the relationship between risk and happiness 
 
15The two studies that explicit examine risk taking and happiness levels are Gouldie et al. (2014) 
and Jin et al. (2017) with both relying on survey data. Experimental relationship between these 
two attitudinal measures is yet to be examined. 
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Table 4: Determinants of entrepreneurs self-perceived risk attitudes 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Female -0.314*** -0.466*** -0.485*** -0.477*** -0.484*** -0.479*** -0.458*** -0.503*** -0.503*** -0.462*** 
 (0.116) (0.172) (0.171) (0.170) (0.172) (0.176) (0.166) (0.172) (0.173) (0.177) 
Female Teams  0.240 0.232 0.223 0.230 0.224 0.260 0.231 0.229 0.256 
  (0.202) (0.201) (0.200) (0.202) (0.206) (0.196) (0.203) (0.203) (0.205) 
Male Teams  0.226 0.207 0.209 0.206 0.197 0.208 0.198 0.192 0.185 
  (0.160) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.161) 
Married     0.017     0.076 
     (0.198)     (0.203) 
Age   -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
HH_size   0.021  0.020 0.020 0.019 0.023 0.021 0.011 
   (0.030)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) 
Education      0.044*    0.042* 
      (0.023)    (0.022) 
Income       0.041***   0.036** 
       (0.013)   (0.014) 
Happiness        0.072** 0.070** 0.053* 
        (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) 
Competitiveness         0.734** 0.844** 
         (0.348) (0.337) 
Rulindo District          0.141 
          (0.125) 
Log-likelihood -521 -520 -518 -518 -518 -516. -514 -515 -512 -506 
Wald Chi(df) 7.37(1) 9.51(3) 11.86(5) 11.36(4) 11.89(6) 15.57(6) 20.02(6) 19.82(6) 25.94(7) 36.20(11) 
P-value 0.006 0.023 0.036 0.023 0.065 0.016 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The resulting coefficients from Table 4 are robust across all estimations (Columns 1- 10). First, 
results show an apparent gender effect. Women self-report to be less willing to take risks than men. 
This finding is in line with previous studies that employ survey risk measures as dependent 
variables. For instance, Jin et al. (2017) in their study asked farmers in rural China about their 
willingness to take risks on a scale of 0 to 10 and found that men consistent with our result were 
more willing to take risks than women. Similarly, Dohmen et al. (2011) using a panel survey of 
the German adult population, show that women were less willing to take risks than men. A survey 
study conducted by Shema and Mutarindwa (2017) in Rwanda (our study context) also confirms 
our results by showing that 61% of women self-report low risk-taking abilities than men.  
Consistent with Dohmen et al. (2011), we find that entrepreneurs with high income and high 
education levels are more likely to take risks. Happy people are also more likely to take risks. 
Whereas our finding on happiness is consistent with Jin et al. (2017) conducted in China, it 
contradicts the conclusion of Goudie et al. (2014) which was based on an American study sample. 
Findings also show a positive relationship between competitiveness and risk taking. 
5.2 Lab results 
Figure 1 presents the certainty equivalents distribution of participants. In line with Appendix B, a 
greater proportion of entrepreneurs show high risk-aversion levels and therefore reveal the lowest 
certainty equivalent. The top panel shows that at a 30% probability level of winning RWF 1200, 
about 55% of entrepreneurs prefer the safe option. A comparable study by Brick and Visser (2015) 
using a sample of 82 South African small-scale farmers with a gambling probability of 30% 
observe similar high-risk aversion proportion of 51%. Akay et al. (2012) also based on small-scale 
farmers in Ethiopia, find that 60% of their sample were highly risk averse. Thus, contrary to 
expectations risk attitudes of entrepreneurs operating the Nuru energy business model in Rwanda, 
to a larger extent are not any different from non-entrepreneurs such as ordinary farmers in South 




Figure 1: Certainty equivalents frequency distributions. The reference line (in red) reflects the 
expected value of the gamble. 
Studies distinguishing entrepreneurs from others are extensive and mixed. Two notable studies 
Koudstaal et al., (2016) and Holm et al., (2013) using lab-in-the-field -experiments addressed the 
inconclusiveness in this body of literature. Precisely, Koudstaal et al., (2016) comparing 
entrepreneurs to two control groups: managers and employees in the Netherlands, show that 
entrepreneurs tend to have similar risk aversion levels with managers, but show lower risk aversion 
levels than employees. Hom et al., (2013), on the other hand, compared entrepreneurs to a sample 
of non-entrepreneurs in China. They find that entrepreneurs were more likely and willing to take 
a strategic risk but not so willing to take risks that do not require any strategy. 
Although our finding of strong risk aversion among entrepreneurs contradicts the find of Koudstaal 
et al., (2016) and Holm et al., (2013), results are not surprising. The recruitment process of the 
Nuru business model targeted ordinary community members who were willing and able to raise 
the commitment fees with focus on gender, poverty alleviation as well as access to modern energy. 
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Commitment fees were therefore set at the barest minimum – RWF 10,000 (USD 10) per person 
to reduce entry barriers. In effect, most entrepreneurs operating the Nuru recharging stations were 
also into subsistence farming, indicating why we find high-risk aversion among our sample. A 
disaggregation of the sample by gender for the experimental risk measure in the lower panel of 
Figure 1 reveal that women are more likely to choose the safer option (60%) than men (50%). 
Women, therefore, show higher risk aversion levels than men. 
Table 5: Risk aversion among entrepreneurs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.155 0.289* 0.305* 0.302* 0.288* 0.297* 
 (0.098) (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
Female Teams  -0.193 -0.186 -0.157 -0.155 -0.156 
  (0.183) (0.182) (0.183) (0.183) (0.182) 
Male Teams  0.061 0.094 0.106 0.114 0.115 
  (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
Age   0.010* 0.011** 0.010* 0.010* 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
HH_size   -0.035 -0.038 -0.036 -0.038 
   (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Rulindo District    0.193* 0.208* 0.213* 
    (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) 
Married    -0.119 -0.151 -0.143 
    (0.182) (0.186) (0.186) 
Education     -0.013 -0.012 
     (0.018) (0.018) 
Income     -0.010 -0.008 
     (0.013) (0.013) 
Happiness      -0.018 
      (0.024) 
Competitiveness      0.045 
      (0.289) 
Constant 1.021*** 1.002*** 0.761*** 0.771*** 0.983*** 1.031** 
 (0.072) (0.087) (0.239) (0.274) (0.345) (0.477) 
Log likelihood -337.75 -308.81 -306.57 -304 -304 -303 
LR Chi 2(1) 2.53 4.98 9.47 13.01 14.11 14.70 
Observations 374 342 342 342 342 342 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the 
𝐶𝐸- ratio with increasing values denoting risk-aversion. 
 
Given that most participants reported the lowest possible certainty equivalent, which causes our 
data to be censored on the right, we use a Tobit regression model. Table 5 reports the results of 
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risk aversion based on the same set of explanatory variables used for the self-reported risk analysis 
in Table 4. Corresponding OLS results are presented in Appendix C.  
Confirming the findings of Figure 1 and Table 4, we find a clear gender effect for risk-aversion 
across model specifications from Column 2 to 6. Female entrepreneurs tend to show higher risk-
aversion levels than men. We also find a weak relationship between age and risk aversion. Older 
people are more risk-averse relative to younger people. Comparing experimental results to the self-
reported risk results, we find that gender is a major driving factor of both risk measures. 
Interestingly, entrepreneurs in Rulindo seems to more risk averse than those from the Ruhango 
district. In the two cases, women are more risk-averse than men. Unlike the survey results, we find 
no significant effect for income, education, happiness and competitiveness for the experimental 
risk measure. 
Gender differences in risk-taking is a widely researched subject. Previous studies have either 
actively examined differences between male and female risk attitudes or partially explored the 
topic (Nelson, 2016; Booth, Cardona-Sosa, & Nolen,2014; Hardies, Breesch & Branson, 2013; 
Booth & Nolen, 2012; Charness & Gneezy,2012; Gneezy  & Croson, 2009; Byrnes, Miller & 
Schafer; 1999). Most studies find differences in risk aversion between men and women with a few 
finding no strong effects. Charness and Gneezy (2012) based on 15 experimental studies in line 
with our finding, observed strong evidence of gender differences in risk-taking with women 
showing higher risk-aversion levels than men.  Consistent with our finding Sutter et al. (2012) and 
Brick et al. (2012) studying risk-attitudes among children and small-scale fishermen respectively 
also find that women are more risk-averse than men. 
 
5.3 Risk aversion and microenterprises performance 
Table 6 report the OLS results of the effect of entrepreneurs’ degree of risk-aversion on business 
performance based on different model specifications (Columns 1 – 4). In Column 3, the 
relationship between self-perceived risk measure and performance is further examined. Additional 
variables: business characteristics of microenterprises, household size, age, education and marital 






Table 6: Relationship between risk aversion and business performance  
Log (Sales) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CE-ratio  -0.382**  -0.333* 
  (0.179)  (0.200) 
Female 0.132 0.266 0.219 0.353 
 (0.219) (0.177) (0.165) (0.296) 
Self-reported risk   -0.009  
   (0.055)  
Female X CE    -0.110 
    (0.349) 
Constant 4.897*** 5.493*** 5.253*** 5.474*** 
 (0.167) (0.463) (0.549) (0.471) 
Observations 373 342 342 342 
R-Squared 0.003 0.092 0.082 0.0920 
Village level clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Increasing 
CE- ratio implies higher risk-aversion. Business characteristics and individual demographic 
indicators are included. 
 
Results show that risk aversion based on the certainty equivalent ratio negatively affects business 
performance, indicating that low performing entrepreneurs tend to have higher risk-aversion 
levels. The subjective risk measure, however, does not significantly affect business performance 
(Column 3). Risk-taking is among the five key attributes16 identified in the entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO) literature as factors influencing successful business performance (Wiklund & 
Shepard, 2003; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Theories suggest that risk-loving individuals are more 
likely to succeed in business compared to risk-averse individuals yet empirical evidence examining 
the relationship between risk-taking and firm performance are however mixed and inconclusive 
(Rauch et al., 2009). Although our finding that high risk-aversion based on experimental indicators 
is associated with low business performance resonates with the theoretical assertions and empirical 
findings of Boermans and Willebrands (2017) Wang and Yen (2012) and Yoon-joo Ma et al. 
(2012) it contradicts the findings of Rezaei et al. (2018),  Kollmann and Stockman (2014) and 
Lechner and  Gudmundsson (2014). 
 
16 The other attributes are innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy and competitiveness. 
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Given our earlier finding (Table 5) that women are more risk-averse than men, one would have 
expected a lower business performance for women. Findings from Table 6, however, show no 
significant difference between female and male entrepreneurs. It is possible that working in teams 
could provide entrepreneurs with the leverage to hedge against personal risk aversion levels, 
therefore reducing the observed high risk-aversion amongst women. Although the study is unable 
to test the difference in performance levels for individual and group business models, in a related 
paper, Barron et al. (2020) show that even under a solo business model, women are more likely to 
outperform men. 
Existing evidence suggests that men tend to make more revenue in business than women 
(Boermans & Willebrands,2017; Willebrands et al., 2012, Robb & Waston, 2012; Klapper & 
Parker, 2010). Such findings support the widely debated female-underperformance hypothesis in 
management studies (Yousafzai et al., 2018; Baker & Welter, 2017; Zolin et al., 2013; Robb & 
Watson, 2012; Du Rietz & Henrekson, 2000). Sappleton (2018) argues that most of the studies 
supporting the female-underperformance hypothesis are based on different business models 
operating in various industries. Our finding of similar performance between men and female could 
also because we study enterprises operating similar business models on the same scale and with 
similar start dates. However, we use only the first three months of operations, so we cannot reject 
that differences in business performance could appear later on when a more extensive data of the 
intervention is evaluated 
Our findings raise important insights for the inclusion of more women in the private energy sector 
of Rwanda. Women participation as entrepreneurs in the energy sector, is associated with several 
benefits. For instance, Pailman (2016) show that entrepreneurs operating solar-powered charging 
kiosk are likely to depend on this role for their primary or supplementary income. Such incomes 
are used to supplement household and agricultural activities (Pailman, 2016). These income-
generating opportunities result in spillover effect on pro-social household spendings such as food, 
health and education expenditures and can enable women to engage in other investment 
opportunities (Iyiola & Azuh 2014; Sigalla & Carney 2012). Existing studies also identify that 
through entrepreneurial activities women often gain access to social networks where best practices 
are shared, and support systems are built to enhance performance (Baruah, 2016; Soria et al., 
2016).  Our study show risk-aversion can negatively impact business success.  Given the many 
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benefits associated with the inclusion of more women in the energy sector, policies geared towards 
hedging against risk aversion in entrepreneurial programs can be vital in reducing gender gaps in 
business performance. Working in teams is a possible way of reducing the risk burden as we find 
equal performance levels despite the gender difference in risk aversion.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Entrepreneurs are generally stereotyped as more willing and able to cope with risks. Whereas 
economic literature has actively sought to understand the risk attitudes of entrepreneurs by 
comparing them to non-entrepreneurs, the question of how risk attitudes impact business 
performance has somewhat been neglected. Findings from existing studies examining the 
relationship between risk attitudes and performance remain inconclusive and rely on subjective 
measures of risk. 
In this paper, we conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment among 374 off-grid renewable energy 
entrepreneurs working in assigned gender teams as energy sales agents in rural Rwanda, to 
examine risk attitudes among entrepreneurs and the effect of risk aversion on business 
performance. The distinguishing features of our study are as follows. The study is conducted with 
entrepreneurs in the renewable energy sector of Rwanda – a country relying on entrepreneurship 
through the private sector to speed up the provision of energy access to rural areas. These 
entrepreneurs, unlike previous studies, operate in the same business model, have a similar number 
of customers and start dates, therefore providing the study with a better tool for comparison. 
Second, given that entrepreneurs operate in gender teams, the study can additionally explore the 
relationship between risk and business performance from a gender perspective. The study further 
employs both incentivized experimental and subjective risk measures which allow the study to 
compare results from both measures. 
Experimental results reveal a strong risk aversion among entrepreneurs. The risk aversion levels 
found in our study is, however, not any different from small-scale farmers in Ethiopia and South 
Africa (Brick & Visser 2015; Akay et al., 2012). Thus, entrepreneurs from our study are similar to 
ordinary farmers in developing countries. Women also tend to show higher risk aversion levels 
than men. Comparing survey results to experimental results, we find that whereas gender is a 
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significant determining factor for both risk measures, subjective risk measures are additionally 
driven by income, education, competitiveness and happiness.  
Further, results show that risk aversion negatively affects business success. As such, entrepreneurs 
with high risk-taking abilities tend to record better sales. Comparing experimental results to the 
survey result, we find no significant relationship between risk and business performance for 
subjective risk measures. Despite the gender differences in risk aversion, women are not 
outperformed by males in business. A potential explanation for this could be the fact that 
individuals are likely to hedge against their self-limitations when they operate in teams. One 
important caveat is that we use only the first three months of operations, so we cannot reject that 
differences in business performance could appear later on. 
Given that our experimental evidence confirms the general theoretical assertion that risk-taking is 
vital for business success, there is the need for more future experimental studies to resolve the 
inconclusiveness in the literature. Future studies testing differences in the impact of risk attitudes 
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Appendix A – Decision sheet 
Experiment number: _________ 
                                                                                        
 Option 1 ✓  Option 2 ✓ 
      
[1]   F160 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[2] F180 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[3] F200 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[4] F220 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[5] F240 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[6] F260 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[7] F280 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[8] F300 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[9] F320 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[10] F340 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[11] F360 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[12] F380 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[13] F400 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[14] F420 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[15] F440 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[16] F460 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[17] F480 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[18] F500 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[19] F520 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      
[20] F540 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
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[21] F560 for sure  OR Spin the wheel:     F0 /     F1200  
      




























Appendix B: Lottery Distribution 
 
Table B1: Distribution of choice of lottery  
Number of safe choices  Switching Points Number of Participants 
22 Always option 1 205 (54.81%) 
21 2 3 (0.8%) 
20 3 10 (2.7%) 
19 4 6 (1.6%) 
18 5 7 (1.87%) 
17 6 3 (0.8%) 
16 7 1 (0.27%) 
15 8 25 (6.68%) 
14 9 6 (1.6%) 
13 10 8 (2.14%) 
12 11 8 (2.14%) 
11 12 9 (2.41%) 
10 13 22 (5.88%) 
9 14 6 (1.60% 
8 15 0 (0%) 
7 16 3 (0.80%) 
6 17 2 (0.53%) 
5 18 6(1.60%) 
4 19 4 (1.07%) 
3 20 1 (0.27%) 
2 21 1 (0.27%) 
1 22 0 (0%) 














Appendix C: Additional Estimation 
Table C1: Determinants of risk aversion (OLS estimates) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.062* 0.106** 0.114** 0.111** 0.108** 0.111** 
 (0.035) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) 
Female Teams  -0.066 -0.065 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057 
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) 
Male Teams  0.017 0.025 0.029 0.030 0.031 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Age   0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HH_size   -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
   (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Rulindo District    0.045 0.048 0.051 
    (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Married    -0.044 -0.049 -0.045 
    (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Education     -0.004 -0.003 
     (0.007) (0.007) 
Income     -0.002 -0.001 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
Happiness      -0.009 
      (0.009) 
Competitiveness      0.006 
      (0.100) 
Constant 0.724*** 0.718*** 0.655*** 0.669*** 0.720*** 0.760*** 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.099) (0.115) (0.138) (0.183) 
R-squared 0.008 0.015 0.028 0.033 0.034 0.037 
Observations 374 342 342 342 342 342 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the 











Appendix D: Supplementary Material 
Literature overview: Risk attitudes among entrepreneurs’ vs non-entrepreneurs  
 Focus Group Comparison Group Region Method 
Koudstaal et 
al. (2016) 
Entrepreneurs Managers and 
Employees  
Netherlands Experiment 
Holm et al 
(2013) 
Entrepreneurs Population at large China Experiment 
Graham et al. 
(2013) 
US Chief executive 
officers 




Lamp et al. 
(2012) 
Entrepreneurs Students Germany Experiment 
List and 
Mason (2011) 
Entrepreneurs Students Costa Rica Experiment 
Sandri et al. 
(2010) 










Individuals who remain 
employ 
Germany Survey 
Djankov et al. 
(2007)  
Entrepreneurs Non-entrepreneurs Russia Survey 
Djankov et al. 
(2006) 
Entrepreneurs Non-entrepreneurs China Survey 
Elston et al. 
(2006) 
Entrepreneurs Non-entrepreneurs United 
States 
Experiment 
Cramer et al. 
(2002) 
Self-employed at 
some point in life 
Never self-employed Netherlands Survey 
Uusitalo 
(2001) 
Self-employed Not self-employed Finland Survey 








Stewart et al. 
(1999) 








Bankers participating in 
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Firm founders Business managers United 
States 
Survey 
Caird (1991) Owner managers Professional groups United 
States 
Survey 
Hull et al. 
(1980) 



























Appendix E: Experiment instructions 
Note:  Instructions were adopted from Brick and Visser (2015) to suit our purposes. Full citation 
can be found in the reference section of the main paper 
“In this part, you will play three games: Game 1, 2 and 3.  
For each game, you have 22 different decisions to make. You will be asked to choose between two 
options; Option1 and Option 2 in all the 22 cases. [POINT TO POSTER] 
You will be paid for only one of your choices: that is only one out of the 22 choices you make will 
be paid for. You will only know which of these choices you will be paid for at the end of the day. 
So, how are we going to determine the choice for which you will be paid? 
I have in this bag 22 numbered balls [TOSS THE BALLS IN BAG FOR THEM TO SEE]. Once 
you have made a choice between Option 1 and Option 2 for each row, we will use this bag to 
decide which row will be played for money AT THE END OF THE DAY. One of you will draw 
a ball from this bag. If the ball has the number 1 on it, we will play row 1 for money. If the ball 
has a 2 on it, we will play row 2 for money. If the ball has a number 22 on it, we will play row 22 
for money.  
 
Okay, let’s try it!  [SEND THE BAG AROUND FOR A FEW PEOPLE TO DRAW FROM 
IT] TO DEEPEN THEIR UNDERSTANDING] 
So, since we do not know which of the 22 choices you make will be paid for, it is important to 
think carefully before you choose between option 1 and Option 2 for each row since real money is 
as stake. 




Risk Aversion  
30% probability of earning RWF 1200 
 
In this game, you must choose between 2 options: Option 1 and Option 2. [POINT TO POSTER].  
 
You must show on the answer sheet in front of you, for each row, whether you choose Option 1 
or Option 2.  [POINT TO POSTER] 
 
This is very important: if you choose Option 1, you will earn a sure amount of money! 
  
If you choose Option 2, the amount of money you earn depends on this spinning wheel. And, it 
depends on whether the arrow lands on white or black.  
 
Because this is SO important, let me say it again: if you choose Option 1, you will earn a sure 
amount of money. But, if you choose Option 2, the amount of money you earn depends on this 
spinning wheel. And, it depends on whether this arrow lands on white or black [DEMONSTRATE 
BY MOVING THE SPIN].  
 
This is what will happen if you choose Option 2:  
 
One of you will come up and spin the arrow. If your arrow lands on white, you will earn nothing. 
If the arrow lands on black, you will earn RWF1200. DEMONSTRATE BY SPINNING THE 
WHEEL: the arrow has landed on [white, black], this means you would have earned [nothing, 
RWF 1200]. 
 
[SPINNING WHEEL REPRESENTING 30%]: Now as you can see, the white area is much bigger 
than the black area. So, this means that if you choose Option 2 and spin the wheel, there is a bigger 
chance of the arrow landing on white than there is of it landing on black. So, there is a bigger 
chance of you earning nothing than there is of you earning RWF 1200.  
 
OK, let’s look at the POSTER: 
 
In row 1:  
 
If you choose Option 1 [POINT TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn RWF 160 for sure. 
You won’t have to spin the arrow. 
 
But, if you choose Option 2 [POINT TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on 
what colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on 
black, you earn RWF 1200. 
In row 2:  
 
If you choose Option 1 [POINT TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn RWF 180 for sure. 




If you choose Option 2 [POINT TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, 
you earn RWF 1200.   
 
 
In row 3:  
 
If you choose Option 1 [POINT TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn RWF 200 for sure. 
You won’t have to spin the arrow. 
 
If you choose Option 2 [POINT TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, 
you earn RWF 1200.   
 
In row 10:  
 
If you choose Option 1 [POINT TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn RWF 340 for sure. 
You won’t have to spin the arrow. 
 
If you choose Option 2 [POINT TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, 
you earn RWF 1200.   
 
In row 15:  
 
If you choose Option 1 [POINT TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn RWF 440 for sure. 
You won’t have to spin the arrow. 
 
If you choose Option 2 [POINT TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, 
you earn RWF 1200.   
 
In row 20:  
 
If you choose Option 1 [POINT TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn RWF 540 for sure. 
You won’t have to spin the arrow. 
 
If you choose Option 2 [POINT TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, 









In row 22:  
 
If you choose Option 1 [POINT TO OPTION 1 ON POSTER], you will earn RWF 580 for sure. 
You won’t have to spin the arrow. 
 
If you choose Option 2 [POINT TO OPTION 2 ON POSTER], your payoff will depend on what 
colour the arrow lands on. If the arrow lands on white, you earn nothing, but if it lands on black, 
you earn RWF 1200.   
 
[IMPORTANT TO STRESS:]  
 
OK, now this is very important! As you can see, the sure payoff you earn from Option 1 
increases as you go down the rows. It has increased from RWF 160 in row 1 to RWF 580 in row 
22 [POINT TO THE POSTER AS YOU SAY THIS].  
 
But, the payoff to Option 2 stays the same throughout the whole game! In the first row, if you 
choose Option 2, you will either earn nothing if the arrow lands on white, or you will earn RWF 
1200 if the arrow lands on black. In row 10, if you choose Option 2, you will either earn nothing 
if the arrow lands on white, or you will earn RWF 1200 if the arrow lands on black. In row 22, if 
you choose Option 2, you will either earn nothing if the arrow lands on white, or RWF 1200 if the 
arrow lands on black. [POINT DOWN POSTER WHILE SAYING THIS] 
 
Let’s do an example: [NOW, YOU DRAW ON THE POSTER] 
 
In row 1, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you 
will earn F160 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the arrow 
lands on. If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn RWF 1200. 
Let’s pretend you choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the right 
box like this [MAKE A TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
 
In row 2, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you 
will earn RWF 180 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the 
arrow lands on. If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn RWF 
1200. Let’s pretend you choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the 
right box like this [MAKE A TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
 
In row 3, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you 
will earn RWF 200 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the 
arrow lands on. If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn RWF 
1200. Let’s pretend you choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the 
right box like this [MAKE A TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
 
In row 4, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you 
will earn RWF 220 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the 
arrow lands on. If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn RWF 
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1200. Let’s pretend you choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the 
right box like this [MAKE A TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
In row 5, you have 2 options. You can choose Option 1 or Option 2. If you choose Option 1, you 
will earn RWF 240 for sure. If you choose Option 2, your payoff will depend on what colour the 
arrow lands on. If it lands on white, you will earn nothing. If it lands on black, you will earn RWF 
1200. Let’s pretend you choose Option 2 – so you want to spin the arrow. Then make a tick in the 
right box like this [MAKE A TICK IN THE RIGHT BOX]. 
Let’s pretend you choose Option 2 all the way down to row 8. TICK UP TO ROW 8.  
Now, in row 9, you choose Option 1. [NOW MAKE A TICK IN THE LEFT COLUMN] 
So, in row 9, you switch to Option 1. Remember that you always get a sure return with Option 1, 
so you will have a sure payoff of RWF 320. So, at row 9, you prefer the sure payoff of RWF 320 
you get with Option 1 as opposed to taking a chance with Option 2 on where the arrow lands and 
earning either RWF 0 or RWF 1200. Then when we go to row 10, you will now earn RWF 340 if 
you pick Option 1 – the sure payoff is now even higher. And in row 11 you will earn even more 
with Option 1 – you will earn RWF 360. In row 12, Option 1 will give you even more money – 
you will get a sure payoff of RWF 380. So, your earnings from Option 1 are getting higher and 
higher as you go down the rows. But with Option 2, you always have the same chance of earning 
F0 or RWF 1200 depending on where the arrow lands.  
So going back to your choice, if you liked Option 1 more in row 9 when you had a sure payoff of 
RWF 320, then you would also like Option 1 in rows 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, all the way to 22 as the 
payoffs get more and more.  
So (this is VERY important) once you pick Option 1, you will pick Option 1 for the rest of the 
rows! [REPEAT THIS POINT A FEW TIMES] 
[Note: Important they know that once they pick Option 1, they must stay with Option 1 for the rest 
of the rows. Once they have filled in the practice sheet, we will go around and check that 
respondents have not made a mistake.]  
[IMPORTANT] Remember you are not going to be paid for all 22 choices made, so let’s try how 
the payment will work in this game. [ INVITE SOMEONE TO COME DRAW FROM THE BAG 
HAVING THE 22 BALLS]. Let’s say ball number 18 is picked. So for all those who choose Option 
1 will get the sure amount and for those who choose option 2 one of you will come to spin the 
wheel [INVITE ONE PERSON TO SPIN THE WHEEL] based on the colour it lands on, that 
becomes the earning for option 2 choice. [REPEAT THIS A FEW TIMES] 
After we know which row we are playing for money, one of you will then come up and spin the 
arrow. 
Does anyone have any questions before we start? 
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Because this is the first game, we are going to first do a practice round. So, this round won’t 
count for money – but is just to make sure that you understand how the game works. 
Ok, let’s start. Please write the number we gave you at the start of the experiment on the sheet 
where it says experiment number [POINT TO WHERE THEY MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER]. 
For each row in the sheet in front of you, indicate whether you would like to choose Option 1 and 
receive a sure amount of money, or whether you would like to choose Option 2 and spin the arrow.  
[GO AROUND TO CHECK DECISIONS OF PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE SURE IT 
CORRESPONDS WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS] 
[COLLECT THE PRACTICE SHEETS] 
Ok, now we are going to play the game for real. Please write the number we gave you at the start 
of the experiment on the sheet where it says experiment number [POINT TO WHERE THEY 
MUST PUT THEIR NUMBER]. 
For each row in the sheet in front of you, indicate whether you would like to choose Option 1 and 
















Chapter 5: The power of nudging: Using feedback, competition and 
responsibility assignment to save electricity in a non-residential setting 
Rebecca A. Klege, Martine Visser, Saugato Datta, Matthew Darling  
 
Abstract 
Can behavioural interventions achieve energy savings in non-residential settings where users do 
not face the financial consequences of their behaviour? Using high-frequency data, our paper 
addresses this question by leveraging social comparison and responsibility assignment aimed at 
reducing electricity consumption in a large provincial government office building with 24 floors, 
a total of 1008 occupants. Floors were divided into two treatments arms. Both treatment groups 
received regular emails encouraging recipients to turn off appliances and lights before leaving the 
office, as well as weekly ranked energy consumption results by floors. Additionally, weekly 
“energy advocates” were assigned to each floor in treatment group two. Findings show that floors 
that participated only in the inter-floor competitions reduced energy consumption by 9%, while 
those additionally assigned floor-wise “energy advocates” reduced energy consumption by 14%. 
A further investigation of the sustainability of our results shows that, although the intervention 
effect we find in the first month of the post-intervention period attenuates monthly, by the fifth 
month, these initial declines in the intervention effect completely dies out. Our five months of 
intervention reveal that financial consequences are not necessarily a pre-requisite for reducing 
energy consumption when using behavioural nudges. 









Commercial buildings are significant consumers of energy and account for a substantial amount 
of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. For large economies such as the United States, United 
Kingdom and Europe, commercial buildings account for 18% and 11%17 of total energy 
respectively (Perez-Lombard, Ortiz & Pout, 2008). In South Africa, the commercial sector 
accounts for 15% of energy use (Eskom, 2017). 
Historically, technological modification has been the most common intervention used to address 
the high energy demand in the commercial sector. Among these technological solutions have been 
the installation of energy-efficient appliances, proper insulation, sensors and intelligent controls. 
Previous studies on the residential sector have also identified behavioural interventions as a cost-
effective way of reducing energy consumption (Kandul, Lang & Lanz 2020; Myers & Souza, 2019; 
Alcott & Kessler, 2019; Torres & Carlsson, 2018;  Sudarshan, 2017; Jessoe, Lade et al., 2017; 
Allcott & Rogers 2014; Costa & Kahn, 2013). Yet, the application of behavioural interventions in 
the non-residential sector is limited.  
Unlike the residential sector, implementing behavioural interventions in non-residential or office 
environments poses additional challenges. Employees do not have any direct financial incentives 
to reduce energy consumption at work. Even when the will to conserve energy exist, they are 
unaware of their energy use due to the absence of utility bills. Also, while the average residential 
household has four members, office floors can have between 50-200 individuals, making 
coordination much more challenging. Despite these challenges, the high levels of wastage in the 
work environment cannot be neglected. Masoso and Grobler (2009) documented employees 
attitudes towards energy use in six commercial buildings located in Botswana and South Africa. 
Findings from their study show that office buildings used more energy (56%) during non-working 
hours compared to working hours (44%).  Mahdavi et al., (2008) also show that during working 
hours, workers on the average spend 50% of the time away from their desks without turning off 
equipment. This suggests the need to implement behavioural interventions in the office 
environment, although workers are not financially liable for their energy use.  
 
17 Both Europe and United Kingdom have the same level energy consumption 
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The few studies that have tackled the subject have been limited to buildings in the United States 
(Onarghi et al., 2018; Gulbinas & Taylor, 2014; Carrico & Riemer, 2011) except for Brown et al. 
(2013) which was conducted in the OECD building in France. Our paper directly contributes to 
the limited literature on the applications of behavioural interventions in the non-residential sector 
by examining the effectiveness of nudges for energy conservation in a single large provincial office 
building in the City of Cape Town. The City of Cape Town is in the Western Cape province of 
South Africa – the country’s second-largest economy. The city accounts for more than half of the 
provincial energy consumption with the commercial sector accounting for 44% of the total energy 
used (Cape Town State of Energy, 2015). Given the numerous energy pressures on the city due to 
rapid urbanization and energy insecurity resulting in periodic “load-shedding”,   examining the 
energy conservation potential of behavioural nudges in such a context will be beneficial to 
policymakers while informing future global studies. 
Further, studies examining the effect of behavioural interventions on energy consumption in the 
workplace focused on social comparison feedback and thermostat default setting, with 
interventions lasting only for a few weeks. We expand the interventions used in this study by 
assigning each floor with a peer leader in the form of an “energy advocates” (responsibility 
assignment) with interventions conducted over five months. The study therefore additionally 
contributes to the literature by introducing a new behavioural intentions where we combine 
reminders and and responsibility assignment. 
 Prior to the start of our study, smart meters were installed on all floors of the building to track the 
daily (30 minutes interval) electricity consumption of each floor. Floors were assigned to two 
treatment arms and a control group, with seven floors in each group. Floors in the first treatment 
arm received repeated general energy conservation information emails and participated in weekly 
inter-floor competitions where floor occupants received ranked electricity consumption results. 
Meanwhile, floors in the second treatment arm received both energy conservation information, 
participated in weekly inter-floor competitions and were also assigned a weekly floor “energy 
advocate”. 
Findings show significant declines in energy use after the rollout of interventions, with our 
preferred estimates indicating a 9% reduction due to the first treatment, and a 14% reduction for 
the second treatment. A follow-up interview with employees revealed that most major behaviour 
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changes occurred at the close of the day as part of a conscious initiative by occupants to switch of 
appliances after work. A further investigation of the sustainability of our results shows that, 
although the intervention effect we find in the first month of the post-intervention period attenuates 
monthly, by the fifth month (October 2016), these initial declines in the intervention effect 
completely dies out. Our findings, consistent with previous studies, reveal the potency of nudging 
employees to achieve energy use reductions in office spaces. We conclude that financial 
consequences are not necessarily a pre-requisite for reducing energy consumption when using 
behavioural nudges. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 review related literature on the applications of 
behavioural interventions. Section 3 presents the experimental overview and design of the study. 
We present data and estimation techniques in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results of our 
study. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
Policymakers seeking to dampen the demand for energy typically use traditional policy 
instruments such as price interventions (raising tariffs, taxes on electricity, and peak-load pricing 
to affect the timing of consumption). In the last two decades, studies within the residential sector 
have shown the cost-effective nature of using behavioural interventions to achieve energy 
conservation. Typical interventions used in the literature include the provision of educational 
information, real-time feedback, social comparison feedbacks, peer leaders and default settings 
(Kandul et al., 2020; Alcott & Roger, 2014, Costa & Kahn, 2013; Alcott 2011; Alcott & 
Mullainathan, 2010; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). 
Asensio and Delmas (2015) compare the effectiveness of price and behavioural interventions. 
Their results show that feedbacks are a more effective way of reducing energy use. A review by 
Fisher (2008) also shows that implementing feedback interventions can lead to energy reductions 
with savings ranging from 1.1% to 20% depending on the type of feedback (indirect or direct 
feedback). Among the feedback family, social comparisons where energy consumptions of 
occupants are compared to peers or neighbours is shown to be the most effective. Allcott and 
Mullainathan (2010) reveal that households can reduce their energy consumption by 2% after 
receiving letters containing social comparison feedback. In a study involving school children, 
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Agarwal et al. (2017) also demonstrate the effectiveness of peer comparison. They show that 
children were able to influence their families to conserve energy. More recently, Kandul et al. 
(2020) provided households with social comparison feedback on indoor heating temperature 
relative to others. Their intervention led to 0.28 degrees Celsius reduction in indoor temperature. 
While evidence shows that behavioural interventions have been largely successful, there are also 
discussions about the long-run impacts and welfare implications of such results. Ferraro, Miranda 
and Price (2011) examined the persistence of treatment effects associated with norm-based 
instruments by running field experiments within residential households to reduce water demand. 
They conclude that social comparisons have a long-run impact on water demand. 
The non-residential sector is yet to fully benefit from the extensive literature on the effect of a 
behavioural intervention to reduce energy consumption. Ornaghi et al. (2018) using different types 
of information framing examined how behavioural interventions can be used to reduce energy 
consumption in university buildings. Their interventions aimed at asking participants to close their 
windows after working hours. Results from their study revealed that the percentage of windows 
left open reduced by half for treatment groups compared to control groups. Similary, Dixon et al. 
(2015) show that university buildings can reduce energy consumption by 6.5% through social 
comparison feedback. Gulbinas and Taylor (2014) find that comparing employees historical and 
current energy consumption with peers can yield a significant reduction in energy use. Based on a 
group level feedback and peer education interventions, Carrico and Riemer (2011) show that 
energy consumption at the workplace can be reduced by 7% when using feedbacks and 4 % when 
only peer education is used. Brown et al. (2013) also addressed the question of “how much does 
changing the default setting in office thermostats affect the chosen  settings in offices?” They find 
that an effective way to prevent overheating is to reduce the thermostat settings to a default mode 
by 1-degree celsius. 
Although evidence shows that studies on the non-residential sector are gradually being expanded, 
most of the action has been limited to developed countries. Also, to date, no existing studies have 
examined the effectiveness of responsibility assignment in the office context. Our paper 
contributes to the limited literature on implementing behavioural interventions in the office context 
by testing the effect of social competition and responsibility assignment in a large provincial 




3. Experimental overview 
3.1 Study building 
The study was conducted in a 24-floor provincial office building located on 4th Dorp street in the 
City of Cape Town, South Africa (see Figure 1) where four provincial government departments 
are headquartered namely; Department of Health, Department of the Premier, Department of 
Transport and Public Works and Department of Treasury. At the time of the study,1008 employees 
were working in the building. The regular working hours for employees start from 8 am to 4 pm. 
After these hours the building is close to the public. The building had two installed smart meters 
on each floor which provided real-time energy consumption data every 30 minutes, making it 
possible for randomization to occur at the floor level. All storeys operated an open floor policy 
which housed several workstations. Apart from lighting, typical appliances available on each floor 
were, computers, printers, photocopy/fax machines, air conditioners, projectors, space heaters, 





Figure 1: 4 Dorp Street Office Building, Western Cape Government, Cape Town 
3.2 Intervention   
Before the commencement of the study, we interacted with employees in the building through 
interviews, focus groups, and site visits to enable us to understand major setbacks impeding 
energy-efficient behaviour in the building. This enabled us to design interventions that aligned 
with specific challenges faced by employees. Our interactions revealed six major bottlenecks 
impeding energy-efficient behaviours. The six bottlenecks include 1. Diffused Responsibility: 
Employees were often unsure about whose responsibility it was to turn off appliances and lights 
at the close of the day.  2. Moral Justification: Employees considered public service as their sole 
contribution to the environment, rather than reducing personal energy consumption in the office 
space.  3. Unit Confusion: It was unclear to employees how small individual behaviours can 
translate into energy efficiency. 4. Limited Attention: Employees sometimes forgot to turn off 
devices. 5. Identity: While at work, employees do not think about translating their energy-efficient 
behaviours at home to the office. 6. Social Norms: Employees do not know how much energy their 
colleagues use and therefore have no reference point for how energy efficient they are.  
Subsequently, the study designed various intervention components to mitigate the observed 
bottlenecks by using an automated email system to test the effect of different isolated messages 
that incorporate the following intervention components: 1. Providing information – Giving easy-
to-understand information regarding energy use that employees can easily translate into action and 
also place specific behaviours into a context familiar to them. 2. Social Competition – A program 
that compares employees’ energy use with other floors to foster a sense of competition and provide 
regular feedback. 3. Responsibility assignment – where one person is chosen every week as a peer 
leader to champion energy-saving initiatives on each floor. For example, one employee is 
randomly singled out on a weekly basis as the “energy champion” for specific floors. This 
employee is subsequently given specific tasks throughout the week (e.g., “turn off lights at the end 
of the day”, “turn off the water heater” and “unplug the printer”). 
3.2 Design 
Out of the 24 floors in the 4th Dorp street office building, the study was implemented on only 21 
floors. The three exempted floors include the ground floor, which served as a security checkpoint 
and access area for visitors while the other two floors were empty due to renovations at the start 
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of the experiment. The 21 floors were randomly assigned to a control group and two treatment 
groups with seven floors in each group based on specific feedbacks as follows: 
• Treatment I group –315 employees:  Employees on floors assigned to this group received 
regular actionable steps emails ( reminders to turn off lights every Friday, information on 
how to conserve electricity every first Monday of the month, kitchen tips every third 
Wednesday of the month) and weekly ranked inter-floor competition energy consumption 
feedback. 
• Treatment II group – 281 employees: Employees in this group received the same emails as 
floors in the first treatment group. Additionally, each floor in this group was assigned a 
peer leader serving as an energy advocate for a week. 
• Control group (305 employees): Members of floors assigned to this group did not receive 
any form of emails or feedback on their energy use. 
 Figure 2 shows sample emails received by employees whose floors were assigned to treatment 
groups. Additional emails on actionable steps to reduce energy consumption are presented in 
Appendix A. 
 
Fig.1. Emails depicting social comparison, responsibility assignment and actionable steps 
The study was conducted within one year, starting from June 2015. This includes the pre-
intervention period, which lasted for five months (June – October 2015). We spent November 2015 
to May 2016 fine-tuning and monitoring the automated email system. During this period, 
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occupants of both treatment I and II floors only received actionable steps on ways to reduce 
electricity consumption. The full roll-out of our study referred to here as the “full fidelity period” 
(June-October 2016) lasted for five months. During this time Treatment, I floors received general 
information and weekly ranked inter-floor competition results while Treatment II floors received 
general information, weekly ranked inter-floor competition results and assignment of a weekly 
floor energy advocate which lasted for five months. 
4. Data and estimation procedure 
The experimental set up provided the study with a panel of energy use data for all 21 floors at a 
high daily frequency interval of 30 minutes. Table 2 presents pre-intervention checks for the 
experiment. Electricity usage for floors in the 4 Dorp office building ranges from 2.49 to 2.59 
kilowatts (kW) for every thirty minutes on the average. This implies the daily electricity 
consumption per floor ranges from 119.52– 124.32 kWh. Table 2 shows no significant energy use 
difference between control and treatment floors, as depicted in column 5. 
We also present a balance test for the number of people occupying these floors (headcount). 
Results show that the number of floor occupants during the baseline period is balanced between 
the control and treatment floors. Given that the number of people occupying a floor can largely 
influence the amount of electricity a floor will use, we include the headcount variable as a covariate 
in our subsequent analysis. 
Table 1: Pre-intervention Randomization Checks  
    𝑘𝑊𝑜̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 𝑘𝑊0
𝑇 − 𝑘𝑊0
𝑐 









2.59 --- 2.54 0.10 
(0.34)  (0.24) (0.48) 
- 2.49 2.49 -0.003 





42.96 --- 42.15 1.61 
(5.96)  (4.21) (8.43) 
- 34.94 38.36 -6.41 
  (6.61) (4.49) (9.01) 




The difference-in-difference (DiD) approach is adopted to evaluate the impact of routine 
behavioural interventions on energy consumption. This is done by comparing electricity 
consumption levels of Treatment I and II floors to control floors. The equation of interest is 
specified below: 





′ 𝛽 + 𝑖𝑡   (1) 
Where 𝑘𝑤𝑖𝑡 is the amount of electricity consumed by individual meters i on each floor at time t in 
kilowatts/30minutes, T1=1 if meter readings are from Treatment I floors at time t, T2=1 if meter 
readings are from Treatment II floors at time t.  A=1 is the post-intervention indicator, 𝛿0 is the 
time trend common to control and treatment floors, 𝛿1  and  𝛿2  are Treatment I and II specific 
effects which account for average time-invariant differences between  the treatment and control 
floors,  𝛾1 measures the average Treatment I effect, 𝛾2 measures the average Treatment II effect, 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 represent the covariates: headcount and monthly fixed effects.  𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The average treatment effect which is the difference-in-difference estimate, therefore, compares 
the difference between the treatment floors before and after they received intervention emails and 
the difference between the before-and-after outcomes of the control floors which did not receive 
the intervention emails but shared similar consumption characteristics (Khandker et al., 2010). The 










𝐶 ]    (3) 
To account for the unobserved heterogeneity, we use the standard panel fixed effect estimator with 
robust standard errors. These standard errors are clustered at the meter level, given that electricity 





5. Results and discussion 
Table 2 presents estimation results and their corresponding aggregated percentage reductions for 
the intervention period for different configurations of monthly dummies18. Our primary estimation 
is column two, which includes the monthly dummies. Even though we validated 21 floors during 
the pre-intervention period of June 2015 – October 2015, at the time of starting our interventions, 
one of the floors had a malfunctioning meter and was subsequently dropped from the study, 
explaining why our estimations report on only 20 floors. 
Table 2: Fixed effect regression estimates for energy consumption. 
Fixed Effects Regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at meter level *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Pre-intervention period: June – October 2015 
 
 
18 As a robustness check, we also estimate a pooled panel OLS regressions which includes both 
monthly and floor fixed effects using the “xtreg” command in Stata. Results are consistent with 
the presented results in Table 3 as shown in Appendix B. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 kW/30mins kW/30mins kW/30mins 
 (0.0576) (0.0777) (0.125) 
Treatment 1 X Post -0.116 -0.119 -0.215* 
 (0.168) (0.169) (0.123) 
Treatment 2 X Post -0.324* -0.349* -0.351** 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.179) 
headcount 0.0148*** 0.0171*** 0.0173*** 
 (0.00458) (0.00470) (0.00472) 
Constant 1.928*** 1.846*** 1.799*** 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.184) 
Monthly Fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Observations 528,928 528,928 502,030 
R-squared 0.010 0.014 0.017 
F(P-Value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Control 185,521 185,521 185,521 
Treatment1 182,840 182,840 155,942 
Treatment 2 160,567 160,567 160,567 
Number of floors 20 20 19 
Number of meters 40 40 38 
Percentage Reduction:    
Treatment 1  5% 9% 
Treatment 2  14% 14% 
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Results in Column (2) show that for every 30 minutes, meters on Treatment II floors consume 
about 0.349 kilowatts less than control floors. From the average treatment effect reported, we 
further calculate the aggregated percentage reduction for the intervention period using the pre-
intervention average electricity consumption values. This implies a 14% reduction (at 10% level 
of significance) for Treatment II floors (general energy conservation information + inter-floor 
competition with weekly feedback + advocates). However, the reduction in electricity 
consumption for Treatment I floors in Column (2) appears to be insignificant. 
In column 3, we present regression results without floor 22. This floor was allocated to the 
Treatment group one. However, meter readings indicated that unlike other floors, floor 22 reported 
increases in energy consumption during the intervention period. Further investigation through site 
visits and qualitative interviews with floor occupants show that an additional water heater, an 
appliance that consumes a significant amount of power, was installed on this floor during the 
intervention period while no corresponding equipment installations took place on other floors. We, 
therefore, show the regression results in column 3 by excluding floor 22 from the analysis. Given 
this preferred model specification, floors assigned to treatment II resulted in the same level of 14% 
reduction in electricity consumption but now at a 5% significance level. Further, Treatment I floor 
who received only general energy conservation information and inter-floor competition with 
weekly feedback subsequently show a reduction of 9%19 (at a 10% significance level). 
Previous studies have shown the possibility of conserving energy in buildings using comparative 
feedback. For instance, Carrico and Riemer (2011) examined the effect of group-level feedback 
on energy conservation for university buildings in the United States. They found a 7% reduction 
in energy use. Dixon et al. (2015) in a similar context of University buildings also find that 
comparative feedback compared to individual feedback, generate a higher energy conservation 
rate of 6.5%. Our finding that behavioural interventions can yield significant reductions in the non-
residential setting is consistent with existing studies such as Onargi et al. (2018), Dixon et al. 
(2015), Gulbinas &Taylor (2014) and Carrico and Remier (2011). 
 
 




5.1 Attenuation effects 
To investigate the sustainability of our results over the intervention period, we systematically run 
regressions monthly by adding on to the initial start month (June 2016) when both treatments were 
running. Table 3 shows an initial decline in the percentage reduction for the combined intervention 
effect of the provision of general energy conservation information, inter-floor competition and 
assignment of floor energy advocate as we add more months to the estimation, with the treatment 
effect becoming less significant as more time elapsed (from 5% to a 10% level of significance). 
Results show that on the average, Treatment II floors reduced electricity consumption by about 
0.36 - 0.49 kW for every 30 minutes depending on the period of estimation. Specifically, in 
Column 1 for June, Treatment II floors recorded a 0.63kW decline in electricity consumption 
relative to control floors. Using pre-intervention average consumption values, this indicates a 28% 
reduction. 
 Interestingly, the rate at which the percentage reductions attenuate slows down as we continue to 
add more months. For instance, a movement from June to the period June-July (two months post-
intervention) saw about a 7.1% reduction from the initial 28% reduction in electricity use achieved 
in June to 20.9% in June-July. Further, moving from the period June- July to the period June-
August (three-month post-intervention) an attenuation effect of 5.6% is recorded, which is below 
the previously reported 7.1%. As we move to four months post-intervention period (June-
September), the attenuation effect dropped to only about 1%. By the fifth month of the post-
intervention period (June- October), these declines completely die out, as shown in figure 3. This 
implies that despite the decline in our treatment effect size in the initial months, the decline 








Table 3: Long-term effects of intervention 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 June June- July June- August June- September 
Treatment 1 X Post -0.359 -0.314 -0.213 -0.167 
 (0.259) (0.197) (0.188) (0.172) 
Treatment 2 X Post -0.630** -0.511** -0.371* -0.347* 
 (0.294) (0.224) (0.219) (0.192) 
headcount 0.0250*** 0.0184*** 0.0159** 0.0163*** 
 (0.00804) (0.00621) (0.00615) (0.00465) 
Constant 1.579*** 1.814*** 1.894*** 1.879*** 
 (0.282) (0.228) (0.230) (0.186) 
Monthly Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 88,189 201,570 320,176 432,528 
R-squared 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.011 
Control 30,721 70,386 111,787 151,580 
Treatment 1 30,725 70,223 111,716 149,715 
Treatment 2 26,743 60,961 96,673 131,233 
F (P-Value) 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Number of Floors 20 20 20 20 
Number of meters 40 40 40 40 
Percentage Reduction:      
Treatment 2 28% 20.9% 15.3% 14.1% 
Fixed Effects Regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at meter level *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0. Pre-intervention period for each estimation comparable with that of previous years. The 
percentage reduction for June- October 2016 is already established in Table 3 (main regression) to be 14 
 
 






















June June- Aug June- SepJune-July June-Oct
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The long-term effects of behavioural interventions in achieving conservation behaviours have 
often been raised. While several attempts have been made in the residential context to address this 
question for both energy and water use (e.g.  Allcott & Rogers, 2014; Ferraro et al., 2011), the few 
existing studies on commercial buildings are yet to contribute to the discussion. Our results show 
that although the high initial conservation rate (28%) recorded in June systematically declined, the 
attenuation only lasted for first three months with effect sizes remaining constant in subsequent 
months at 14%. Thus, consistent with Allcott and Rogers (2014), it is likely to sustain conservation 
for additional months. 
5.2 Intervention effect at different periods within the day 
Table 4 presents the intervention effect for working and non-working hours. Results show that a 
significant amount of reduction in energy use occurred after working hours. No substantial 
reductions were recorded during working hours. Of the two feedback interventions implemented, 
floors assigned to treatment group two showed higher reductions  (at 5% significance level)  
implying that the main way this group of floors seems to have worked better than Treatment I 
floors is by empowering the floor advocates to either turn off or ask people to turn off appliances 
at the end of the workday. Our results confirm the findings of Masoso and Gobler (2010) which 
show that high waste among office occupants in Botswana and South Africa is likely to occur after 
working hours and suggest the tendency to achieve significant reductions if behavioural 


















Treatment1 X Post -0.0650 -0.149 
 (0.203) (0.172) 
Treatment 2 X Post -0.201 -0.440** 
 (0.207) (0.183) 
headcount 0.0232*** 0.0135*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00434) 
Constant 2.899*** 1.206*** 
 (0.258) (0.162) 
Observations 198,836 330,092 
R-squared 0.029 0.019 
F (P-Value) 0.00 0.00 
Control 69,704 115,817 
Treatment 1 68,977 113,863 
Treatment 2 60,155 100,412 
Number of floors 20 20 
Number of meters 40 40 
Fixed Effects Regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at meter level *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Pre-intervention period: June – October 2015 
To further understand the mechanism through which interventions led to the reduction in energy 
use, post-intervention qualitative interviews were conducted. The follow-up interviews revealed 
two major sets of findings. First, the impressive overall reductions in electricity use due to 
Treatment II (14%) mask considerable variation in how occupants on different floors responded 
to the intervention. While some employees on treatment floors worked as a team to reduce energy 
consumption, others were lukewarm towards the routine emails they received. Although the net 
effect of such behaviours resulted in an ultimate decline in electricity use for treatment floors, such 
differences in behaviour must be considered in the event of a scale-up. 
Secondly, interviews with floor occupants confirmed our empirical results about effects being 
concentrated outside office hours, as major initiatives by floor advocates were implemented after 
working hours.  For instance, unlike before the interventions, floor occupants became conscious 





Nonresidential buildings are significant consumers of energy. The effort to reduce energy 
consumption in this sector has led to the adoption of advanced technologies such as energy-
efficient appliances, sensors and intelligent remotes. Despite these efforts, there still exists high 
energy waste in the workplace with a greater proportion of wastage occurring after working hours 
(Masoso & Gobler, 2010). This wastage is largely driven by workers attitudes towards energy 
conservation at the workplace. 
Although behavioural interventions are often used in the residential setting to achieve energy 
reductions, workplace applications of such interventions are limited. In this paper, we ascertain 
the effect of behavioural interventions on energy consumption in a nonresidential context (office 
building) where occupants are not financially liable for their energy use. Two main interventions 
were used consisting of a range of emails which includes providing general conservation 
information, social comparison feedback and the assignment of responsibility to employees. 
Our findings show that behavioural interventions are valuable and effective tools for conserving 
energy in the workplace. Although consistent with Ornarghi et al. (2018) and Cialdini and 
Goldstein (2008) result show that provision of social comparison feedback to workers can yield 
significant reductions in energy consumption, we find a higher effect when floors are additionally 
assigned weekly “energy advocates” to spearhead the energy conservation campaign. Results also 
show that the main way in which floors that received both the weekly ranked floor consumption 
feedback and the assigned weekly energy advocates (Treatment II) seems to have worked better 
than those who only received the social comparison feedback (Treatment I)  was by empowering 
floor advocates to either turn off or ask people to turn off appliances at the end of business hours.   
Several factors contribute to the effectiveness of behavioural interventions. For instance, simple 
and easy to understand interventions tailored to specific needs and behaviour is more effective 
(Steg &Vlek, 2009). This is clearly the case for our study as emails were designed based on initial 
discussions with employees on factors limiting them from reducing energy use at the workplace. 
Also, the emails provided to employees were simple, actionable steps which are found in the 
literature as a great source of conservation behaviours (Abrahamse et al.,2005). Given the 
reductions achieved during the intervention period, there is a potential for employers, in our case, 
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the Western Cape Government to implement behavioural nudges in response to high energy 
consumption in the non-residential centre. 
The sustainability and the efficacy of behavioural interventions over time; are major concerns (List 
& Metcalfe, 2014). Indeed, our month-by-month estimates show a gradual decline in the treatment 
effect, implying that energy reductions are likely to decline; however, this decline in energy 
reductions dwindles with time and stabilizes by the fourth month. Allcot and Rogers (2014) 
examined the persistent levels of treatment effect arising from social norms and other behavioural 
nudges by continuing interventions for two further years. They found that about two-thirds of the 
initial treatment effect remained and concluded that reduction in energy consumption declines 
somewhat over time but does not disappear. As we are unable to estimate the long-run effect of 
our interventions, research to establish the durability of the effects we find would be a critical input 
into efforts towards the sustainable and effective use of nudges in the commercial sector.  
In the context of maintaining behavioural results from competition feedback, our interventions 
could be recalibrated or incentivized anew by awarding prizes, the announcement of advocates’ 
names for winning floors on the screens in the foyer of the building and even media releases 
recognizing the “winners” to keep competing floors motivated. Given the duration and focus of 
the study, we did not experiment with such measures, but it is an avenue for future research. 
Overall, our study presents additional evidence which suggests there may be a large scope for 
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Appendix A: Sample Emails 
1. Tips for Kitchen  
From: 2wise2waste@westerncape.gov.za 
To: [All staff, customized by floor] 
Time:… 
 
Subject: Reduce electricity use in the kitchen 
Dear [name] 
The kitchen is a room filled with electrical equipment. Help reduce your 
building’s / floor’s electricity use by following the following tips: 
 
- Use hot water sparingly form the tap / hydro boil 
- Boil the amount of hot water required 
- Switch-off kitchen appliances not in use 
- Close the fridge door as soon as possible after opening it, 
ensure the seal is intact, and that it closes properly. 
- Very often fridges are unnecessarily set too cold. Turn the temperature setting 
dial up a notch. 
The 2Wise2Waste Electricity Savings Project 
 
 




To: All staff, customized by floor  
Time: Monday, 9:00 AM 
Subject: How to save electricity on your floor  
Dear [name] 
Here are some easy things you can do to save electricity on your floor: 
1. [Tip 1] 
2. [Tip 2] 
3. [Tip 3] 
Good luck. Let us make saving electricity BETTER TOGETHER! 







3. Weekly Friday Afternoon Reminder  
 
From: 2wise2waste@westerncape.gov.za 
     To: [All staff, customized by floor] 
Subject: Remember to switch off all office equipment and appliances 




Please remember to switch off your desktop computer, laptop and office printer before heading 
out for the weekend. 
 
Before going home, check whether you are the last to leave the [X]th floor. If so, be sure to turn 
off (at the wall) all communal office equipment and kitchen appliances like the printer, kettle, 
toaster, microwave and water heater. And remember to switch off the lights on your way out! 
 
Thanks for helping us to meet our target of reducing electricity usage by 10% across all 
Provincial Buildings by 2015. Let us make using electricity efficiently BETTER TOGETHER! 
Have a great weekend! 
 















Appendix B: Additional Estimates 
Table B.1.Treatment Effects of Interventions on Energy Consumption. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment 1 2.788*** 2.746*** 1.535 
 (0.729) (0.729) (1.136) 
Treatment 2 2.344*** 2.384*** 2.387*** 
 (0.626) (0.626) (0.627) 
Post -0.124** -0.312*** -0.341*** 
 (0.0576) (0.0843) (0.0842) 
Treatment 1 X Post -0.116 -0.119 -0.215* 
 (0.168) (0.169) (0.123) 
Treatment 2 X Post -0.324* -0.349* -0.351** 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.179) 
headcount 0.0148*** 0.0171*** 0.0173*** 
 (0.00458) (0.00470) (0.00472) 
Constant 0.371 0.270 0.269 
 (0.458) (0.454) (0.455) 
Observations 528,928 528,928 502,030 
R2 0.166 0.169 0.155 
Wald P-Value  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Control 185,521 185,521 185,521 
Treatment1 182,840 182,840 155,942 
Treatment 2 160,567 160,567 160,567 
Number of floors 20 20 19 
Number of meters 40 40 38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at meter level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Pre-










Appendix C: Energy consumption patterns for baseline and intervention period by floors 

























Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In the context of addressing some of the complexities and challenges in the energy sector, this 
thesis leverage on empirical and experimental methods to investigate (i) households energy use 
patterns ; (ii) the role of competitiveness and risk-taking and its effects on the successfulness of 
energy businesses from the perspective of including more women in the energy sector and (iii) the 
effectiveness of behavioural nudges in promoting energy conservation in a non-residential sector. 
In this section, the results in reference to these thematic areas are outlined. 
(i) Households energy use patterns 
The first paper ‘Energy Choices and Tenancy in Rwanda’ set the tone for two subsequent papers 
of the thesis by examining the energy use patterns of Rwanda. The paper contributes to the energy 
literature by investigating the role of tenancy and dwelling types in determining household cooking 
and lighting energy choices. To achieve this objective, the most recent household national survey 
conducted by the Rwandan National Institute of Statistics is used. Additionally, a bivariate probit 
model to attenuate potential endogeneity biases is adopted. The paper further analyses the 
heterogeneity in household energy choices using income, gender of household heads and the 
geographical location of households by tenure status and dwelling type. 
Results show that renters compared to owner-occupants use charcoal and “other” fuels but less of 
fuelwood for cooking. We find no effect for compound house residents compared to private house 
residents. Results for lighting energy show that renters in comparison to homeowners use more 
electricity and “other” fuels but fewer oil lamps and torches. Household residing in compound 
houses tend to use more electricity but fewer torches and “other” lighting energy sources. In 
contrast with previous findings, our findings weakly supports the energy ladder hypothesis. 
The findings reinforce the role of higher socio-economic status on energy choices. Low -income 
group homeowners in Rwanda who are usually based in the rural areas of the country are likely to 
move from dirty lighting and cooking fuels with improvement in income levels. Programs and 




(ii) The role of competitiveness and risk-taking and its effects on the successfulness of 
energy businesses from the perspective of including more women in the energy 
sector 
In addition to understanding the energy use patterns in Rwanda, women participation in the energy 
sector through entrepreneurship is of importance in promoting welfare opportunities and economic 
freedom. However, competitiveness and risk-taking abilities are discussed in the literature as 
important characteristics of entrepreneurship (Shane, Locke & Collins, 2003) that can influence 
their participation and success rates. 
The renewable sector of Rwanda is also booming as the government of Rwanda is determined to 
promote private sector involvement, in its quest to accelerate rural electrification to off-grid 
communities in order to provide 100% energy access to its citizenry, women’s participation in the 
private energy sector of Rwanda is low, as there are no gender policies governing the private 
energy sector (Parshotam & van der Westhuizen, 2018). 
Against this background, the second and third papers of the thesis contribute to the energy literature 
by examining women’s competitiveness and risk-taking abilities to provide key insights into 
including more women as entrepreneurs in the private energy sector of Rwanda. 
Specifically, the second paper ‘Competition and Gender in the Lab vs Field: Experiments with 
Off-Grid Renewable Energy Entrepreneurs in Rural Rwanda’ examines the gender 
differences in competitiveness and how this affects the business success of entrepreneurs operating 
renewable energy enterprises. This paper relies on a lab-in-the-field experiment using the standard 
experimental design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). The sample pool for the experiments are 
entrepreneurs operating off-grid solar recharging centres in Rwanda as part of an extensive RCT 
study to understand the role of gender quota business models.  
Contrary to most previous studies, female entrepreneurs are not less likely to compete and are not 
outperformed by male entrepreneurs. This stands in contrast to several studies, mostly conducted 
on university students of developed countries. Furthermore, we leverage administrative and self-
reported business data to show that the female entrepreneurs who chose to compete in the lab 
perform as well as their male counterparts, providing some external validity to our lab results 
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The third paper ‘Risk attitudes, Gender and Business Performance Among off-grid 
Renewable Energy Entrepreneurs in Rural Rwanda’ examines risk attitudes among 
entrepreneurs and the effect of risk aversion on business performance using the same subjects as 
in paper two. The paper makes use of both subjective and experimental risk measures. A multiple 
price list experimental design was used to elicit risk attitudes. 
Findings show a strong risk aversion among entrepreneurs. Results also reveal a negative 
relationship between risk aversion and business performance. Thus, entrepreneurs with high risk-
taking abilities tend to record better sales. Contrary to experimental results, we find no significant 
relationship between risk attitudes and business performance for subjective risk measures. Women 
reveal higher risk aversion levels than men for both experimental and survey risk measures. 
Surprisingly, despite the gender differences in risk aversion, women tend to perform as well as 
men. The findings raise important insights for the inclusion of more women in the private energy 
sector of Rwanda. 
While addressing this thematic area unleashes the applicability of experimental results by adding 
to the competition and risk literature, the two papers also provide insights for the private energy 
sector.  Currently, women’s participation in the private energy sector of Rwanda is low, as some 
companies potentially see the inclusion of women as a limitation for revenue maximization 
(Parshotam & van der Westhuizen, 2018). By showing that women are equally competitive and 
are also likely to perform as well as men when given the opportunity, our study provides an impetus 
for private energy companies in Rwanda to reconsider the involvement of more women in this 
sector. It further provides support for the notion of gender quotas within this sector to even out 
disparities in access to labour markets for women, especially in recent times, where pro-gender 
national policies are gradually permeating the perceptions and sense of agency among the people 
of Rwanda. 
Also, given the many benefits associated with the inclusion of more women in the energy sector, 
policies geared towards hedging against risk aversion in entrepreneurial programs can be vital in 
reducing gender gaps in business success. 
Future studies testing differences in the impact of competitiveness and risk attitudes on business 
success for solo and team business models will also be a useful extension to these findings. 
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(iii) The effectiveness of behavioural nudges in promoting energy conservation in a 
non-residential sector 
The fourth paper addresses a key challenge in the energy sector: energy conservation.  The paper, 
‘The power of nudging: Using feedback, competition and responsibility assignment to save 
electricity in a non-residential setting’ contributes to the application of nudges literature by 
focusing on commercial buildings. This stems from the fact that a greater part of the energy 
conservation literature has been centred on the residential sector despite evidence showing large 
wastage in office buildings (Masoso & Grobler, 2009). 
The paper directly answers the question ‘Can behavioural interventions achieve energy savings in 
non-residential settings where users do not face the financial consequences of their behaviour?’  A 
randomised control trial was adopted to address this question leveraging on two behavioural 
interventions: social comparison and responsibility assignment aimed at reducing electricity 
consumption in a large provincial government office building with 24 floors. 
Floors were divided into two treatments arms. Treatment one floors received regular emails 
encouraging recipients to turn off appliances and lights before leaving the office, as well as weekly 
ranked energy consumption results by floors. Treatment two floors were additionally assigned to 
weekly “energy advocates”. 
Results show that behavioural interventions are valuable and effective tools for conserving energy 
in the workplace. Floors that participated only in the inter-floor competitions reduced energy 
consumption by 9%, while those additionally assigned floor-wise “energy advocates” reduced 
energy consumption by 14%. A follow-up interview with employees revealed that most major 
behaviour changes occurred at the close of the day as part of a conscious initiative by occupants 
to switch of appliances after work.  
Although an attempt was made to show the sustainability of results by examining the attenuation 
effect month by month during the intervention period, the study was unable to study the long-run 
effect of the interventions. Future research focused on the durability of these effects will be a 




Further, given the duration and focus of the study, the paper did not experiment with the effect of 
incentivization, but it is an avenue for future research. Overall, this paper presents additional 
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